Lowe v. State
| Decision Date | 15 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. S96A1218,S96A1218 |
| Citation | 476 S.E.2d 583,267 Ga. 180 |
| Parties | LOWE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
J. Russell Jackson, Cumming, for Judy Dovinna Lowe.
Garry Thomas Moss, Dist. Atty., Canton, C. David Gafnea, Asst. Dist. Atty., Woodstock, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Allison Beth Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
This appeal is from Judy Dovinna Lowe's conviction for felony murder with arson as the underlying felony. 1 The victim died of smoke inhalation in a fire which destroyed the small house in which she lived at the back of the property on which Lowe lived. Lowe testified at trial that she went to the small house just before the fire, seeking the victim, but failed to get an answer to her knocks on the door, and returned to her own home. While there, she heard what sounded like a shot and went outside to find the small house burning. She said she looked in through a window and found the victim sitting in her bedroom, but could not get the victim's attention before being forced to retreat due to the heat. Other witnesses testified that the fire was started with an accelerant in a different part of the house than that in which the victim was found dead of smoke inhalation. There were no utilities in the house. One witness testified that when she and Lowe heard a television report of the fire, Lowe exclaimed that she would be put in jail. On another occasion, she told a witness that she could make anyone believe anything because she was such a good actress. She told another witness that she could escape punishment in this case because she had multiple personalities. In an interview with police officers, she said that she did not start the fire, but that perhaps "Chipper" had done so. "Chipper" was a nickname by which Lowe was known. She also told the police that she hated the house that burned and was upset that there was always family around, and that if she had wanted to get rid of the "little house," she would have burned it. Those portions of Lowe's statement in which she claimed to have tried to find the victim were inconsistent with the testimony of other witnesses, including firemen, regarding conditions around the fire.
1. Though largely circumstantial, the evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Lowe guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); McCoy v. State, 262 Ga. 699(1), 425 S.E.2d 646 (1993). That being so, there was no error in denying Lowe's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Blackwell v. State, 264 Ga. 517, 448 S.E.2d 359 (1994).
2. Lowe enumerates as error the trial court's refusal to give her requested charge on bare suspicion, contending that the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial raised only suspicion. Since the trial court gave complete instructions on reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and presence at scene of a crime, there was no error in refusing to give the requested charge. Morrison v. State, 220 Ga.App. 151(3b), 469 S.E.2d 686 (1996).
3. In charging on circumstantial evidence, the trial court told the jury, "You are not authorized to return a verdict of guilty based upon circumstantial evidence alone unless the evidence points so convincingly toward the conclusion of guilty that any other conclusion is unreasonable." We disagree with Lowe's contention that the charge was error. It is the functional equivalent of the rule stated in OCGA § 24-4-6. The trial court need not track the exact language of that Code section in order to satisfy the requirement that the jury be instructed on the principle of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to warrant a conviction. Price v. State, 180 Ga.App. 215(2), 348 S.E.2d 740 (1986).
4. Finally, Lowe argues that the admissions she made were not sufficiently corroborated to permit her conviction, and that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury, without request, on the principle stated in OCGA § 24-3-53, that a confession...
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Moses v. State, No. A03A2118
...requested. Massey v. State, 270 Ga. 76, 78(4), 508 S.E.2d 149 (1998). An almost identical charge was upheld in Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 181(3), 476 S.E.2d 583 (1996). Our Supreme Court held in Lowe that the charge given was "the functional equivalent of the rule stated in OCGA § 24-4-6. ......
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Morris v. State
...that the jury be instructed on the principle of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to warrant a conviction. Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 181(3), 476 S.E.2d 583, applying Price v. State, 180 Ga.App. 215(2), 348 S.E.2d 740. Defendant certainly has not shown how any circumstantial evide......
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Young v. State
...rather, an admission, as it was not so comprehensive as to include every essential element of the offense.").18 Lowe v. State , 267 Ga. 180, 181-82 (4), 476 S.E.2d 583 (1996) ; accord Herrington , 243 Ga. App. at 266 (3), 533 S.E.2d 133.19 Lowe , 267 Ga. at 182 (4), 476 S.E.2d 583 ; accord ......
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Wynn v. State
...departure from the words of OCGA § 24-4-6 appears to be inconsistent with the holding of our Supreme Court in Lowe v. State, 267 Ga. 180, 181(3), 476 S.E.2d 583, where a charge containing the same addition of "alone" is held to be the functional equivalent of the rule stated in OCGA § 24-4-......
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