Lowe v. Apfel, 99-4337

• Citation: 226 F.3d 969
• Decision Date: 16 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-4337,99-4337
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) CHERYL LOWE, APPELLANT, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, APPELLEE. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 969

226 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2000)

CHERYL LOWE, APPELLANT, v. KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, APPELLEE.

No. 99-4337

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: June 16, 2000

Filed: September 25, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Bowman and Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judges, and O'brien, District Judge.¹

Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judge.

Cheryl Lowe applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income based primarily on back, hand, and arm injuries. The Social Security Administration denied her application initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Ms. Lowe was not disabled because she was able to perform her past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), § 416.920(e). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Lowe's request for review. Ms. Lowe then appealed to the district court, which upheld the administrative decision.

Ms. Lowe now appeals to our court, contending that the ALJ failed to support his finding that her subjective complaints were not fully credible. She also argues that the ALJ's conclusion that she can perform her past work was not based on substantial evidence and that, in fact, the ALJ's findings compel the conclusion that she cannot work and is therefore disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1), § 416.920(f)(1).

We review de novo the district court's decision upholding the denial of social security benefits. See Pettit v. Apfel, 218 F.3d 901, 902 (8th Cir. 2000). When considering whether the ALJ properly denied social security benefits, we determine whether the decision is based on legal error, and whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Clark v. Chater, 75 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir.1996). Because it may affect the factual basis for the disability determination, we first address Ms. Lowe's contention that the ALJ failed to support his finding that her subjective complaints were not fully credible.

I.

The ALJ was required to make an express credibility determination explaining why he did not fully credit Ms. Lowe's complaints. See Ghant v. Bowen, 930 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 1991). To assess Ms. Lowe's credibility, the ALJ had to consider all of the evidence, including prior work records and observations by third parties and doctors regarding daily activities, the duration, frequency, and intensity of pain, precipitating and aggravating factors, the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication, and functional restrictions. See Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984). The ALJ may not discount a claimant's complaints solely because they are not fully supported by the objective medical evidence, but the complaints may be discounted based on inconsistencies in the record as a whole. See id.

Where adequately explained and supported, credibility findings are for the ALJ to make. See Tang v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 1084, 1087 (8th Cir. 2000). Here the ALJ referred to the Polaski considerations and cited inconsistencies in the record to support his finding that Ms. Lowe's complaints (particularly her complaints of back pain) were not "fully credible." The ALJ was not required to discuss methodically each Polaski consideration, so long as he acknowledged and examined those considerations before discounting Ms. Lowe's subjective complaints. See Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996). We have carefully reviewed the record, and we believe that the ALJ's finding that Ms. Lowe's subjective complaints were not fully credible was adequately explained and was supported by the record as a whole.

II.

Ms. Lowe also argues that the ALJ's conclusion that she was capable of performing her past relevant work as a home attendant and laundromat manager was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ's finding that she "must not perform repetitive activity with her hands" precluded her from doing any work. Although we disagree with Ms. Lowe's contention that the ALJ's findings necessarily require an award of benefits, we conclude that his findings provide an inadequate basis for our review and that we must remand the case for further proceedings.

When evaluating whether Ms. Lowe could return to her past work, the ALJ was required to set forth specifically her limitations and to determine how those limitations affected her residual functional capacity. See Ingram v. Chater, 107 F.3d 598, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) "Residual functional capacity" is what the claimant is able to do despite limitations caused by all of the claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). The ALJ also was required to make "explicit findings" regarding the physical and mental demands of Ms. Lowe's past work, and to compare those demands with her residual functional capacity to determine whether she could perform the relevant duties. See Ingram, 107 F.3d at 604. We believe that the ALJ failed to make the necessary comparison of Ms. Lowe's residual functional capacity to use her hands with the demands of her past work. See id.

A.

The ALJ found that Ms. Lowe had severe carpal tunnel syndrome, "a complex of symptoms resulting from compression of the median nerve in the [interior passageway of the wrist], with pain and burning or tingling ... in the fingers and hand, sometimes extending to the elbow," Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1626 (28th ed. 1994); see also id. at 271, 1765. With regard to the residual functional capacity of Ms. Lowe's hands, the ALJ found that her "impaired hand function" limited her to lifting ten pounds frequently with occasional lifting of up to twenty pounds and that she "must not perform repetitive activity with her hands." The ALJ then stated that Mark Schulzinger, a qualified vocational expert, reported that Ms. Lowe's "past job of laundry manager is commonly performed at the sedentary exertional level, and that she performed the job of home attendant at the light exertional level at times." Without further discussion, the ALJ concluded "that neither of these jobs exceeded [Ms. Lowe's] residual capacity."

Where the claimant has the residual functional capacity to do either the specific work previously done or the same type of work as it is generally performed in the national economy, the claimant is found not to be disabled. See Jones v. Chater, 86 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), § 416.920(e). We believe that the ALJ's decision indicates that he found that Ms. Lowe could perform the job of laundromat manager at the sedentary level as it is generally performed and that she could perform the job of home attendant at the light level as she had previously performed it "at times."

Mr. Schulzinger, upon whom the ALJ relied, relied in turn on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th rev. ed. 1991) (DOT) to find that the laundromat manager position is classified as sedentary. See DOT § 369.167-010; cf. Jones, 86 F.3d at 826 (ALJ may take judicial notice of job information in DOT). As described in the DOT, the position of laundromat manager "frequently" (one-third to two-thirds of...