Cazanas v. State

• Decision Date: 09 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. S98A0903.,S98A0903.
• Citation: 270 Ga. 130,508 S.E.2d 412
• Parties: CAZANAS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

508 S.E.2d 412

270 Ga. 130

CAZANAS v. The STATE.

No. S98A0903.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

November 9, 1998.

Brian Allen McDaniel, Short & Fowler, Moultrie, for Luzardo Cazanas.

H. Lamar Cole, Dist. Atty., Valdosta, Charles M. Stines, Asst. Dist. Atty., Moultrie, for the State.

HINES, Justice.

Luzardo Cazanas pled guilty to malice murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Because Cazanas is a native of Cuba and was represented as speaking little or no English, the trial court appointed an interpreter to translate for him during the plea and other court proceedings, and at meetings with his attorney. Cazanas filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he did not enter it knowingly, intelligently, and with an understanding of its consequences. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Cazanas' motion. Cazanas contends that the court improperly denied withdrawal of the plea because at the plea hearing the interpreter did not fully and effectively translate the trial court's explanation of his rights and the consequences of his plea. He further asserts that the trial court erred in permitting his former attorney and interpreter to testify for the State at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the plea. For the reasons which follow, we affirm.¹

When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, and subsequently challenges the validity of the guilty plea, the State may meet its burden of demonstrating that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered by showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant was cognizant of all of the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea, or by use of extrinsic evidence that affirmatively shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893, 895(1), 471 S.E.2d 869 (1996); Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 475(1), 211 S.E.2d 764 (1975). The trial court is the final arbiter of all factual issues raised by the evidence, Dean v. State, 177 Ga.App. 123, 126(2), 338 S.E.2d 711 (1985), and after sentence is pronounced a guilty plea may be withdrawn only to correct a manifest injustice. Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 33.12; State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 336(3), 454 S.E.2d 468 (1995).

1. Over Cazanas' objection, the State called his former trial lawyer to testify as to whether Cazanas understood the proceedings and his rights prior to entering his plea. Cazanas' plea interpreter was also called as a witness and asked to express her opinion as to whether Cazanas fully understood the plea proceedings. Cazanas contends that the court erred in allowing this testimony to be used as it violated the attorney-client privilege.

But, the attorney-client privilege did not bar the testimony of Cazanas' former attorney and interpreter. A defendant who attacks the validity of a guilty plea in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding on the grounds that he did not enter the plea knowingly and intelligently may not assert a claim of attorney-client privilege to block the testimony of the lawyer who represented him at the plea hearing. Roberts, supra at 477(3), 211 S.E.2d 764; Bailey v. Baker, 232 Ga. 84, 86(2)(a), 205 S.E.2d 278 (1974). Such a claim will be subject to an objective inquiry as to whether

the position taken by the party goes so far into the matter covered by the privilege that fairness requires the privilege shall cease even when, subjectively, [the client] never intended that result.... Courts earnestly pursuing reality would be hard put to justify a rule that would allow a defendant ... to assert that his solemn pleas of guilty were negated for lack of accurate information of sentence consequences, then permit him to run a procedural trap play that would block the development of the plain truth ... Not only does this specious sophistry fail to protect confidential relationships, it trifles with the truth—it scoffs at justice....

Bailey, supra at 86(2)(a), 205 S.E.2d 278, quoting with approval United States v. Woodall, 438 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.1970).

This reasoning is equally compelling in this case. Cazanas himself raised the issue of the validity of the guilty plea on the grounds of lack of knowledge and understanding. Having made such an assertion, he cannot now invoke the privilege in order to block the introduction of evidence that would tend to establish the truth or falsity of the very matter that his assertions rest upon. By attacking the validity of the plea in this manner, Cazanas waived the privilege, and thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of his interpreter and attorney at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

2. Cazanas further contends that he did not enter a knowing and intelligent plea because the interpreter was a native of Mexico and could not adequately translate the plea hearing proceedings into his native Cuban dialect. Cazanas introduced evidence that variations in grammar, syntax, and vocabulary exist among the dialects of the Spanish language which are spoken in different regions of the world. However, at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, the State offered extrinsic evidence demonstrating that the defendant made an informed and voluntary plea. Bowers, supra at 895(1), 471 S.E.2d 869; Roberts, supra at 475(1), 211 S.E.2d 764.

The trial court was authorized to find that any differences in the dialects spoken by the interpreter and Cazanas did not prevent Cazanas from obtaining a meaningful understanding of his constitutional rights or the plea consequences. Although Cazanas did ask that a friend interpret during some meetings with his lawyer, there is no evidence that Cazanas expressed any dissatisfaction with or difficulty in communicating through his court-appointed interpreter at any time prior to sentencing. This interpreter, who handled the plea proceedings, testified that she was fluent in both the Mexican and Cuban dialects of Spanish, and she affirmed that she was able to effectively communicate with Cazanas, and that Cazanas appeared to understand most of what was said in English as well. Furthermore, Cazanas failed to identify any specific portions of the trial court's explanation of his rights at the plea hearing where dialectical differences would have impeded his understanding of the proceedings. In fact, another interpreter who testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea agreed that there was not a substantial difference between the Cuban and Mexican dialects in the translation of the rights to remain silent, to a trial by jury, to be represented by an attorney, and the fact that the State must prove guilt.

Cazanas also argues that the plea interpreter did not fully translate the court's...