State v. Yelsen Land Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 July 1975
• Docket Number: No. 20060,20060
• Citation: 216 S.E.2d 876,265 S.C. 78
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE of South Carolina, Respondent, v. YELSEN LAND COMPANY, INC., and Dajon Realty Company, Appellants.

Page 876

216 S.E.2d 876

265 S.C. 78

The STATE of South Carolina, Respondent, v. YELSEN LAND COMPANY, INC., and Dajon Realty Company, Appellants.

No. 20060.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 14, 1975.

Arthur G. Howe and Paul N. Uricchio, Jr., of Uricchio, Howe & Krell, Charleston, and Edwin P. Gardner of Sloan & Gardner, Columbia, for appellants.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Edward B. Latimer, Columbia, and Edward D. Buckley of Bailey & Buckley, Charleston, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice:

This action was brought by the State of South Carolina against Yelsen Land Company, Inc., and Dajon Realty Company, Inc., to settle a dispute between the State and the defendant Corporations concerning title to certain tidelands adjacent to the highlands on Morris Island located near Charleston, South Carolina. It is conceded that Yelsen and Dajon own the highlands comprising Morris Island, Yelsen claiming the southern portion and Dajon the northern part. The line of demarcation between the respective areas claimed by each corporation cannot be ascertained, but both corporations are owned by the same party. This controversy involves only the respective claims of the parties to the adjacent tidelands.

After a prior appeal involving the mode of trial, State v. Yelsen Land Company, et al., 257 S.C. 401, 185 S.E.2d 897, the case was tried before the court and a jury, resulting in a verdict in faovr of the State. Yelsen and Dajon have appealed, asserting by their exceptions, error in the trial court's refusal of their timely motion for a directed verdict and, alternatively, seek a new trial upon the basis of alleged trial errors in the admission of testimony and in the instructions to the jury.

The State is presumptively the owner of the tidelands and contends, in this case, that it has never parted with title to the area in question. Yelsen and Dajon contend that they are the owners of the tidelands in controversy by virtue of grants from the State--Yelsen under a grant in 1790 to its predecessor in title, the United States of America, and Dajon under a grant in 1818 to its claimed predecessor in title, John M. Maillard. Since the claims of Yelsen and Dajon are based upon separate chains of title, they will be discussed separately.

Since the State is presumptively the owner of the tidelands, the burden rested upon Yelsen and Dajon to prove that the State had granted title to such lands to their predecessors in title. State v. Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484; State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497.

According to the agreed Statement in the Transcript of Record, Yelsen is claiming under a grant by the State of South Carolina to the United States of America, on January 20, 1790, as contained in Act No. 1486 of 1790, Vol. 5, pages 147, 148 of the Statutes of South Carolina from 1786 to 1814. The area included in the grant is described as 'Middle Bay Island,' 'Bounded to the North by a small inlet passing between the said island and Morris's Island, to the South by an inlet called the Folly Inlet, to the East by the Atlantic Ocean, and to the West by a sound or Creek passing between the said Middle Bay Island and the other island aforesaid.'

In State v. Griffith, (filed herewith) S.C., 216 S.E.2d 765, we held that similar descriptive language was insufficient to convey title to the tidelands there in dispute. The record here shows conclusively that the 'inlet' and 'sound or creek' referred to as boundaries in the grant, under which Yelsen claims, were arms of the Atlantic Ocean and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. Under well settled rules of construction naming such boundaries will convey land only to the high water mark in the absence of specific language, either in the grant or upon a plat, showing that it was intended to convey land below the high water mark. State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 193 S.E.2d 497, Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Canning Co., 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434.

Under the principles set forth in State v. Griffith, supra, the language of the grant, under which Yelsen claims, being insufficient to convey the land below the high water mark and there being no other fact tending to prove an intent to grant title beyond the high water mark, Yelsen has completely failed to establish its claim to the tidelands in question.

Appellant Dajon has likewise failed to prove its claim. It traced its title to a conveyance from J. A. Leland, Master in Equity, to G. W. McCormick,...