Lucas v. Zoning Comm'n of The Town of Harwinton

• Decision Date: 09 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32110.,32110.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: James LUCAS et al.v.ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF HARWINTON et al.

130 Conn.App. 587

23 A.3d 1261

James LUCAS et al.

v.ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF HARWINTON et al.

No. 32110.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 1, 2011.Decided Aug. 9, 2011.

R. Bartley Halloran, Farmington, with whom, on the brief, was Kaitlin A. Halloran, for the appellants (plaintiffs).Steven E. Byrne, for the appellees (defendants).DiPENTIMA, C.J., and LAVINE and BEAR, Js.BEAR, J.

The plaintiffs, James Lucas and Leslie B. Lucas, appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their appeal from the decision of the defendant zoning commission of the town of Harwinton on the ground that they failed to plead facts sufficient to allege aggrievement.¹ On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claim that they pleaded facts sufficient to allege both statutory and classical aggrievement, and, therefore, that the court improperly dismissed their appeal. We agree that the plaintiffs' complaint contained facts sufficient to allege statutory aggrievement pursuant to General Statutes § 8–8(a)(1).² Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs' complaint contains the following relevant allegations. The plaintiffs own property on 119 Woodchuck Lane in Harwinton. Their property is located in the country residential zone (CR zone). Prior to September 15, 2008, all residential zones in Harwinton were subject to the same limitations and restrictions concerning buildable area. On September 15, 2008, however, the defendant adopted an amendment to § 2.3 of the Harwinton zoning regulations (regulations) that redefined buildable area in the CR zone. “[T]he plaintiffs are the owners of real property in such [CR zone] which is affected by the restrictions set forth in said regulations.” No other zones in Harwinton were affected by this amendment. The amendment to § 2.3 of the regulations “constituted an illegal taking of the plaintiffs' property.”

Attached to the plaintiffs' complaint as exhibit A was a copy of the amended regulation. The amendment adds the following to § 2.3 of the regulations: “Buildable Area—That amount of land area on a lot (in a[CR] zone) consisting of one contiguous acre of land excluding the following: (1) Land classified as inland wetlands and watercourses as defined in the Harwinton Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Regulations; (2) Land with naturally occurring pre-development slope equal to or greater than 25 [percent] as determined by a[ten] foot vertical change of grade in horizontal distance of [forty] feet or less (based on field topography or USGS topography); (3) Land subject to public utility easements or rights of way with the exception of those public utility services directly servicing the lot.”

The record contains the following additional facts and procedural history. The plaintiffs appealed to the court on several grounds from the defendant's decision approving the amendment to § 2.3 of the regulations. The court heard the appeal on July 8, 2009. During the hearing, the plaintiffs first attempted to establish aggrievement. An inland wetland map, which purportedly showed, inter alia, the plaintiffs' property, was shown to the defendant's counsel. The defendant's counsel agreed that the map indicated that the plaintiffs' property contained wetlands and that that was “satisfactory” to establish aggrievement. The court then asked how counsel wanted to proceed. The parties presented their arguments on the merits of the plaintiffs' appeal. On January 8, 2010, however, the court issued a memorandum of decision in which it dismissed the appeal on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to plead facts sufficient to establish either classical or statutory aggrievement.³ This appeal followed.

“It is well established that [p]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of a plaintiff's appeal.... [I]n order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved.... Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory.... Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wucik v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 113 Conn.App. 502, 505–506, 967 A.2d 572 (2009).

“Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court.... The scope of review of a trial court's factual decision on appeal is limited to a determination of whether it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings.... Conclusions are not erroneous unless they violate law, logic or reason or are inconsistent with the subordinate facts.... A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 665–66, 899 A.2d 26 (2006). In considering whether the plaintiffs properly pleaded facts sufficient to establish aggrievement, however, we view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. See generally St. Germain v. LaBrie, 108 Conn.App. 587, 594, 949 A.2d 518 (2008) (construing complaint in light most favorable to pleader, this court concluded plaintiff met both prongs for showing classical aggrievement); Chiulli v. Zola, 97 Conn.App. 699, 705, 905 A.2d 1236 (2006) (same). The interpretation of pleadings “is always a question of law for the court....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 573 n. 12, 864 A.2d 1 (2005).

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly dismissed their appeal because they had pleaded facts sufficient to establish aggrievement. We agree that the plaintiffs pleaded facts sufficient to allege statutory aggrievement.

General Statutes § 8–8 provides in relevant part: “(a) As used in this section: (1) ‘Aggrieved person’ means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes ... any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board.” Those persons who come within § 8–8(a)(1) are statutorily aggrieved and are not required to plead and to prove the elements of classical aggrievement. Here, the plaintiffs argue that they pleaded that they own property located in the zone governed by such regulations and that their property is specifically affected by the decision to amend § 2.3 of the regulations. Therefore, according to the plaintiffs, they alleged facts sufficient to establish that they are statutorily aggrieved by the amendment. We agree that their complaint alleges facts sufficient to establish statutory aggrievement.

We are guided in our decision by several relevant cases. In Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 374, 376, 610 A.2d 617 (1992), the plaintiffs appealed from a planning and zoning commission decision to increase lot size in zone B from 40,000 square feet to 80,000 square feet and to make all zone A requirements applicable to zone B. Our Supreme Court stated, albeit in dicta, that “[a]s owners of land in zone B [the zone affected by the amendments], the plaintiffs are aggrieved parties. See General Statutes § 8–8(b) [providing that an aggrieved party may appeal]; Fletcher v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 158 Conn. 497, 502–503, 264 A.2d 566 (1969).” Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, at 376 n. 3, 610 A.2d 617. Although our Supreme Court did not offer an analysis of its determination of aggrievement, it concluded, nonetheless, that the plaintiffs, as owners of land in the affected zone, were aggrieved. Id. There has been some discussion about whether the Supreme Court in Timber Trails Corp. was referring to statutory aggrievement, classical aggrievement or both. See Stauton v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 271 Conn. 152, 161–62, 856 A.2d 400 (2004) (unclear in Timber Trails Corp. whether statutory aggrievement, classical aggrievement or both were found); Harris v. Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 402, 413, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002) (“[a]lthough the question of aggrievement was not directly at issue [in Timber Trails Corp.], we noted in dicta that the plaintiffs had established both classical and statutory aggrievement”); Lewis v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 62 Conn.App. 284, 291 n. 8, 771 A.2d 167 (2001) (concluding that Supreme Court in Timber Trails Corp. found classical aggrievement, not statutory aggrievement).

In Cole v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 30 Conn.App. 511, 512, 620 A.2d 1324 (1993), the plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from the planning and zoning commission's decision to amend its regulations, specifically the regulations affecting the R–3 and R–5 zones. After an evidentiary hearing on aggrievement, the court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to prove aggrievement and dismissed the appeal for lack of standing. Id., at 513, 620 A.2d 1324. On appeal to this court, we specifically explained that classical aggrievement had not been proved: “The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs had ‘failed to demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest as distinguished from a general interest such as is the concern of members of the community as a whole and to establish a specific and legal interest which has been specially and injuriously affected by the action of the commission.’ ” Id., at 514, 620 A.2d 1324. We then concluded, citing Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 222 Conn. at 376 n. 3, 610 A.2d 617, that statutory aggrievement was proved: “The plaintiffs, however, as owners of land...