Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company v. Creek
| Decision Date | 07 January 1892 |
| Docket Number | 15,256 |
| Parties | The Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Company v. Creek, Administrator |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Carroll Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
E. C Field and C. C. Matson, for appellant.
J. H Gould, for appellee.
Suit by the appellee, as administrator of the estate of Matilda McClintic, who was killed on a highway crossing by one of the appellant's locomotive engines.
The complaint charges, in substance, that the decedent's death was caused by the actionable negligence of the appellant, in this, that appellant had allowed a hedge together with trees, bushes and weeds, to grow along the line of its track, and adjacent to said crossing, to such height and so densely that for a long distance all view of the track was cut off from persons on the highway; that the same obstructions, together with buildings erected along and near its track, tended to deaden and cut off the sound of approaching trains; that employees of appellant, in charge of and operating said locomotive engine, and drawing a train of cars, ran the same upon and over said crossing at a speed of thirty miles an hour, without having given the signals required by statute; that the decedent, with her husband, was travelling along said highway in a buggy; that they were at the time passing over said crossing, using due care, and guilty of no negligence, and were struck by said locomotive and decedent was killed.
Verdict for the appellee. With the verdict the jury returned answers to forty-six interrogatories propounded by the appellant. The appellant moved for a judgment on the answers to interrogatories notwithstanding the general verdict. This motion was overruled, and this ruling presents the only question in the record.
The appellee contends that the motion was fatally defective, and does not raise the question argued.
The record entry of the motion is as follows:
This motion was in writing, and was signed by counsel for the appellant.
Counsel for the appellee says:
The motion is certainly lacking in formality and in certainty.
Rules of practice and procedure are necessary for the orderly conduct of litigation, and as aids in the administration of justice.
It is no hardship to require of litigants substantial conformity to reasonable rules.
It is possible, however, by an over rigid and strict enforcement of the rules of practice, to make them hindrances to the doing of justice, rather than aids. When a substantial controversy in fact exists between parties, which is so presented that the court can apply the law, and adjust their rights, it would not be in accordance with the spirit of an enlightened jurisprudence to refuse to do so, merely because of some slight informality, or a failure by one party to comply strictly with the rules of practice in matters where the informality or omission will not work injustice, or impose any hardship upon the opposite party. Thus applied, most beneficent rules might often serve as intrenchments for injustice.
In our opinion, notwithstanding the informality and lack of precision and certainty in the motion, it is sufficient as a motion by the appellee for a judgment in its favor, and it is our duty to consider the questions thus presented.
The motion for a judgment non obstante is based upon the ground:
1st. That the answers to interrogatories show that the appellee's decedent was guilty of contributory negligence.
2d. That if this is not true, they do show that the husband of the decedent, with whom she was riding at the time she was killed, was guilty of negligence, and that his negligence should be imputed to her, and precludes a recovery by her administrator.
A motion for a judgment on special findings notwithstanding the general verdict should only be sustained when the special findings and the general verdict can not be reconciled with each other under any supposable state of facts provable under the issues. Stevens v. City of Logansport, 76 Ind. 498; Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Martin, 82 Ind. 476; Higgins v. Kendall, 73 Ind. 522; Louthain v. Miller, 85 Ind. 161; Amidon v. Gaff, 24 Ind. 128; Shoner v. Pennsylvania Co., post, p. 170; Town of Poseyville v. Lewis, 126 Ind. 80, 25 N.E. 593; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Clifford, 113 Ind. 460, 15 N.E. 524.
The court will not presume anything in aid of the special findings, but will make every reasonable presumption in favor of the general verdict. Pittsburgh, etc., R. W. Co. v. Martin, supra; Shoner v. Pennsylvania Co., supra; Town of Poseyville v. Lewis, supra, and cases cited.
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Louisville, N.A. & C. RY. Co. v. Creek
... ... Judge.Action by Moses Creek, administrator, against Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant appeals ... ...