Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. State

Decision Date10 September 2001
Docket NumberNo. 3388.,3388.
PartiesLOWCOUNTRY OPEN LAND TRUST, Respondent, v. STATE of South Carolina and James A. Atkins, of Whom James A. Atkins is, Appellant.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

Newman Jackson Smith, of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, of Charleston; and Kenneth P. Woodington, of Columbia, for appellant.

W. Foster Gaillard and Elizabeth Henry Warner, both of Buist, Moore, Smythe & McGee, of Charleston, for respondent.

SHULER, J.:

In this quiet title action, James A. Atkins appeals the master-in-equity's ruling that Lowcountry Open Land Trust, as fee simple owner of tidelands adjoining the Ashley River, can bar Atkins from "wharfing out" over its land to obtain access to the river. We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By deed dated June 7, 1991, the Legare family donated 448.40 acres of marshland on the west bank of the Ashley River to Lowcountry Open Land Trust (LOLT).1 Two months later James Atkins purchased an adjacent upland lot. Thereafter, the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) provisionally approved a permit authorizing Atkins to build a sixty-foot dock across LOLT's property to the Ashley River.

On June 3, 1996, LOLT filed a declaratory judgment action against the State of South Carolina pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-220 (1987),2 seeking a declaration of fee simple title to the 448.40-acre tidelands tract. The court permitted Atkins to intervene, and referred the case to the Master-in-Equity for Charleston County on January 20, 1998.3

The master held a trial on May 10, 1999 on partly-stipulated facts, including the following:

LOLT is record owner of a 448.40 acre tract of marshland ("the 448 acre tract") located on the Ashley River in Charleston County.... By stipulating that LOLT is the record owner of the 448 acre tract, the State of South Carolina does not concede that LOLT owns the tidelands. Purported title to the tract derives from that certain Grant of the State of South Carolina dated March 7th, 1836, pursuant to an Act of the Legislature entitled "An Act for Establishing the Mode of Granting the Lands Now Vacant in This State, and for Allowing a Commutation to be Received for Some Lands That Have Been Granted" passed the 19th day of February, 1791, said Grant being executed by George McDuffie, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over the State of South Carolina, to Edward C. Peronneau, filed in the South Carolina Department of Archives and History in State Grants Volume 0-6, Page 125 (Control No. 98), together with plat showing and depicting eleven hundred two (1,102) acres surveyed on January 14, 1836, said plat being annexed to the foregoing Grant and being filed in State Plat Volume 41(1), Pages 99-100, South Carolina Department of Archives and History.
Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of that certain grant of the State of South Carolina dated March 7, 1836....
Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the plat annexed to and made a part of Exhibit B, said plat showing and depicting 1102 acres of marsh situate on the west side of the Ashley River, said plat being certified by James Kingman, Deputy Surveyor General, on February 10, 1836.
The 448 acre tract is a portion of the marshlands shown on the plat attached hereto as Exhibit C.
Such private title, if any, which exists in the intertidal marshes located on the 448 acre tract extends in an unbroken chain from the grant of the State of South Carolina....

On September 28, 1999, the master issued an order confirming fee simple title in LOLT and finding Atkins could not build the dock without LOLT's permission. Both the State and Atkins filed motions to alter or amend the judgment; the master denied Atkins' motion, but granted the State's in part on an issue not relevant here. This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS
Standard of Review

A suit for declaratory judgment may be legal or equitable, and is characterized as such by the nature of the underlying issue outlined in the complaint. See Felts v. Richland County, 303 S.C. 354, 400 S.E.2d 781 (1991); Clark v. Hargrave, 323 S.C. 84, 473 S.E.2d 474 (Ct.App.1996). Although an action to quiet title generally lies in equity, the main purpose of the complaint in this instance concerns the determination of title to real property.

A determination of title is legal in nature. Wigfall v. Fobbs, 295 S.C. 59, 367 S.E.2d 156 (1988); Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 331 S.C. 398, 503 S.E.2d 191 (Ct.App.1998). Because this is a law case tried by the master alone with direct appeal to the supreme court, our review is limited to correcting errors of law. Accordingly, we will affirm the master's factual findings if there is any evidence in the record which reasonably supports them. Eldridge, 331 S.C. at 416,503 S.E.2d at 200; Clark, 323 S.C. at 87,473 S.E.2d at 476.

I. Tidelands Ownership

Atkins first argues the master erred in concluding the State granted the tidelands at issue to LOLT. We find no error.

The State of South Carolina holds presumptive title to all tidelands within its borders, which are held in trust for the benefit of the public. See Coburg Dairy, Inc. v. Lesser, 318 S.C. 510, 458 S.E.2d 547 (1995); Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern, 272 S.C. 392, 252 S.E.2d 133 (1979). The State may, however, grant private individuals an ownership interest in tidelands. See Hobonny, 272 S.C. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 136 ("Despite the special status accorded tidelands, the government, and specifically the King of England, had the power to grant, and did in fact grant, tidelands to subjects, who exercised private ownership."); State v. Holston Land Co., 272 S.C. 65, 68, 248 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1978) ("The law in South Carolina is well settled that a grant conveying `marshland' can give rise to private ownership of property to the mean low water mark.").

Traditionally, South Carolina has granted private rights to tidelands through acts of the Legislature. See State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 84 (1884) ("[I]n order to give effect to an alienation which the [S]tate might undertake to make[,] it would be necessary to have a special act of the [L]egislature expressing in terms and formally such intention."). Because tidelands are held in public trust, a grant of private ownership must contain "specific language, either in the deed or on the plat, showing that [the grant] was intended to go below high water mark...." Hobonny, 272 S.C. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 135 (quoting State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 543, 193 S.E.2d 497, 500 (1972)); see State v. Yelsen Land Co., 265 S.C. 78, 82, 216 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1975) ("Under well settled rules of construction ... boundaries [subject to the ebb and flow of the tide] will convey land only to the high water mark in the absence of specific language, either in the grant or upon a plat, showing that it was intended to convey land below the high water mark."). Atkins claims the 1836 grant from the State of South Carolina to Edward C. Peronneau is ambiguous, and therefore lacks the specificity required to demonstrate an intentional transfer of title. We disagree.

A grant from the State purporting to vest title to tidelands in a private party is construed strictly in favor of the government and against the grantee. See Pacific Guano, 22 S.C. at 86 ("In all grants from the government to the subject, the terms of the grant are to be taken most strongly against the grantee, and in favor of the grantor...."); see also State v. Fain, 273 S.C. 748, 259 S.E.2d 606 (1979). Consequently, the party asserting a transfer of title bears the burden of proving its own good title. See Pacific Guano, 22 S.C. at 74 ("[Claimants must show] that they or those from whom they hold acquired title ... either from the British crown before the revolution, or from the state since that time[.]"); Fain, 273 S.C. at 752, 259 S.E.2d at 608 ("[T]he State comes into court with a presumption of title, and, if an individual is to prevail, he must recover upon the strength of his own title, of which he must make proof.").

To establish fee simple ownership of the marshland tract, therefore, LOLT must show (1) its predecessors in title possessed a valid grant, and (2) the grant's language was sufficient to convey the land below the high water mark to Peronneau. Holston, 272 S.C. at 66, 248 S.E.2d at 923. Since the parties stipulated to LOLT's unbroken chain of title flowing from the State's grant, the only question remaining is whether the grant itself adequately conveyed the tideland acreage. See id. at 67, 248 S.E.2d at 923 (stating that where the State conceded property granted by the sovereign was traceable in a complete chain, the only issue to determine was whether the grant "evidenced an intent to convey property below the high water mark"). We believe the evidence overwhelmingly supports the master's finding that it did.4 The grant to Peronneau describes the property transferred as:

Eleven Hundred and Two Acres Surveyed for him this 14th day of January 1836, Situate in Charleston District, on the West side of Ashley River, Branch Waters of Charleston Harbour—

In addition, the certification of James Kingman, who surveyed the property and prepared the plat on February 10, 1836, states:

I do hereby Certify for Edward C. Peronneau a Tract of Marsh Land containing One Thousand One Hundred and Two Acres, Surveyed for him the 14th day of January 1836 Situate in Charleston District on the West Side of Ashley River, Branch Waters of Charleston Harbour, Bounded South Easterly by Lucas and Said Edward C. Peronneau and on all other Sides by Ashley River—And hath such form and Marks as the above Plat Represents—

Finally, the plat, incorporated into the grant, clearly depicts an area delineated as "1102 acres," bounded on one side by the land of Lucas and Edward C. Peronneau and on all other sides by the Ashley River, with "Marsh" appearing twice on its face.5 These facts convince us the...

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