Lowery v. Redmond

• Decision Date: 23 May 2022
• Docket Number: W2021-00611-COA-R3-CV
• Parties: MICKELL LOWERY v. MICHAEL REDMOND ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

MICKELL LOWERY v. MICHAEL REDMOND ET AL.

No. W2021-00611-COA-R3-CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Jackson

May 23, 2022

Session February 8, 2022

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Shelby County No. CH-17-1580 JoeDae L. Jenkins, Chancellor

Petitioner/Appellee filed a petition in chancery court against Respondents/Appellants, alleging various claims related to allegedly false and defamatory statements made by the Respondents/Appellants. An objection was made to the chancery court's subject matter jurisdiction, seeking dismissal or transfer of the action to circuit court. The chancery court denied the motion to dismiss or transfer and ultimately rendered judgment in favor of Petitioner/Appellee. We conclude that the chancery court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse the judgment of the chancery court regarding subject matter jurisdiction, vacate all other orders of judgment entered by the trial court, and remand the case for transfer to circuit court.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed in Part and Vacated in Part and Remanded

Stuart Breakstone and Adrian Vivar-Alcalde, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Michael Redmond and Cora Redmond.

Tannera G. Gibson and Patrick J. Hillard, Memphis, Tennessee for the appellee, Mickell Lowery.

J Steven Stafford, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Kenny Armstrong, and Carma Dennis McGee, JJ., joined.

OPINION

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

I. ^[1]

According to Petitioner/Appellee Mickell Lowery ("Appellee"), Respondents/Appellants Cora and Michael Redmond ("Appellants") defamed his character in an attempt to ensure that he would not succeed in his bid for election to public office, by distributing defamatory information about him to prospective voters. Consequently, Appellee filed a "Petition for Defamation" against Appellants on October 27, 2017 in Shelby County Chancery Court (the "trial court" or the "chancery court"). Therein, Appellee alleged tort claims for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); the petition sought both compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief and attorney's fees. In his petition, Appellee further requested that should Appellants continue to distribute the allegedly defamatory information, they be fined $1, 000.00 per distribution, found in contempt, imprisoned, and ordered to undergo psychological evaluation.

On October 30, 2017, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order in Appellee's favor. On November 21, 2017, Mrs. Redmond filed a motion to dismiss the action based on the trial court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction; in the alternative, the motion asked that the matter be transferred to circuit court.^[2] On December 8, 2017, the trial court entered a consent order granting a temporary injunction against Appellants, relying in part on the parties' agreement to continue the temporary restraining order already in place. On September 6, 2018, Appellee filed an "Amended Petition for Defamation, Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief." Therein, Appellee added a count seeking declaratory judgment-specifically, that Appellants had violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 2-19-116(a) and 2-19-142 "and other relevant and applicable Tennessee statutory election laws." Appellee also filed a separate petition for injunctive relief in the trial court on November 4, 2019 related to the subject matter of his tort claims, in addition to various contempt petitions, along with at least one more request for attorney's fees.

The trial court apparently entered another a temporary restraining order on November 4, 2019, which enjoined Appellants from distributing certain material about Appellee. The trial court then granted Appellee's requests for injunctive relief in an initial order entered on November 25, 2019, an amended order entered on January 24, 2020, and a second amended order entered on February 7, 2020. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss or transfer the action in a separate order entered February 7, 2020.

On May 6, 2021, the trial court entered written orders that included the following findings: Appellants were liable for defamation; Mr. Redmond was liable for false light invasion of privacy; Appellants were not liable for IIED; Appellants violated sections 2-19-116(a) and 2-19-142; and Mr. Redmond was in criminal contempt. The trial court ordered Appellants to pay $10, 000.00 in actual damages and $10, 000.00 in punitive damages to Appellee, and ordered Mr. Redmond to remove certain information he had posted on the Internet, serve three days in jail, and pay a $2, 525.00 fine.

Appellants filed this appeal on June 4, 2021.

II.

Appellants raise various issues, but we conclude that the question of the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is dispositive of this appeal. On this issue, this Court has previously explained as follows:

The concept of subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to adjudicate a particular type of controversy. Courts derive their subject matter jurisdiction from the Constitution of Tennessee or from legislative act, and cannot exercise jurisdictional powers that have not been conferred directly on them expressly or by necessary implication.

A court's subject matter jurisdiction in a particular circumstance depends on the nature of the cause of action and the relief sought. It does not depend on the conduct or agreement of the parties, and thus the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a trial or an appellate court by appearance, plea, consent, silence, or waiver.

Judgments or orders entered by courts without subject matter jurisdiction are void. The lack of subject matter jurisdiction is so fundamental that it requires dismissal whenever it is raised and demonstrated.

Thus, when an appellate court determines that a trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it must vacate the judgment and dismiss the case without reaching the merits of the appeal.

Dishmon v. Shelby State Cmty. Coll., 15 S.W.3d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (internal citations omitted); see also Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.08.

"Since a determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo, without a presumption of correctness." Chapman v. DaVita, Inc., 380 S.W.3d 710, 712-13 (Tenn. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III.

In the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss or to transfer the case due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court stated that it "believe[d] that it ha[d] jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief requested to enjoin [Appellants] from seeking to disseminate false information pursuant to [sections] 2-19-116 and 2-19-142."^[3] The trial court further relied on caselaw stating that if a chancery court has jurisdiction over any part of a controversy, it can assert jurisdiction over other portions of the controversy that it would normally not have jurisdiction to decide.

Appellants argue in part that the trial court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section 16-11-102, which states as follows:

(a) The chancery court has concurrent jurisdiction, with the circuit court, of all civil causes of action, triable in the circuit court, except for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character, and except for unliquidated damages for injuries to property not resulting from a breach of oral or written contract; and no demurrer for want of jurisdiction of the cause of action shall be sustained in the chancery court, except in the cases excepted.

(b) Any suit in the nature of the cases excepted in subsection (a) brought in the chancery court, where objection has not been taken by a plea to the jurisdiction, may be transferred to the circuit court of the county, or heard and determined by the chancery court upon the principles of a court of law.

(Emphasis added). Accordingly, Appellants aver that because they objected to the trial court's jurisdiction, and Appellee's original defamation petition sought unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character, the trial court should have transferred the case to circuit court. Appellants further argue, inter alia, that while Appellee sought equitable relief in the form of injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment, those forms of relief are incidental to the main subject of this cause-the defamation claim-over which the trial court does not have jurisdiction. Furthermore, Appellants note that this case does not involve an election contest, so Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-17-101 does not confer jurisdiction upon the trial court.^[4]

Appellee concedes that the chancery court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action solely for unliquidated damages for injuries to person or character. However, he argues that the trial court had jurisdiction over his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and the portion involving liquidated damages, and thus the trial court also had jurisdiction to adjudicate his remaining claims. Appellee asserts that the portion of his claim involving liquidated damages is the $50.00 fine imposed on Class C misdemeanors, which Appellee alleges Appellants committed by violating sections 2-19-116 and 2-19-142. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-111 (providing for a fine of $50.00 or thirty days in jail for Class C misdemeanors). Appellee further relies on section 16-11-103, which confers on chancery courts "exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases of an equitable nature, where the debt or demand exceeds fifty dollars ($50.00)."

For purposes of determining whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this...