Love v. Chester's Diesel, LLC
| Decision Date | 05 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:16-CV-00179-DMB-JMV,4:16-CV-00179-DMB-JMV |
| Parties | POLLY LOVE and TIMOTHY LOVE PLAINTIFFS v. CHESTER'S DIESEL, LLC DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This motor vehicle collision action is before the Court on the motion to remand filed by Polly Love and Timothy Love. Doc. #7. Because the Court has jurisdiction over this case, the motion to remand will be denied.
On July 12, 2016, Polly Love and Timothy Love filed a complaint against Chester's Diesel, LLC ("Chester's"), in the Circuit Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi. Doc. #2. In their complaint, the Loves allege that on September 1, 2015, their vehicle was struck by a truck owned and operated by Chester's. Id. at ¶ 6. The Loves further allege that Polly "suffered significant bodily injuries in the collision" and that "[t]he injuries to Polly Love negatively affected the party's normal conjugal relationship as well as the household services that Polly Love provided to Timothy Love prior to the collision." Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. The complaint seeks damages "in the amount of $74,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus all legal costs." Id. at 4. Chester's was served with a copy of the summons and complaint on or about July 26, 2016. Doc. #1-4.
On August 25, 2016, Chester's removed the state court action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. Doc. #1. On September 27, 2016, the Loves filed a motion to remand this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. #7. Chester's responded to the motion on October 14, 2016. Doc. #9. The Loves did not file a reply in support of their motion to remand.
Int'l Energy Ventures Mgmt., L.L.C. v. United Energy Grp., Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2016). Scarlott v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). In this regard, "[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
In its notice of removal, Chester's argues that this action implicates the Court's diversity jurisdiction. Diversity jurisdiction requires that there be (1) complete diversity between the parties; and (2) an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
Complete diversity "requires that all persons on one side of the controversy be citizens of different states than all persons on the other side." Valliancourt v. PNC Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 771 F.3d 843, 847 (5th Cir. 2014). Here, the Loves are citizens of Mississippi. Doc. #2 at ¶¶ 2. Chester's is "a single-member limited liability company with its principal place of business inEudora, Arkansas, whose sole member, Chester Hensley is ... a citizen of Eudora, Arkansas." Doc. #1 at ¶ 17. Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that complete diversity exists. See Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mtn. States/Rosen, Ltd. Liab. Corp., 757 F.3d 481, 483 (5th Cir. 2014) ().
In their motion to remand, the Loves argue that, because their complaint only seeks $74,500.00 in damages, the amount in controversy requirement is not met. Doc. #7 at 1. Chester's argues that, notwithstanding the claim for damages, the amount in controversy is satisfied by the complaint alone. Doc. #10 at 5-6. Chester's further contends that even if the complaint does not satisfy the amount in controversy, the grounds stated in the notice of removal demonstrate the required amount in controversy has been met. Id. at 7-10.
"[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant's amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the court." Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 553 (2014). However, if the plaintiff contests the defendant's assertion by filing a motion to remand, "the court must decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether the relevant amount in controversy is met." Robertson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 814 F.3d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2015). "A removing defendant can meet its burden of demonstrating the amount in controversy by showing that the amount is 'facially apparent' from the plaintiffs' pleadings alone, or by submitting summary-judgment-type evidence." Id.
Where, as here, multiple plaintiffs assert claims against a single defendant, "[t]he general rule is that each plaintiff who invokes diversity of citizenship jurisdiction must allege damages that meet the dollar requirement of § 1332." Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1330(5th Cir. 1995). However, aggregation "of damages allegedly owed to separate plaintiffs ... may be permitted in the limited situation where two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as in this case, a husband and wife bring personal injury claims and a related loss of consortium claim, the propriety of aggregation "depends on the characterization of the claim by state law" as either an independent or derivative claim. Penn v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 557, 568 n.12 (D.N.J. 2000). To this end, the Mississippi Supreme Court has made clear that under Mississippi law, when a loss of consortium claim is brought alongside a "primary personal-injury claim," "there is one cause of action and more than one plaintiff." Estate of Klaus ex rel. Klaus v. Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC, 972 So.2d 555, 562 n.8 (Miss. 2007). Accordingly, it is appropriate to aggregate the Loves' claims for the purpose of determining the amount in controversy.
"[J]urisdiction will be proper if it is facially apparent from the plaintiff['s] complaint that [the] claims are likely above $75,000." Garcia v. Koch Oil Co. of Tex., Inc., 351 F.3d 636, 639 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
As explained above, the Loves' state court complaint seeks damages "in the amount of $74,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus all legal costs." Doc. #2 at 4. This damages claim is supported, in part, by the allegation that, as a result of the accident, Polly Id. at ¶ 15. The Loves allege that these damages were caused by "gross negligence whichevidences a reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. at ¶ 13(e). In its notice of removal, Chester's argues:
By their invocation of "legal costs," Plaintiff['s] are apparently seeking attorney's fees, which are not the sort of "costs" referred to in 28 U.S.C. §1332(a). Thus, Plaintiffs are seeking $74,500.00 in actual and compensatory damages plus attorney's fees. Attorneys fee requests are included in calculating whether the amount in controversy requirement is met. Attorney's fees in a case such as this, if awarded, would certainly exceed $500.00.
Doc. #1 at ¶ 19 (emphasis omitted).
Where a plaintiff pleads damages less than the jurisdictional amount, the facially apparent test is not met. See De Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1410 (5th Cir. 1995) ( ). Because attorney's fees are included in the amount in controversy but "costs" are not, the facial value of the Loves' complaint depends on the meaning of "legal costs."1 If the phrase does not include attorney's fees, then the Loves pled damages less than the jurisdictional amount and the facially apparent test is not met. If, however, the phrase can be deemed to include a request for fees, which would certainly exceed five hundred dollars in this case, the complaint satisfies the threshold.2
"[T]here seems to be no universally-accepted dictionary definition of the term 'legal costs.'" U.S. Fidelity and Guar Co. v. Braspetro Oil Servs. Co., 369 F.3d 34, 77 (2d Cir. 2004).Rather, "one of three standard dictionaries includes attorneys' fees in its definition of legal costs, while the others do not." Id. This Court, as it must, resolves this ambiguity in favor of remand and holds that the Loves' demand for legal costs does not include attorney's fees. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the requisite amount in controversy is not facially apparent from the Loves' complaint.
In support of its notice of removal, Chester's attached as exhibits two settlement demand letters. On February 3, 2016, the Loves' counsel sent the first letter to the Columbia Insurance Group outlining Polly's injuries and representing that Polly suffered approximately $21,500.00 in medical expenses as a result of her injuries. Doc. #1-2. The letter states that "[b]ased upon all of the forgoing injuries, medical bills and loss [sic] wages, we are authorized to settle this claim for $125,000.00." Id. Approximately three weeks later, on February 22, 2016, the Loves' counsel sent a second letter, rejecting "[y]our insured's offer of $14,000.00." Doc. #1-3. The second letter states:
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