Lovejoy v. Heckler
| Decision Date | 16 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1044,85-1044 |
| Citation | 790 F.2d 1114 |
| Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 16,796 Greathel M. LOVEJOY, Appellant, v. Margaret M. HECKLER, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Hazel A. Straub, Charleston, W.Va., for appellant.
Marye L. Wright, Asst. U.S. Atty. (David A. Faber, U.S. Atty., Charleston, W.Va., on brief), for appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and HOFFMAN, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Greathel Lovejoy appeals the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia upholding a denial of social security disability benefits by the appellee Secretary of Health and Human Services. We find that the Secretary's decision that appellant could perform her past relevant work is unsupported by substantial evidence. We remand the case to the district court with instructions to remand to the Secretary for further proceedings.
Greathel Lovejoy filed an application for disability benefits in December 1981 claiming that she could no longer work because of pains in her chest, shortness of breath, and pains in her joints and legs. Lovejoy had worked at a variety of unskilled jobs such as inspector in a glove manufacturing plant, coil assembler in an acoustical speaker manufacturing plant, and housekeeper in a nursing home. She alleged that these jobs were too strenuous for her to continue.
Lovejoy's application was denied by Health and Human Services, and she was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge in October 1982. At that hearing, Lovejoy testified concerning her subjective complaints of pain. Medical evidence indicated that she had a history of arrested tuberculosis and was suffering from pulmonary fibrosis and cystadenosis of the left breast (which has subsequently been surgically removed). A Dr. Willard Pushkin noted some impairment of breath sounds in her lungs and some reduced exercise tolerance but concluded that she was capable of light or sedentary work. Another medical consultant indicated that she could not work in an environment containing dust, fumes, toxic conditions or poor ventilation. The medical evidence further indicated that Lovejoy's heartbeat was somewhat slower than normal.
The ALJ concluded that Lovejoy was disabled. He found that her impairment was severe under the Social Security regulations because it limited her ability to perform basic work activities. He further found that her past relevant work involved light to medium exertional requirements and that she could no longer perform such work. Applying the "grids" to determine her residual functional capacity, he found that she would be restricted to sedentary work activity and that given her marginal education and lack of transferable skills, jobs which she could perform did not exist in significant numbers in the national economy. He awarded her disability benefits retroactive to November 1981.
The Appeals Council reviewed the ALJ's decision on its own motion pursuant to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.969. The Appeals Council found that the clinical findings did not support Lovejoy's allegations of severe disabling pain and concluded that her impairment did not meet the severity requirement of the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, App. 1, Subpart P. The Appeals Council then found that her past relevant work as a coil assembler was a sedentary job which did not require lifting or carrying objects weighing more than ten pounds. Based on those findings, the Appeals Council reversed the decision of the ALJ and held that Lovejoy was not disabled as she could perform her past relevant work. That decision became the decision of the Secretary.
Lovejoy then filed the present action for review of the Secretary's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g). The case was referred to a magistrate who recommended granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, thereby reversing the decision of the Secretary. He held that the Appeals Council erred by reversing the ALJ; in his view, the decision of the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence and by reviewing the entire record to reach a contrary conclusion, the Appeals Council had engaged in a de novo review contrary to 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.970(a)(3) which, the magistrate thought, imposed a judicially enforceable substantial evidence standard of review on the Appeals Council.
The district court declined to follow the magistrate's recommendation. It held that the decision of the ALJ was not binding on the Appeals Council and that the Secretary's final decision was to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Upon reviewing the record, the district court found the decision to be so supported and granted summary judgment affirming the Secretary's decision. This appeal followed.
We first address the appellant's contention that the Appeals Council erred by engaging in a de novo review of the ALJ's decision in violation of its own regulations. We disagree, and hold that the district court applied the correct standard of review. As we held in Parris v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.1984), and more recently in Kellough v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.1986), the courts in judicial review must uphold the Appeals Council decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. The substantiality of evidence supporting the ALJ's decision is a factor to consider in assessing the evidence in support of the Appeals Council's decision, but the ALJ's findings, though supported by substantial evidence, are not binding on the Appeals Council. That the Appeals Council found the ALJ's decision unsupported by substantial evidence does not necessarily suggest that the Appeals Council applied an improper standard of review, and as in Parris, we find nothing in this record to suggest that the Appeals Council exceeded its authority. Therefore, our review of the Secretary's decision is confined to ascertaining if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C....
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...The Fourth Circuit has found that a claimant "may not be penalized for failing to seek treatment she cannot afford." Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986). As a result, an ALJ should not discount a claimant's subjective complaints on the basis of her failure to seek medica......
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Smith v. Sullivan, Civ. A. No. 88-677-N.
...of the Department of Health and Human Services who subsequently renders the Department's "final" decision.5 See Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir.1986) (noting that an Appeals Council decision reversing a prior determination by an Administrative Law Judge became the Secretary......
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...and unable to afford the level of medical treatment which would have been consistent with the pain she alleged. See Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir.1986) (in evaluating allegations of disabling pain, "a claimant may not be penalized for failing to seek treatment she cannot ......
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...and can find no way to obtain it, the condition that is disabling in fact continues to be disabling in law."); Lovejoy v. Heckler , 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986) (failure to follow prescribed treatment does not preclude a finding of disability "when that failure is justified by lack o......
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Assessment of disability issues
...the claimant. Id. , citing Marbury v. Sullivan , 957 F.2d 837, 839 (11 th Cir. 1992); Miller , 953 F.2d at 422; Lovejoy v. Heckler , 790 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4 th Cir. 1986); Lovelace , 813 F.2d at 60. “Likewise, we have repeatedly endorsed the role of observation in determining credibility and......
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...the claimant’s complaints of severe disabling pain were not credible did not withstand substantial evidence review. Lovejoy v. Heckler , 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit held that the case should be remanded with instructions that the claimant be given the opportunity......
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Issue topics
...the claimant’s complaints of severe disabling pain were not credible did not withstand substantial evidence review. Lovejoy v. Heckler , 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit held that the case should be remanded with instructions that the claimant be given the opportunity......
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Issue topics
...the claimant’s complaints of severe disabling pain were not credible did not withstand substantial evidence review. Lovejoy v. Heckler , 790 F.2d 1114, 1117 (4th Cir. 1986). The Fourth Circuit held that the case should be remanded with instructions that the claimant be given the opportunity......