Loyd v. Youth Conservation Commission

• Decision Date: 17 April 1970
• Docket Number: No. 41773,41773
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: In re Welfare of Dee Lowell LOYD, Appellant, v. YOUTH CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent.

Page 555

177 N.W.2d 555

287 Minn. 12

In re Welfare of Dee Lowell LOYD, Appellant, v. YOUTH CONSERVATION COMMISSION, Respondent.

No. 41773.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 17, 1970.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 1970.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Recent developments in constitutional law held not to require a formal hearing and representation by counsel in parole violation proceedings under Youth Conservation Act, Minn.St. c. 242.

2. Minn.St. 242.36, providing discretionary review procedures for juveniles committed to the Youth Conservation Commission after conviction of a felony or gross misdemeanor, held not to deny the equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to juveniles committed to the commission after adjudication of delinquency.

Smith & Munro and Bernard P. Becker and Gerald Heetland, Legal Aid Society, Inc., Minneapolis, for appellant.

Douglas Head, Atty. Gen., James Bradford, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

OPINION

SHERAN, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the Hennepin County District Court, Juvenile Division, denying appellant's motion for an order granting a hearing before the Youth Conservation Commission upon revocation of parole, with the following rights to be guaranteed appellant:

(a) Notice of any alleged violation of law.

(b) Court-appointed counsel.

(c) A fact hearing on the allegations.

(d) Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses.

(e) Presentation of evidence in his own behalf.

(f) Minimal demands of due process, including presumption of innocence, burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and bail.

Appellant was declared a delinquent on April 21, 1967, and was committed to the Youth Conservation Commission pursuant to Minn.St. c. 242. Appellant was placed in the State Training School at Red Wing, Minnesota, on May 15, 1967, and was granted parole on July 5, 1968. While on parole, appellant was allegedly involved in an incident at Central High School, Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he was a student, on September 19, 1968. Following the incident, appellant was arrested and confined at the Lino Lakes Reception Center. Appellant's mother requested the Youth Conservation Commission to allow her to be present, together with counsel for appellant, at parole violation proceedings. Counsel and appellant's mother were allowed only to meet with an official of the Youth Conservation Commission for one-half hour preceding a hearing on October 1, 1968. The hearing, at which appellant was allowed to testify in his own behalf, resulted in the revocation of appellant's parole and his recommitment to the Red Wing school. ¹ Appellant then moved the district court for relief which was denied. This appeal results.

1. This appeal challenges the validity of State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3, ² as it relates to this case, in light of recent holdings of the United States Supreme Court and of other state courts. In the Meyer case we upheld the Youth Conservation Act, Minn.St. c. 242, as not being repugnant to the United States or Minnesota Constitutions. We there held that neither constitution required the guarantee of the above-enumerated rights in parole revocation proceedings. In denying appellant's motion, the district court held that recent developments in constitutional law do not require a broadening or reversal of Meyer. We affirm.

Appellant bases his claim upon a series of cases beginning with Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. In that case the 16-year-old petitioner was charged with housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Under District of Columbia law, he was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court unless that court should waive jurisdiction and remit him to the District of Columbia District Court for trial. Petitioner requested access to the juvenile court's social service file pertaining to a prior probation, and he moved the court for a hearing on the question of waiver. Without ruling on these motions, the juvenile court waived jurisdiction over petitioner and bound him over to district court, where he was tried and convicted. On appeal the Supreme Court remanded for a determination of whether the juvenile court, in waiving jurisdiction, had afforded petitioner the right to a hearing access by counsel to court records, and a statement of reasons for waiver sufficient for appellate review. Entry of judgment upon the conviction was conditioned upon the determination of the appropriateness of the waiver by the juvenile court. In declaring the due process rights of the accused juvenile, the Supreme Court limited its holding to proceedings involving waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court, reasoning that such waiver 'is a 'critically important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile.' 383 U.S. 556, 86 S.Ct. 1055, 16 L.Ed.2d 94.

The second case relied upon by appellant is In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. In that case a 15-year-old was taken into custody on complaint of making a lewd telephone call. Following hearings he was committed to the State Industrial School until he should attain his majority. His parents brought habeas corpus proceedings, resulting in the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that adjudication of delinquency must measure up to the essentials of a fair trial, including notice of charges; being informed of right to counsel, with an attorney to be provided if necessary; being informed of the privilege against self-incrimination and right to remain silent; and, absent a confession, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. The court reasoned that the constitutional guarantees of due process encompass juveniles to the same extent as adults. However, the court limited its holding to the adjudicatory stage, where commitment may follow.

The most recent case relied upon by appellant is Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336. ³ In that case petitioner had previously pled guilty to 'joyriding,' for which he was placed on probation for 2 years with sentencing deferred under Washington state law. While on probation, he was charged with burglary. Denied the right to counsel at the probation revocation hearing, petitioner 'acknowledged involvement' in the alleged burglary. Probation was revoked and he was sentenced to 10 years. He brought habeas corpus proceedings 6 years later, claiming denial of the right to counsel at the probation revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment, applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, required that petitioner be granted the right to counsel. The Court stated that certain prior decisions, most notably Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 'clearly stand for the proposition that appointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.' 389 U.S. 134, 88 S.Ct. 257, 19 L.Ed.2d 340. However, the determination that petitioner was entitled to counsel was limited to sentencing procedures on the rationale that a criminal accused possesses certain important rights at sentencing, which rights may be lost if counsel is not present. ⁴

We cannot agree with the appellant in the instant case that these decisions, or any other decisions by the United States Supreme Court, require us to reverse our holding in State v. Meyer, Supra, as it relates to this case. The holdings in the above listed cases were all limited to crucial procedural phases of criminal adjudication. Those phases had all been accomplished in the instant case when the challenged procedure occurred, and appellant makes no claim that the prior phases were constitutionally irregular. We do not feel constrained to extend the above listed holdings beyond their express limitations to the facts of this appeal.

Appellant also relies upon recent holdings of other state and Federal courts, such as Reed v. Butterworth, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 365, 297 F.2d 776; Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443 P.2d 1020; Warden of Maryland Penitentiary v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439. We do not find the reasoning of those decisions persuasive in the context of this appeal, however. Furthermore, it appears that the majority of states do not recognize a right to counsel and a full evidentiary hearing on charges of parole violation. ⁵

As indicated in State v. Meyer, Supra, the purpose of the Youth Conservation Act is to rehabilitate juveniles adjudicated delinquent by a flexible system of supervision. The system allows the delinquent the maximum degree of individual liberty consistent with public safety and with the progress of...