Love v. Buckner, 6174.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1932
• Docket Number: No. 6174.,6174.
• Citation: 49 S.W.2d 425
• Parties: LOVE v. BUCKNER et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 425

49 S.W.2d 425

LOVE v. BUCKNER et al.

No. 6174.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 21, 1932.

Certified Question from Court of Civil Appeals of Fifth Supreme Judicial District.

Action between Thomas B. Love and Murrell L. Buckner and others. From an adverse judgment, the former appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which certified a question to the Supreme Court.

Question answered.

Thomas B. Love, pro se, and H. Bascom Thomas, both of Dallas, and Dan Moody, of Austin, for appellant.

J. Hart Willis, Albert Sidney Johnson, C. C. Renfro, Harold H. Young, and William Andress, Jr., all of Dallas, for appellees.

M. M. Crane, of Dallas, amicus curiæ.

GREENWOOD, J.

The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals has certified to the Supreme Court for its determination the question whether the Democratic State Executive Committee had lawful authority to require otherwise lawfully qualified and eligible Democratic voters to take the pledge specified in the resolution adopted by the committee at its meeting in March, which reads:

"Be it resolved:

"That no person shall be permitted to participate in any precinct or county Democratic convention in Texas, held for the purpose of selecting delegates to the state convention of the Democratic party, at which national delegates are selected to represent Texas democracy in the national Democratic convention, unless such person be willing to take, and shall in good faith actually take, a written pledge as follows, towit: `I hereby pledge myself to support the nominees of the Democratic party for president and vice-president of the United States, by voting for the Democratic electors of the State of Texas.'

"That a copy of this resolution be furnished to each county chairman, with instructions to forward copies thereof to each precinct chairman, for the purpose of requiring said pledge of all delegates participating in the respective precinct and county conventions aforesaid."

The court answers that the Democratic State Executive Committee was authorized to require the voters to take the specified pledge.

The committee's power to require a pledge is contested on the ground that the committee possesses no authority over the conventions of its party not granted by statute, and that the statutes of Texas do not grant, but negative, the committee's power to exact such a pledge.

We do not think it consistent with the history and usages of parties in this state nor with the course of our legislation to regard the respective parties or the state executive committees as denied all power over the party membership, conventions, and primaries, save where such power may be found to have been expressly delegated by statute. On the contrary, the statutes recognize party organizations including the state committees, as the repositories of party power, which the Legislature has sought to control or regulate only so far as was deemed necessary for important governmental ends, such as purity of the ballot and integrity in the ascertainment and fulfillment of the party will as declared by its membership.

Without either statutory sanction or prohibition, the party must have the right to adopt reasonable regulations for the enforcement of such obligations to the party from its members as necessarily arise from the nature and purpose of party government. The pledge here attacked requires nothing further than that those who would participate in the precinct or county Democratic Conventions in May should express a present intention to support the party nominees for President and Vice President by voting for the party's candidates for electors. More than ten years ago, the Supreme Court declared that every participant in a party convention or primary was obligated to support the party's nominees, even though such support was not expressly pledged or promised. Speaking of the test ordered printed on primary ballots by the article of the statutes then numbered 3096, whereby the voter pledged support to party nominees, the court said:

"For many years such a test was required in party primaries while under no statutory regulation. The object of the test, when so required by party managers, was simply to determine the voter's qualifications to have a part in choosing the candidates of the party or in dictating its policies.

"It is not believed that the Legislature can in reason be said to have had a different object in the enactment of article 3096. The purpose of the Legislature was the same as the pre-existing purpose of the party managers, and that was to exclude from party action all persons save those holding a present party allegiance and having a bona fide present intention to support ...