Loyd v. the State.

• Decision Date: 10 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. S10P1772.,S10P1772.
• Citation: 288 Ga. 481,705 S.E.2d 616
• Parties: LOYDv.The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

288 Ga. 481

705 S.E.2d 616

11 FCDR 53

LOYD

v.The STATE.

No. S10P1772.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 10, 2011.

Jeffrey L. Grube, Centerville, David E. Morgan, III, Abbeville, for appellant.Denise D. Fachini, District Attorney, Cheri L. Nichols, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Mary Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Patricia Attaway Burton, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richard Tangum, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.Brian Kammer, Richard A. Malone, Atlanta, Gerald P. Word, Carrollton, amici curiae.

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice.

Roger Lynn Loyd pled guilty in this death penalty case to the malice murder of three-year-old Tevin Hammonds and to related crimes committed against the child. Loyd waived his right to a jury trial as to sentencing for the murder. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584(II), 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (Sixth Amendment requires aggravating circumstances to be found by a jury); see also Jones v. State, 279 Ga. 854(5), 622 S.E.2d 1 (2005). At the conclusion of a bench trial on sentencing, the trial court found the existence of multiple statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Loyd to death for the murder. See OCGA § 17–10–30(b). The trial court thereafter denied Loyd's motions to withdraw the guilty pleas and for a new trial.¹ Loyd appeals and, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm Loyd's convictions and sentences.

1. The trial court was authorized to conclude the following based upon the evidence presented at the sentencing trial, including evidence of several statements Loyd made to law enforcement officers that were corroborated by either direct or circumstantial evidence. On December 1, 1998, Loyd was with Faye Hammonds at her apartment; her son, Tevin, who had just recently turned three years old, was also there. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Hammonds went to the adjacent apartment, leaving Tevin alone with Loyd inside the residence for a few minutes. Loyd, who was upset with Hammonds for refusing his sexual advances, told the child that they were going to Loyd's father's house. However, his admitted intention in removing Tevin from his home was “to have sex with him.”

While holding Tevin's hand, Loyd led him from the apartment and down a dirt road to an abandoned trailer. Although Tevin initially went with Loyd willingly, he soon began to tell Loyd that he wanted to return home. Nevertheless, Loyd took the child inside the trailer and into a bedroom. After Tevin was made to lie down on the floor and his pants were removed, Loyd fondled Tevin's buttocks and digitally penetrated Tevin's anus. Then Loyd got on his knees, cutting himself on a piece of broken glass on the carpet. Loyd lowered his pants and, in an attempt to arouse himself, first rubbed his penis against Tevin's buttocks and then between Tevin's legs. Loyd put his own saliva on Tevin as lubrication and attempted to anally penetrate Tevin. He performed oral sex on Tevin and then put his penis in Tevin's mouth, which caused Tevin to gag and vomit on Loyd and on the floor of the trailer. Loyd was unable to achieve an erection. Frustrated, Loyd took out his pocketknife, cut his underwear off himself and used it to wipe the blood off his knee and the vomit off his body. Then Loyd put his clothes back on and instructed Tevin to do the same. Before they left the trailer, Loyd threatened to kill Tevin if he told his mother about the molestation.

Next, Loyd took Tevin down nearby railroad tracks to a dump site, ignoring the child's entreaties to go home. Loyd walked Tevin behind a mound of dirt, where he directed the child to lie down and asked him if he were ready to die. When Tevin said that he did not want to die and began to cry, Loyd told the child, “You're fixing to.” Loyd then began strangling the child and, as Tevin struggled and kicked, stabbed Tevin in the left thigh using his pocketknife to stop the kicking. Loyd continued to strangle Tevin for at least five minutes but, when the child took a deep breath after Loyd released his grasp, Loyd resumed strangling him until he was dead. Loyd covered the body with a discarded political campaign sign to conceal it and threw Tevin's shoes, which had been kicked off during the struggle, a few feet to the right of the body before leaving the area. Loyd told police that he intended to return the next night to dispose of Tevin's body in a dumpster because he knew its contents would be picked up and taken to a landfill the following day.

Hammonds testified that she left Tevin alone with Loyd for approximately five minutes before returning to find both of them gone. When she finally located Loyd the next morning, he told her that he had not seen Tevin and offered to help in the search for him. However, Loyd soon told law enforcement officers involved in the search that there was no need to continue, stating “he's dead, I killed him, I made sure of it.” In addition to directing police to the location of Tevin's body, Loyd drew diagrams accurately depicting the route that he and Tevin took and the crime scenes at the abandoned trailer and the dump site. An investigation of the trailer revealed underwear in the hallway and blood stains and vomit on the bedroom carpet; the blood on the carpet and on the underwear tested positive for Loyd's blood. Shoe impressions matching Tevin's and Loyd's shoes were found leading to the murder scene; Tevin's shoes were located in the area where Loyd indicated he had tossed them. Loyd told police that he lost three writing pens from his shirt pocket during the incident; three pens matching Loyd's descriptions were found lying around Tevin's body. Saline swabs of Tevin's penis and scrotum tested positive for amylase, an enzyme present in saliva. The medical examiner testified that the cause of Tevin's death was strangulation and that, while still alive, Tevin suffered a superficial stab wound on his left thigh consistent with a knife wound.

Although Loyd pled guilty to Tevin's murder and related crimes, we nevertheless have reviewed the evidence from his sentencing trial and conclude that it was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find Loyd guilty of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307(III)(B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Sands v. State, 262 Ga. 367(1), 418 S.E.2d 55 (1992) (“[a]lthough an uncorroborated confession cannot support a conviction under OCGA § 24–3–53, corroboration of a confession in any particular satisfies the requirements of the statute”).

2. Loyd voiced his desire to plead guilty on the third day of jury selection in his case while sitting in the courtroom outside his counsel's presence during a late morning break. After Loyd met with the three attorneys who were representing him, his psychiatrist and his mental health counselor, the jury selection process resumed that afternoon. The following morning, however, Loyd again expressed his desire to plead guilty. After defense counsel conferred with the district attorney, Loyd's guilty pleas were entered.

Loyd contends his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered based on his assertions that he was “totally stressed out and ready to get it over with” at the time that he entered his guilty pleas; he was not “thinking straight” as a result of being on medication to control his moods; he was agitated as a result of the “harassing” questions the prospective jurors faced during voir dire; and he was misinformed during the plea colloquy regarding his right to later withdraw his pleas. Accordingly, he claims that the trial court erred by denying his oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

(a) Loyd did not move to withdraw his guilty pleas until the term of court following the term in which he was sentenced. See OCGA § 15–6–3(13)(B) (establishing the terms of court for Crisp County).

It is well settled that when the term of court has expired in which a defendant was sentenced pursuant to a guilty plea the trial court lacks jurisdiction to allow the withdrawal of the plea. [Cit.] [Loyd]'s only available means to withdraw his guilty plea[s] is through habeas corpus proceedings, [cit.] and the trial court therefore properly denied [Loyd]'s motion.

Henry v. State, 269 Ga. 851, 853(2), 507 S.E.2d 419 (1998) (affirming the trial court's denial of a defendant's untimely motion to withdraw his guilty plea in a capital murder case).

(b) Moreover, a review of the record shows that, even if Loyd's motion had been timely, allowance of the withdrawal of his guilty pleas would not be required.

When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, and subsequently challenges the validity of the guilty plea, the State may meet its burden of demonstrating that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea, or by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. [Cits.] The trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence, [cit.], and after sentence is pronounced a guilty plea may be withdrawn only to correct a manifest injustice. [Cits.]

Cazanas v. State, 270 Ga. 130, 131, 508 S.E.2d 412 (1998).

Here, the transcript of the plea hearing shows that, prior to Loyd's entering his guilty pleas, his counsel stated for the record that Loyd's psychiatrist, who had begun treating Loyd prior to his arrest and had seen Loyd on a number of occasions, met with Loyd on the previous day and found him competent to enter a guilty plea. Trial counsel also stated the following: that he and co-counsel had “in[-]depth conversations” with Loyd regarding the consequences of his entering a guilty plea in this case and his waiving the right to a jury trial as to sentencing; that counsel discussed with Loyd what they...