Seay v. Latham

• Decision Date: 23 September 1944
• Docket Number: No. A-338.,A-338.
• Citation: 182 S.W.2d 251
• Parties: SEAY et al. v. LATHAM, Secretary of State, et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 251

182 S.W.2d 251

SEAY et al. v. LATHAM, Secretary of State, et al.

No. A-338.

Supreme Court of Texas.

September 23, 1944.

Original proceeding for writ of mandamus by Harry L. Seay and others against Sidney Latham, Secretary of State, and others to compel the Secretary of State to certify to the election officials the name of R. D. Sanders and fourteen others as nominees of the Democratic party as candidates for the position of presidential electors.

Order granting writ of mandamus.

Robert W. Calvert, of Hillsboro, Carl Wright Johnson, of San Antonio, James V. Allred, of Houston, A. J. Wirtz, of Austin, Woodville Rogers, of San Antonio, Everett L. Looney and Herman Jones, both of Austin, Wright Patman, of Texarkana, Tom L. Tyson, of Corsicana, George W. Eddy, of Dallas, Warren Phillips, of Corpus Christi, Dallas Scarborough, of Abilene, Bert King, of Wichita Falls, Elmer L. Lincoln, of Texarkana, L. J. Wardlaw, of Ft. Worth, John Davis, of Dallas, C. F. Richards, of Lockhart, Robert Lee Bobbitt, of San Antonio, Robert L. Holliday and Ernest Guinn, both of El Paso, Robert F. Peden, of Houston, and Walter S. Pope, of Abilene, for petitioners.

Sidney Latham, pro se, of Austin, and T. R. James, Rice M. Tilley, Sidney Samuels, Homa S. Hill, Hamilton Rogers, T. S. Christopher, A. B. Culbertson, Thompson, Walker, Smith & Shannon, Wm. Pannill, B. B. Stone, Lloyd E. Price, R. A. Stuart, and Karl Crowley, all of Fort Worth, for respondent Arch H. Rowan.

C. C. Renfro, of Dallas, Frank J. Knapp, of Houston, John Wheeler and R. J. Boyle, both of San Antonio, John H. Crooker, Andrews, Kelley, Kurth & Campbell, R. H. Kelley, Lewis Fisher, Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman & Bates, John H. Freeman, Butler & Binion and John C. Townes, all of Houston, J. Hart Willis, of Dallas, W. O. Gross, of Mineral Wells, James G. Harrell, of Breckenridge, Perkins & Floyd, of Alice, Turner & Seaberry, of Eastland, A. B. Culbertson, of Ft. Worth, John E. Quaid, of El Paso, Henry Russell, of Pecos, T. D. Kimbrough, of Midland, T. G. Tilford, of Nacogdoches, Chas. E. Coombes, of Stamford, Joseph A. Chandler, of Stephenville, Stubbeman, McRae & Sealy, of Midland, T. H. McGregor and C. C. Small, both of Austin, Wright Morrow, of Houston, Richard Brooks, of Midland, and Geo. E. Smith, of Comanche, for respondents.

W. S. Bramlette, of Dallas, amicus curiæ.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

The Honorable Harry L. Seay, as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party of Texas, and others have filed in this Court an original application for a writ of mandamus against the Honorable Sidney Latham, Secretary of State, and others, to compel the Secretary of State to certify to the election officials of the various counties of this State the names of Honorable R. D. Sanders and fourteen others, as nominees of the Democratic Party as candidates for the positions of presidential electors for the ensuing presidential election.

The record shows that the Democratic Party at its May, 1944, convention (provided for by Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, Article 3167) selected twenty-three nominees for presidential electors, and the Executive Committee of the Party duly certified their names to the Secretary of State as the nominees of said Party and as candidates for said positions. At that time the convention adopted resolutions which absolved such nominees from any obligation to support the nominees of the Democratic National Convention, under certain conditions. Thereafter the Democratic National Convention, 1944, nominated the Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt as a candidate for President of the United States and the Honorable Harry S. Truman as a candidate for Vice-President thereof. After said nominations had been made by said Democratic National Convention, fifteen of those who had been nominated by the Party at its May convention, herein referred to as the "May nominees," announced that they would not, if elected, cast their votes in the Electoral College for the nominees of the Party as made by the Democratic National Convention. Thereafter, at the September, 1944, convention of the State Democratic Party (provided for by Article 3139), a resolution was adopted withdrawing and cancelling the nomination of the fifteen nominees who had announced their intention not to support the nominees of the Party as made at the Democratic National Convention, and thereupon said convention nominated said R. D. Sanders and fourteen others, hereinafter referred to as the "September nominees," as the nominees of the Party, in lieu of the fifteen "May nominees" above referred to. At the same time the convention renominated and approved seven of those who had been nominated at the May convention, and in addition nominated a nominee to take the place of one of those who had been nominated in the May convention and who in the meantime had resigned. The names of those nominated and approved at the September convention were duly certified to the Secretary of State by the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party, and the Secretary of State was requested to certify their names as nominees of the Party, and as candidates for said positions, in lieu of those nominated at the May convention. The Secretary of State has declined to certify the fifteen September nominees who were nominated in lieu of the fifteen May nominees. It is his position that, since the names of the May nominees were first certified to him, they acquired prior rights, and until there has been a judicial determination of the dispute between the two factions it is his duty to certify the names first filed with him.

The Secretary of State has not yet certified to the election officials the list of names to be placed on the official ballot for the November, 1944, election, and the time for making such certificate has not yet expired.

It is the contention of the "May nominees," in substance, that Party nominations for the positions of presidential electors could be made by the Democratic Party only at the May convention, and since the Party nominated the "May nominees" at such convention their nominations could not be withdrawn without their consent at the September convention.

In the case of Stanford et al. v. Butler et al., Tex.Sup., 181 S.W.2d 269, 275, we held that there was no statutory provision in force in this State directing how a political party should select its nominees for presidential electors. In that same case we further said: "In the absence of a statute directing how the party should select its nominees for presidential electors, the party is free to follow any method which it may choose in keeping with party usages and customs, so long as it does not pursue a method expressly prohibited by law. Love v. Buckner, 121 Tex. 369, 49 S.W.2d 425; Brown v. Darden, 121 Tex. 495, 50 S.W.2d 261; Kilday v. Germany, 139 Tex. 380, 163 S.W.2d 184."

A political party is a voluntary association, instituted for political purposes. It is organized for the purpose of effectuating the will of those who constitute its members, and it has the inherent power of determining its own policies. Bell v. Hill, County Clerk, 123 Tex. 531, 74 S.W.2d 113, and authorities there cited; People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 333 Ill. 606, 165 N.E. 217, 62 A.L.R. 912; Davis v. Hambrick, 109 Ky. 276, 58 S.W. 779, 51 L.R.A. 671; State ex rel. Webber v. Felton, 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85, 12 Ann.Cas. 65; State v. Stewart, 64 Mont. 453, 210 P. 465; Ex parte Wilson, 7 Okl. Cr. 610, 125 P. 739; Morrow v. Wipf, 22 S.D. 146, 115 N.W. 1121. The power to determine the policies of the Party, including the power to determine who shall represent it in the selection of the President and Vice-President of the United States, when not otherwise provided by statute or by rule of the association, resides in the State convention of the Party. Nixon v. Condon et al., 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984, 88 A.L.R. 458.

In the case of Phillips v. Gallagher, 73 Minn. 528, 76 N.W. 285, 287, 42 L.R.A. 222, the rule is thus correctly stated: "The questions which such a convention deals with are essentially political, and it would be a menace to the right of the members of a political party to select their own party nominees, and to the respect which should be entertained for judicial tribunals, for the courts to review and reverse the proceedings of a political convention, in the absence of fraud or oppression on its part or of its officers. The delegates in a nominating convention meet for the purpose of selecting and agreeing upon candidates for office, to be supported by the party. The discharge of this duty involves the exercise of judgment and discretion on the part of the members of the convention, and a majority of them have, in the absence of fraud or oppression, the right to control the action of the convention, and to correct or reverse any action taken by it. Such a convention is a deliberative body, and unless it acts arbitrarily, oppressively, or fraudulently, its final determination as to candidates, or any other question of which it has jurisdiction, will be followed by the courts."

Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, Article 3167, provides that delegates to the national...