Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. State
Decision Date | 10 September 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 3388.,3388. |
Parties | LOWCOUNTRY OPEN LAND TRUST, Respondent, v. STATE of South Carolina and James A. Atkins, of Whom James A. Atkins is, Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Newman Jackson Smith, of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Charleston; and Kenneth P. Woodington, of Columbia, for appellant.
W. Foster Gaillard and Elizabeth Henry Warner, both of Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, of Charleston, for respondent.
In this quiet title action, James A. Atkins appeals the master-in-equity's ruling that Lowcountry Open Land Trust, as fee simple owner of tidelands adjoining the Ashley River, can bar Atkins from "wharfing out" over its land to obtain access to the river. We affirm.
By deed dated June 7, 1991, the Legare family donated 448.40 acres of marshland on the west bank of the Ashley River to Lowcountry Open Land Trust (LOLT).1 Two months later James Atkins purchased an adjacent upland lot. Thereafter, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) provisionally approved a permit authorizing Atkins to build a sixty-foot dock across LOLT's property to the Ashley River.
On June 3, 1996, LOLT filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of South Carolina pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-220 (1987),2 seeking a declaration of fee simple title to the 448.40-acre tidelands tract. The court permitted Atkins to intervene, and referred the case to the Master-in-Equity for Charleston County on January 20, 1998.3
The master held a trial on May 10, 1999 on partly-stipulated facts, including the following:
On September 28, 1999, the master issued an order confirming fee simple title in LOLT and finding Atkins could not build the dock without LOLT's permission. Both the State and Atkins filed motions to alter or amend the judgment; the master denied Atkins' motion, but granted the State's in part on an issue not relevant here. This appeal followed.
A suit for declaratory judgment may be legal or equitable, and is characterized as such by the nature of the underlying issue outlined in the complaint. See Felts v. Richland County, 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991); Clark v. Hargrave, 323 S.C. 84, 473 S.E.2d 474 (Ct.App.1996). Although an action to quiet title generally lies in equity, the main purpose of the complaint in this instance concerns the determination of title to real property.
A determination of title is legal in nature. Wigfall v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59, 367 S.E.2d 156 (1988); Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 331 S.C. 398, 503 S.E.2d 191 (Ct.App.1998). Because this is a law case tried by the master alone with direct appeal to the supreme court, our review is limited to correcting errors of law. Accordingly, we will affirm the master's factual findings if there is any evidence in the record which reasonably supports them. Eldridge, 331 S.C. at 416,503 S.E.2d at 200; Clark, 323 S.C. at 87,473 S.E.2d at 476.
Atkins first argues the master erred in concluding the State granted the tidelands at issue to LOLT. We find no error.
The State of South Carolina holds presumptive title to all tidelands within its borders, which are held in trust for the benefit of the public. See Coburg Dairy, Inc. v. Lesser, 318 S.C. 510, 458 S.E.2d 547 (1995); Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern, 272 S.C. 392, 252 S.E.2d 133 (1979). The State may, however, grant private individuals an ownership interest in tidelands. See Hobonny, 272 S.C. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 136 (); State v. Holston Land Co., 272 S.C. 65, 68, 248 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1978) ().
Traditionally, South Carolina has granted private rights to tidelands through acts of the Legislature. See State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 84 (1884) (). Because tidelands are held in public trust, a grant of private ownership must contain "specific language, either in the deed or on the plat, showing that [the grant] was intended to go below high water mark...." Hobonny, 272 S.C. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 135 (quoting State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 543, 193 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1972)); see State v. Yelsen Land Co., 265 S.C. 78, 82, 216 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1975) (). Atkins claims the 1836 grant from the State of South Carolina to Edward C. Peronneau is ambiguous, and therefore lacks the specificity required to demonstrate an intentional transfer of title. We disagree.
A grant from the State purporting to vest title to tidelands in a private party is construed strictly in favor of the government and against the grantee. See Pacific Guano, 22 S.C. at 86 (); see also State v. Fain, 273 S.C. 748, 259 S.E.2d 606 (1979). Consequently, the party asserting a transfer of title bears the burden of proving its own good title. See Pacific Guano, 22 S.C. at 74 (); Fain, 273 S.C. at 752, 259 S.E.2d at 608 ().
To establish fee simple ownership of the marshland tract, therefore, LOLT must show (1) its predecessors in title possessed a valid grant, and (2) the grant's language was sufficient to convey the land below the high water mark to Peronneau. Holston, 272 S.C. at 66, 248 S.E.2d at 923. Since the parties stipulated to LOLT's unbroken chain of title flowing from the State's grant, the only question remaining is whether the grant itself adequately conveyed the tideland acreage. See id. at 67, 248 S.E.2d at 923 ( ). We believe the evidence overwhelmingly supports the master's finding that it did.4 The grant to Peronneau describes the property transferred as:
Eleven Hundred and Two Acres Surveyed for him this 14th day of January 1836, Situate in Charleston District, on the West side of Ashley River, Branch Waters of Charleston Harbour—
In addition, the certification of James Kingman, who surveyed the property and prepared the plat on February 10, 1836, states:
I do hereby Certify for Edward C. Peronneau a Tract of Marsh Land containing One Thousand One Hundred and Two Acres, Surveyed for him the 14th day of January 1836 Situate in Charleston District on the West Side of Ashley River, Branch Waters of Charleston Harbour, Bounded South Easterly by Lucas and Said Edward C. Peronneau and on all other Sides by Ashley River—And hath such form and Marks as the above Plat Represents—
Finally, the plat, incorporated into the grant, clearly depicts an area delineated as "1102 acres," bounded on one side by the land of Lucas and Edward C. Peronneau and on all other sides by the Ashley River, with "Marsh" appearing twice on its face.5 These facts convince us the...
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