Loyd v. State
| Decision Date | 18 December 1920 |
| Docket Number | 2018. |
| Citation | 105 S.E. 465,150 Ga. 803 |
| Parties | LOYD v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1921.
Syllabus by the Court.
The court did not err in permitting a witness, who was a neighbor of the prosecutrix, to testify that her children of tender age came through the darkness to his house. The conduct of the children, under the circumstances testified to by the prosecutrix in the case, was a material fact for the consideration of the jury. Likewise the evidence as to the conduct of the prosecutrix when she came to the house where these children were, immediately after the commission of the crime, which tended to show her mental condition.
The statement of the defendant tending to show that the prosecutrix was a woman of immoral character and that she had been guilty of lewd acts, it was permissible for the state to introduce evidence tending to show her general good character.
The court having charged the jury that, to constitute the crime of rape, carnal knowledge must be accomplished by the use of force, did not err in instructing the jury as to other elements of the crime of rape by his failure to repeat the instructions as to the necessity of the existence of the element of force in the commission of the crime.
The charge of the court on the subject of force as an essential element of the crime of rape is not open to the criticism that it is either misleading or argumentative, or that it qualifies that part of the statute relating to that element of the crime.
The evidence authorized the charge upon the subject of violence and force used by the defendant.
The charge upon the subject of the necessity of corroboration of the testimony of the alleged victim of the assault contains nothing of which the defendant can complain.
The court was authorized, under the evidence, to instruct the jury that in passing upon the question of the defendant's guilt they might consider whether the prosecutrix was of good fame or not, and whether after the alleged act she presently discovered the alleged offense, showed circumstances or signs of injury, and similar facts and circumstances.
It is not ground for reversing the judgment of the court denying a new trial that the court reduced to writing the different forms of a verdict in a case like this; there being no complaint that the court omitted to give a written form for a verdict favorable to the defendant.
Where the court omitted in his charge to the jury to instruct them upon the subject of the defendant's statement, but recalled the jury before they made their verdict and instructed them upon that subject, the omission to charge in the first instance will not require the grant of a new trial.
After the jury returned a verdict of guilty and recommended that the defendant be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for one year, the court instructed them that, in order to render their verdict proper as to form, they should fix a minimum and a maximum sentence, and that, if they wished to fix it just one year and no longer, as their verdict seemed to express, it would be all right to write into the verdict "not less than one year nor more than one year." This the jury did. Held, as no less a sentence than one year could have been imposed under the law, that the defendant was not injured by the instruction complained of.
Error from Superior Court, Bleckley County; E. D. Graham, Judge.
Tom Loyd was convicted of rape, and he brings error. Affirmed.
See also, 102 S.E. 378; 103 S.E. 496.
John R Cooper and W. O. Cooper, Jr., both of Macon, and C. A. Weddington, of Cochran, for plaintiff in error.
W. A. Wooten, Sol. Gen., of Eastman, R. A. Denny, Atty. Gen., and Graham Wright, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Tom Loyd was tried under an indictment charging him with the offense of rape, alleged to have been committed upon Lilla Mathis. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant's motion for a new trial was overruled.
1. Error is assigned upon the ruling of the court by which one George Griffin was permitted to testify, over the objection of defendant's counsel, that he saw certain children of Lilla Mathis, the prosecutrix, on the night of the commission of the alleged crime. The ground of the objection to the testimony was that it was not relevant, that it was hearsay, and that what the woman's children did in no way corroborated her testimony. The evidence was not irrelevant, but was relevant, material, and admissible. The prosecutrix had testified that the accused and his brother came to her house just at dark. She testified to acts of violence and threats upon the part of the men. She had six children, the oldest 13 years of age. Her children were living in the house with her. Her husband was dead. If she was forcibly seized, as she testified, there was no one to protect her children; and these young children fled in the darkness, going some to one neighbor's house and others to another. This was a material fact tending to corroborate the recital given by the witness of the attack made upon her. It was to be considered by the jury along with other facts and circumstances of the case. It was for the jury to determine whether the mother had sent the children away from her home, or whether they fled when the mother was attacked. Nor did the court err in admitting, over objection, the testimony of the same witness to the effect that when the prosecutrix reached his house that night she "kind of slided in the door like" and seized him about the neck. This conduct upon the part of the prosecutrix was admissible as tending to throw light upon her physical and mental condition at the time.
2. A witness for the state was permitted to testify, over objection, that the general moral character of the prosecutrix in the community was good. This was objected to upon the ground that the state could not introduce evidence of the prosecutrix's character when it had not been attacked. A sufficient reply to this objection is that the prosecutrix's good character had been attacked by defendant. In his statement the defendant recited to the jury the circumstances under which the prosecutrix moved to his place, and stated that on one occasion, although she had gotten very little money from him, she came to his store and made purchases to a considerable amount, and when he protested she replied that she had plenty of money, and pulled out a $20 bill. Further in his statement the defendant said:
The tendency of this statement was to show that the woman was of immoral character, a prostitute, and given to drinking intoxicating liquor to excess. The court properly allowed her to introduce testimony to repel that statement of the defendant. From the decision in the case of Crawley v. State, 137 Ga. 777, 74 S.E. 537, it appears that the accused in his statement had declared that the decedent was a dangerous man, that he apprehended the latter would shoot him at the first opportunity, as he had threatened to do it many times to many people, and that he had shot and killed the defendant's brother, and had hounded him around and made various threats against defendant, and he stated other instances showing that the decedent was a man of violent character and relentless in determination to take advantage of a fitting opportunity for the purpose of slaying the accused. This court held in that case that the court properly permitted counsel for the state to introduce evidence tending to develop before the jury the question as to whether the slain man was one of peaceable or of violent disposition and character. It was also said in that case:
"It has been held that the defendant can put his own character in issue by his statement alone (Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 552); and if he can put his own character in issue merely by his statement, it would seem...
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Camp v. State
... ... 26-2806, is imprisonment and labor for not less than two or ... more than seven years. The indeterminate-sentence act thus ... gave to the jury the power and duty to impose a maximum and ... minimum sentence within those limits. See Oliver v ... State, 160 Ga. 365(6), 127 S.E. 732; Loyd v ... State, 150 Ga. 803, 105 S.E. 465; Johnson v ... State, 154 Ga. 806(2), 115 S.E. 642; Johnson v ... State, 29 Ga.App. 659, 660(2), 116 S.E. 226; Powell ... v. State, 25 Ga.App. 329(5), 103 S.E. 174 ... 3 ... Under the rulings in the Winston Case, supra, and the ... ...