Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist.
| Decision Date | 22 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | B302209,2d Civ. Nos. B300072 |
| Citation | 56 Cal.App.5th 211,270 Cal.Rptr.3d 264 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | John LOWRY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PORT SAN LUIS HARBOR DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent. |
Krissman & Silver, Jarrod A. Krissman and Donna Silver, Long Beach, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Collins Collins Muir + Stewart and Jolene R. Rice, Rancho Cucamonga, for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff missed the statutory deadline to file a claim against a public entity, so he applied to submit a late claim. He filed his complaint the same day, not waiting for the public entity to respond to his application. We hold that the Government Claims Act (the Act; Gov. Code,1 § 810 et seq. ) is not satisfied by filing a complaint before rejection of a claim.
John Lowry sued the Port San Luis Harbor District (the District) for injuries he suffered while attempting to board one of the District's boats. He appeals from a judgment on the pleadings against him. He contends that he complied with the Act by filing an application to file a late claim the same day he filed his complaint. He also challenges certain costs awarded to the District. We affirm.
Lowry was a harbor patrol officer employed by the District. He was injured on March 11, 2016, when he fell from a ladder while attempting to board a rescue boat.
On the day of the incident, Lowry submitted a workers’ compensation claim. The claim was granted to provide for continuation of his salary.
On March 10, 2017, Lowry filed a complaint in superior court against the District. He alleged Jones Act negligence ( 46 U.S.C. § 30104 ), maintenance and cure, and unseaworthiness. The complaint included a cause of action by his wife for loss of consortium. The complaint also included checked boxes stating: "Plaintiff is required to comply with a claims statute," "has complied with applicable claims statutes," and "is excused from complying because (specify):" without specifying why he was excused.
The same day, Lowry faxed the District an application for permission to present a late claim. (§ 911.4) A proposed claim was attached to the application. The District's harbor manager received the application on March 11. She presented the claim to the Harbor's Board of Commissioners on March 28, 2017.
The District sent Lowry a notice of rejection that stated, "Notice is hereby given that the claim presented to the Port San Luis Harbor District on March 11, 2016, was rejected on March 29, 2017." The harbor commissioner declared that March 11, 2016, was a typographical error, and she meant the date she received the application, March 11, 2017.
The District was served with the summons and complaint on June 2, 2017. It filed an answer alleging affirmative defenses including failure to comply with the Act. Lowry then filed a first amended complaint (FAC) adding unseaworthiness pursuant to the Jones Act, and unseaworthiness and negligence pursuant to the General Maritime Law. The cause of action for loss of consortium was deleted. No boxes regarding compliance with claims statutes were marked. Lowry's counsel declared that this failure was inadvertent. The District filed an answer, again alleging failure to comply with the Act.
On June 20, 2019, the trial court issued a ruling on motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to bifurcate. It granted the District's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on noncompliance with the Act.2
On June 27, 2019, Lowry filed a motion for reconsideration of the ruling granting judgment on the pleadings. On July 15, 2019, the Harbor served Lowry with a purported notice of entry of judgment, with a copy of the June 20 ruling attached. On August 13, 2019, the court issued a ruling on motion for reconsideration, which denied reconsideration of the June 20 ruling, and stated, "Judgment on the pleadings is entered for Defendant."
On November 6, 2019, the court taxed $942.58 from the District's costs, and awarded the District costs of $22,977.98.
We consolidated for appeal three notices of appeal filed by Lowry. The first notice is from the judgment entered August 13, 2019. The second is from the order denying the motion for reconsideration. The third is from the ruling on the motion to strike/tax costs.
The District contends Lowry did not properly appeal the judgment. We disagree. The trial court entered judgment on August 13, 2019. Lowry properly appealed from the judgment, not from the earlier nonappealable ruling granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings. ( Ellerbee v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1212-1213, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 756.)
The purported notice of entry of judgment filed by the District on July 15, 2019, is not effective because no judgment had been issued yet. "The rendition of a judgment is a judicial act; its entry upon the record is merely ministerial." ( In re Cook's Estate (1888) 77 Cal. 220, 226, 19 P. 431 ; In re J.V. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1335, 180 Cal.Rptr.3d 711 ; see Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (h)(3).) References to a "Judgment" in the court's computer records for June and July 2019 are not supported by oral pronouncements or written orders of the judge. We do not view these notations as the entry of judgment in the "judgment book" or "permanent minutes." ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(c)(1) & (2).) To the extent the trial court's records regarding the date of judgment are unclear, we liberally construe the notice of appeal to allow the appeal. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2).)
Lowry concedes that appeal of the denial of motion for reconsideration was neither necessary nor proper. Instead, we consider the motion for reconsideration as part of the appeal from the judgment. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g) ; Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35, 51, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 119.) The order regarding costs is appealable as an order after judgment. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) ; Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 654-655, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179.)
Judgment on the pleadings
In a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court accepts as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, and may consider matters subject to judicial notice. ( Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d) ; Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720.) We review de novo an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. ( Gerawan , at p. 515, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720.) We review the judgment and not the trial court's reasoning. ( Hood v. Santa Barbara Bank & Trust (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 526, 535, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 369.)
Public entities are protected by sovereign immunity for injuries arising from their acts or omissions, except as provided in the Government Claims Act or other statutes. (§ 815.) The Act "was conceived to strictly limit governmental liability." ( Williams v. Horvath (1976) 16 Cal.3d 834, 842, 129 Cal.Rptr. 453, 548 P.2d 1125.) The District is a local public entity subject to the Act. (§§ 900.4, 905, 915; Harb. & Nav. Code, § 6095.)
"A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person ... shall be presented ... not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action." (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) A public entity's knowledge of an incident and injuries does not excuse the claim requirement. ( DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990-991, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 111, 289 P.3d 884 ( DiCampli-Mintz ).) "[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action." ( State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde ) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 ( Bodde ).)3
Late claim
A claimant who misses the six-month claim deadline may apply to file a late claim "within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action." (§ 911.4.) The trial court took judicial notice of an application Lowry faxed the District on March 10, 2017, within a year of the incident.
The harbor manager gave the application to the Board at a meeting 18 days later, but that did not render Lowry's application untimely. This case is unlike Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1780, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 860, where the application to submit a late claim was untimely because it was sent to the wrong entity (a prison) and was not forwarded to the Board of Control until after the deadline.
The District sent Lowry a notice that "the claim presented to the [District] on March 11, 2016, was rejected on March 29, 2017." The District asserts, and Lowry accepts, that the notice contains a typographical error, and the date the claim was presented was March 11, 2017.
By denying the claim, the District impliedly granted the application to present a late claim. ( Harvey v. City of Holtville (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 595, 597, 60 Cal.Rptr. 635 ; Harvey v. City of Holtville (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 816, 819-820, 76 Cal.Rptr. 795.) The plain language of the notice states that the claim was denied, not the application to file a late claim. The notice contained the warning required to accompany denial of a claim, i.e., that the claimant has six months to file a lawsuit. (§ 913, subd. (b).) It did not include the warning required for denial of an application to file a late claim, i.e., that the claimant has six months to file a petition for relief from the claim requirement. (§ 911.8, subd. (b).)
By advising Lowry the claim was denied, the District was estopped from asserting that it did not grant the application to file a late claim. Accordingly, section 946.6, which allows a petition to seek relief from the failure to comply with the claim requirement after denial of an application for...
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