Curtis v. Palomar Health
| Decision Date | 17 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | D079266 |
| Parties | JAMES CURTIS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. PALOMAR HEALTH et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No 37-2020-00015803-CU-PA-CTL, John S. Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
Hamilton &Associates, Ben-Thomas Hamilton, Aleries Lau and Alec F. Dea for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &Smith, Jeffry A. Miller, Craig T Mann, and Corinne C. Bertsche for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiffs James Curtis and Barbara Cruz appeal the summary judgment in their action against defendants Palomar Health and five of its nurses for the wrongful death of their mother. The trial court ruled the action was barred because plaintiffs did not comply with time requirements of the Government Claims Act (). We affirm.
Plaintiffs' mother went to Palomar Medical Center, a hospital owned and operated by Palomar Health, for a routine surgical procedure on December 26, 2018. She died later that day in the recovery room. A physician informed Curtis immediately after his mother's death that she likely died from a pulmonary embolism, a surgical byproduct, or comorbidities, and not from any negligence or fault on the part of physicians or hospital staff. Curtis relayed that information to Cruz on the same day. Plaintiffs nevertheless suspected on the day their mother died that something was wrong with her care.
Plaintiffs retained counsel in April 2019. Counsel requested copies of plaintiffs' mother's medical records and received them on June 10, 2019. On the bottom of 123 of the 143 pages of the records, Palomar Health is identified as "A California Public Healthcare District." The physicians and nurses involved in the care and treatment of plaintiffs' mother were identified by name in the medical records.
On December 20, 2019, plaintiffs' counsel mailed a 90-day notice of intent to sue pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 364[1] to Palomar Health and Palomar Medical Center, as well as separate notices to five nurses at the same address. The notices alleged that plaintiffs' mother died from the addressees' failure to monitor and treat her properly for the surgery on December 26, 2018, and that plaintiffs intended to commence an action against the addressees after 90 days from the date of service.
In response to the 90-day notice, a risk claims and insurance analyst for Palomar Health mailed plaintiffs' counsel a letter on January 10, 2020, stating that the claim was "being returned because it was not presented within six months after the event or occurrence as required by law," and therefore "no action was taken on the [c]laim." The letter advised plaintiffs that their "only recourse at this time is to apply without delay to Palomar Medical Center Escondido for leave to present a late [c]laim." The letter was printed on Palomar Health letterhead and identified Palomar Medical Center Escondido as a "facility of Palomar Health."
Plaintiffs mailed a request to present a late claim to Palomar Medical Center Escondido on February 3, 2020. No response was given.
On March 16, 2020, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Palomar Health, Palomar Medical Center, five nurses employed by Palomar Health, and others who are not parties to this appeal. Plaintiffs alleged defendants negligently performed surgery and follow-up care on their mother and thereby caused her death. They sought general and special damages and costs of suit. The complaint contained no allegations of compliance with the Act.
Palomar Health and the five nurses (collectively defendants) answered the complaint by asserting a general denial and multiple affirmative defenses, including the failure of plaintiffs to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the Act. Defendants later moved for summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) on the basis of plaintiffs' noncompliance with the Act. In support of the motion, they submitted declarations from Palomar Health's director of risk management for regulatory compliance and chief human resources officer, who stated that Palomar Health is a public entity that owns and operates Palomar Medical Center and employed the five nurses on December 26, 2018. Defendants also submitted copies of the notices of intent to sue, Palomar Health's response, several pages from plaintiffs' mother's medical records stating Palomar Health is a public health care district, and discovery responses in which plaintiffs admitted they suspected on December 26, 2018, that something was wrong with their mother's care and treatment.
In opposition to the motion, plaintiffs argued that they substantially complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Act by mailing the 90-day notices of intent to sue, which provided enough information for defendants to investigate and evaluate plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs further argued that Palomar Health waived its right to demand compliance with the Act by failing to notify plaintiffs of the insufficiency of their claim, because only Palomar Medical Center responded to the notice. Finally, plaintiffs argued their claims against the nurses were not barred, because plaintiffs did not learn the nurses were employees of a public entity within six months of accrual of their claim. In their opposition papers, plaintiffs included declarations stating that they did not know Palomar Health was a public entity or that it employed the nurses, that the medical records did not indicate Palomar Health was a public entity, and that physicians told them their mother "likely died as a result of, 'either a pulmonary embolus, surgical byproduct, or her comor[bid]ities,' not as the result of negligence or wrongdoing." Plaintiffs also included a copy of their request to present a late claim to Palomar Medical Center.
The trial court ruled there were no triable issues of material fact on whether the claim was timely presented, whether Palomar Health waived the right to object to the lateness of the claim, or whether plaintiffs knew or had reason to know that the nurses were employees of a public entity within the time limit to submit the claim, and granted the motion for summary judgment. The court later entered a judgment in favor of Palomar Health and the nurses and against plaintiffs.
In asking us to reverse the judgment, plaintiffs repeat the arguments they made in opposition to the summary judgment motion and add an argument that barring their claims for noncompliance with the Act would be contrary to public policy. After setting forth the standard of review, we shall consider and reject each of plaintiffs' arguments.
We review the trial court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment de novo to determine whether the record discloses any triable issue of fact material under the applicable law. (Coral Construction, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 50 Cal.4th 315, 336; Meda v. Autozone, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 366, 374.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and resolve any dispute, doubt, or ambiguity in their favor. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768; Meda, at p. 374.) If there are no triable issues of material fact and defendants are entitled to judgment under the applicable law, the motion for summary judgment was properly granted; if those conditions are not satisfied, the motion should have been denied. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); EHP Glendale, LLC v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 262, 273-274.)
Plaintiffs first argue the trial court erred by ruling that their failure to present their claim within six months of their mother's death barred their lawsuit against Palomar Health. They contend the Act requires only substantial compliance, and they substantially complied by mailing a 90-day notice of intent to sue that asserted a claim for compensation for the wrongful death of their mother that could result in litigation if not paid. Plaintiffs also suggest there is a triable issue of material fact on whether their claim accrued on the day their mother died, because physicians told them she died not from any negligence in her care but from a pulmonary embolus, surgical byproduct, or comorbidities. As we shall explain, the trial court correctly determined plaintiffs failed to meet the claim presentation deadline.
The Act requires a "claim relating to a cause of action for death" be presented to a public entity "not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action." (§ 911.2.) The claim must include, among other information, the name and address of the claimant, the date and place of the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the claim, a general description of the injury or loss incurred, and the name(s) of the public employee(s) causing the injury or loss, if known. (§ 910.) With exceptions not at issue here, "no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board." (§ 945.4.) Hence, ...
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