Lucero v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo.

Decision Date26 March 2013
Docket NumberNo. WD 74768.,WD 74768.
PartiesJoseph LUCERO, Appellant, v. The CURATORS OF the UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

George S. Smith, for Appellant.

Paul R. Maguffee, Columbia, MO, for Respondent.

Before Division Three: THOMAS H. NEWTON, Presiding Judge, JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge and GARY D. WITT, Judge.

JOSEPH M. ELLIS, Judge.

Appellant Joseph Lucero appeals from a judgment entered in the Circuit Court of Boone County granting summary judgment in favor of the Curators of the University of Missouri (Respondent) in an action filed by Appellant. Appellant sought damages for Respondent's alleged breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and also prayed for a declaratory judgment setting forth the rights and obligations that exist among the parties with regard to Respondent's faculty irresponsibility proceedings. For the following reasons, the judgment is affirmed.

In 2006, Appellant applied and was accepted to attend the University of Missouri School of Law. In 2007, during the fall semester of his second year, Appellant enrolled in two classes taught by Professor Pamela Smith. Appellant began to have problems with Professor Smith after she canceled several classes and ultimately rescheduled the time and days on which those two classes would meet.

Later in the semester, Professor Smith sent an email instructing the class on an assignment that required the class to write a research memorandum advocating one side in a high profile trademark lawsuit. In addition to the memorandum, each student would also have to present a topic that Professor Smith assigned to them regarding the same lawsuit. An email exchange regarding the assignment then ensued between Appellant and Professor Smith.

The emails from Appellant questioned the restrictions Professor Smith placed on the assignment, such as the prohibition on outside research and the subject of the assignment, which involved a trademark dispute between Paris Hilton and Hallmark Cards. Professor Smith's responses to Appellant's emails indicated she believed Appellant was unprepared for his class presentation and failed to comply with the prohibition against outside research, which she suggested resulted in an honor code violation.

Professor Smith forwarded Appellant's emails to both the dean of the law school (“the Dean”) and the associate dean for academic affairs at the law school. In her email to the deans, Professor Smith indicated that she found Appellant's emails to be threatening and did not feel safe with him in her class or in the law school. The email further requested that Appellant be removed from her classes, that an honor code investigation be opened, and that campus police be notified.

Following the emails, Professor Smith initiated an honor code violation action against Appellant for conducting outside research with respect to the class assignment. Professor Smith also brought subsequent honor code violations against Appellant with regard to other class assignments. All of the honor code violation actions initiated by Professor Smith were decided in favor of Appellant.

Professor Smith also filed a complaint with campus police regarding the nature of the emails she received from Appellant. Campus police investigated the matter but determined no further action was necessary. Appellant was never arrested or warned by campus police in response to Professor Smith's complaint.

Although Appellant was not removed from Professor Smith's classes by the Dean, he voluntarily withdrew from both classes prior to the end of the semester. On December 11, 2007, Appellant withdrew from the law school after finishing his exams.

Prior to withdrawing, however, Appellant filed a charge of faculty irresponsibility against Professor Smith with the university on November 15, 2007. On March 13, 2008, Appellant's lawyer requested an update as to the status of the faculty irresponsibility charge Appellant had filed against Professor Smith. On March 25, 2008, the Dean responded that the charge had been deemed abandoned and forfeited. After further inquiry from Appellant's counsel in the following months, the university's counsel informed Appellant that it had been recommended that the faculty irresponsibility proceedings be stayed until the civil proceedings between Appellant and Professor Smith were resolved.1

On October 14, 2008, Appellant filed a petition for damages in the Circuit Court of Boone County against Respondent. Appellant subsequently filed an amended petition for damages and declaratory judgment that alleged claims of breach of contractand breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and requested declaratory judgment setting forth the parties' rights and obligations under the faculty irresponsibility procedures set forth in Respondent's Faculty Bylaws.

On July 13, 2011, Respondent filed its motion for summary judgment. In its motion, Respondent asserted that Appellant could not sustain a claim for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. More specifically, Respondent asserted that Appellant failed to identify any specific and discrete promises Respondent breached for purposes of establishing a viable breach of contract claim between Appellant, as a student, and Respondent, as a university. The motion further alleged that Appellant lacked standing to request a declaratory judgment regarding Respondent's faculty irresponsibility procedures.

On December 1, 2011, the circuit court entered a judgment sustaining Respondent's motion for summary judgment as to all counts alleged in Appellant's amended petition. The judgment was silent as to the circuit court's grounds for granting Respondent's summary judgment motion. This appeal followed.

Appellant raises seven points on appeal. Because points III and VII are dispositive of this appeal, we address those points first.

In his third point, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining Respondent's motion for summary judgment with respect to his breach of contract claim because Appellant alleged specific and discrete promises that were breached by Respondent for which Respondent can be held liable for breach of contract. “Our review of a grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo. Sherf v. Koster, 371 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Mo.App. W.D.2012). “To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must show that there is no dispute of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). We review “the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered.” Harpagon MO, LLC v. Bosch, 370 S.W.3d 579, 581–82 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal quotation omitted). We may affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment under any theory that is supported by the record.” Duthoy v. Duthoy, 385 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Mo.App. W.D.2012). “When the trial court's order does not state the reasons for its grant of summary judgment, we presume that it is on the grounds specified in the movant's motion for summary judgment.” Sherf, 371 S.W.3d at 905.

While other jurisdictions have found a contractual relationship exists between a student and a university, see Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 F.Supp.2d 199, 206 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (explaining that New York courts have suggested that when “a student enrolls at a university, an implied contract arises”); Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 957 F.Supp. 306, 317 (D.Mass.1997) (stating that [u]niversities are capable of forming legally cognizable contractual relationships with their students”); Behrend v. State, 55 Ohio App.2d 135, 379 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1977) (stating that [g]enerally it may be stated that when a student enrolls in a college or university, pays his or her tuition and fees, and attends such school, the resulting relationship may reasonably be construed as being contractual in nature”), the parties have not cited, nor has our research uncovered, any case law in Missouri that expressly finds the existence of a contractual relationship between a studentand a university.2 However, even if we were to assume that the relationship between Appellant and Respondent was contractual in nature, Appellant has not alleged or established any specific promise or obligation that Respondent breached to form the basis of his breach of contract claim.

“In order to make a submissible case of breach of contract, the complaining party must establish the existence of a valid contract, the rights of plaintiff and obligations of defendant under the contract, a breach by defendant, and damages resulting from the breach.” C. Am. Health Sciences Univ., Belize Med. College v. Norouzian, 236 S.W.3d 69, 84 (Mo.App. W.D.2007) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Missouri law, therefore, requires Appellant to identify which rights or obligations Respondent breached under the contract in order to establish a claim for breach of contract. This requirement is consistent with case law from other jurisdictions addressing contractual liability between students and universities.

As both parties recognize, other jurisdictions have held that “an educational institution's brochures, policy manuals and other advertisements may form the basis of a legally cognizable contractual relationship between the institution and its students.” Bittle v. Oklahoma City Univ., 6 P.3d 509, 514 (Okla.Ct.App.2000). Nevertheless, [n]ot every dispute between a student and a university is amenable to a breach of contract claim.” Gally, 22 F.Supp.2d at 206. Rather, in order to assert a breach of contract claim against a university, a student plaintiff must “point to an identifiable contractual promise that the [university] defendant failed to honor.” Miller v. Loyola Univ. of New Orleans, 829 So.2d 1057, 1060 (La.Ct.App....

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