Lowery v. Klemm

• Decision Date: 21 April 2006
• Citation: 446 Mass. 572,845 N.E.2d 1124
• Parties: Lorraine LOWERY v. Francis KLEMM.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1124

845 N.E.2d 1124

446 Mass. 572

Lorraine LOWERY v. Francis KLEMM.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

Argued February 8, 2006.

Decided April 21, 2006.

Lee M. Berger, Buzzards Bay, for the defendant.

Kevin M. Orme for the plaintiff.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

SPINA, J.

This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation: whether G.L. c. 214, § 1C, which states that "[a] person shall have the right to be free from sexual harassment, as defined in" G.L. c. 151B and c. 151C, applies to volunteers. The plaintiff, a volunteer, brought an action alleging sexual harassment by a former coworker. A judge in the Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendant because the alleged conduct did not occur in an employment or academic context. The Appeals Court determined that G.L. c. 214, § 1C, creates a cause of action for volunteers and reversed the order. Lowery v. Klemm, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 307, 825 N.E.2d 1065 (2005). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review, and we hold that G.L. c. 214, § 1C, does not apply to volunteers, although volunteers retain their common-law rights regarding sexual harassment. We therefore affirm the order of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

1. Background. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). The plaintiff volunteered her time at a "swap shop," operated by the town of Falmouth (town) at its waste management facility. The defendant worked as the gatekeeper and land supervisor at the same facility. He frequently visited the shop and made sexual advances toward the plaintiff for three years, despite her repeated requests that he leave her alone. The town ultimately terminated the plaintiff's volunteer services and issued a no-trespass order, barring her from the facility.

The plaintiff filed a one-count complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that the defendant had harassed her sexually in violation of G.L. c. 214, § 1C.¹ The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief could be based because she was not an employee. The judge granted summary judgment for the defendant, reasoning that G.L. c. 214, § 1C, incorporates definitions of "sexual harassment" from G.L. c. 151B and c. 151C, which require that the conduct occur in an employment or academic environment.²

The Appeals Court, however, concluded that G.L. c. 214, § 1C, applies to volunteers and reversed the order. Lowery v. Klemm, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 307, 308, 825 N.E.2d 1065 (2005). The court discerned "a legislative intent comprehensively and broadly to reach sexual harassment wherever occurring, including in nontraditional employment structures." Id. at 312, 825 N.E.2d 1065. The court further noted that the statute's broad language, which grants "[a]ll `persons'" the right to be free from sexual harassment, and its codification in G.L. c. 214, which confers equity jurisdiction, suggest a statutory reach broad enough to encompass volunteers. Id. at 313-314, 825 N.E.2d 1065. Finally, as a matter of public policy, the Appeals Court observed that an interpretation of G.L. c. 214, § 1C, that did not protect volunteers would create unfair and absurd results: volunteer workers could be subject to the same sexual harassment as paid employees, but would lack the statutory remedies afforded them. Id. at 314-315, 825 N.E.2d 1065.

2. Discussion. In 1986, the Legislature passed "An Act prohibiting sexual harassment," St.1986, c. 588, which added a definition of sexual harassment to G.L. c. 151B, § 1(18), and declared it an "unlawful practice" for an employer or its agents "to sexually harass any employee," G.L. c. 151B, § 4(16A). See Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 553, 664 N.E.2d 808 (1996) (discussing enactment of St.1986, c. 588). It also amended G.L. c. 151C to include a definition of sexual harassment, see G.L. c. 151C, § 1 (e), and made it "an unfair educational practice ... [t]o sexually harass students in any program or course of study in any educational institution," G.L. c. 151C, § 2 (g). In addition, this legislation created G.L. c. 214, § 1C, which provides that "[a] person shall have the right to be free from sexual harassment, as defined in" G.L. c. 151B and c. 151C, and grants the Superior Court jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims. See Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra at 553, 554, 664 N.E.2d 808.

General Laws c. 151B provides a remedy for sexual harassment involving employers with six or more employees.³ Guzman v. Lowinger, 422 Mass. 570, 572, 664 N.E.2d 820 (1996); Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra at 559, 664 N.E.2d 808. Plaintiffs alleging sexual harassment in this environment must comply with the procedural requirements of G.L. c. 151B, § 5, by filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) within the statutory time limit.⁴ Although the "broad exclusivity provision" of G.L. c. 151B, § 9, precludes plaintiffs from "recasting" their claims of sexual harassment as common-law claims or violations of other statutes, it permits recovery of actual and punitive damages (as well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs). See Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra at 555, 664 N.E.2d 808 (employee's statutory claims alleging violations of civil rights act and equal rights act, and common law claims for negligence, breach of contract, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, barred by exclusivity provisions of G.L. c. 151B and workers' compensation act). See Doe v. Purity Supreme, Inc., 422 Mass. 563, 565-567, 664 N.E.2d 815 (1996) (employee's common-law claims for negligence, assault and battery, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress barred by exclusivity provision of workers' compensation act; statutory claims barred by exclusivity provision of G.L. c. 151B).

General Laws c. 214, § 1C, supplements G.L. c. 151B by ensuring "that all employees are protected against sexual harassment in the workplace, whether or not their employers fit within the definition in c. 151B" (emphasis in original). Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., supra at 557, 664 N.E.2d 808. General Laws c. 214, § 1C, thus extends statutory protection from sexual harassment to employees of employers with fewer than six workers. Id. Like G.L. c. 151B, when G.L. c. 214, § 1C, applies to a claim of sexual harassment, it is the exclusive remedy: plaintiffs may not proceed with other statutory or common-law actions for sexual harassment. See Guzman v. Lowinger, supra at 572, 664 N.E.2d 820 ("Just as G.L. c. 151B provides an exclusive remedy for sexual harassment claims against employers with six or more employees, G.L. c. 214, § 1C, provides the exclusive remedy for such claims against employers of fewer than six employees").

The defendant contends that G.L. c. 214, § 1C, incorporates the entire definition of sexual harassment contained in G.L. c. 151B, § 1(18), and G.L. c. 151C, § 1 (e), and that it therefore provides statutory protection only from sexual harassment that affects a person's employment or education. The defendant emphasizes that victims of sexual harassment in other contexts are not without remedy: unlike employees and students, they may pursue common-law claims against alleged offenders. The plaintiff, however, urges us to adopt an interpretation of G.L. c. 214, § 1C, that is not limited to employment and academic settings, because it grants the right to be free from sexual harassment to "a person," not "an employee" or "a student." The plaintiff claims that the Legislature intended to incorporate into G.L. c. 214, § 1C, only the part of the definition of sexual harassment that appears in both G.L. c. 151B and c. 151C: "The term `sexual harassment' shall mean sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature," without any reference to an employment or academic environment. The plaintiff further argues that the Legislature already has addressed the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace and academia, and that limiting the scope of G.L. c. 214, § 1C, to those environments would leave it "entirely duplicative" of G.L. c. 151B and c. 151C.⁵

"The general and familiar rule is that a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished." Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934). "[T]he primary source of insight into the intent of the Legislature is the language of the statute." International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853, 443 N.E.2d 1308 (1983). We therefore begin with the plain language of G.L. c. 214, § 1C: "A person shall have the right to be free from sexual harassment, as defined in chapter[s 151B and 151C]." Although we agree with the plaintiff that "person" is a broad term, the definitions of sexual harassment in G.L. c. 151B and c. 151C, expressly incorporated into G.L. c. 214, § 1C, limit the reach of that statute: these provisions define as "sexual harassment" only conduct that affects "a term or condition of employment" or serves as "a basis for employment decisions," G.L. c. 151B, § 1(18) (a); creates "an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive work environment," G.L. c. 151B, § 1(18) (b); functions as "a basis for the evaluation of academic achievement" or otherwise affects academic placement or privileges, G.L. c. 151C, § 1 (e) (i); or creates "an intimidating, hostile, humiliating or sexually offensive...