Lucero v. Parkinson Constr. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No.: 18-0515 (RC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | ELISEO LIMA LUCERO Plaintiff, v. PARKINSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., et al. Defendant. |
On December 11, 2018, this Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Eliseo Lima Lucero on his action to recover damages for overtime pay from Defendant Parkinson Construction Company under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.; the Maryland Wage and Hour Law, Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. Art., § 3-401 et seq.; and the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. Art., § 3-501 et seq. See Final J., ECF No. 22; Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed this Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on January 10, 2019. See Mot. for Atty's' Fees, ECF No. 23. On January 25, 2019, this matter was referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather for mediation. See Order Setting Mediation, ECF No. 26. However, mediation did not yield a resolution on the outstanding issue. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to receive reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the FLSA. See Mot. for Atty's' Fees at 1. Defendant argues that an award of attorneys' fees and costs is unreasonable because Plaintiff "intensely litigated on false pretenses." Def.'s Response to Mot. for Att'ys' Fees at 1, ECF No. 24.
Under the FLSA, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see, e.g., Driscoll v. George Washington Univ., 55 F. Supp. 3d 106, 111 (D.D.C. 2014). A court is to determine a reasonable fee using the "lodestar" method, whereby the number of hours reasonably expended is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See DL v. District of Columbia, No. 18-7004, 2019 WL 2180398, at *2 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2019) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). Therefore, in assessing whether an attorneys' fees award is reasonable, a court is to (1) determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate, (2) assess whether the hours billed are reasonable, and (3) consider whether adjustments or multipliers to the lodestar are warranted. See Martini v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 977 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
The reasonableness of an attorney's hourly rate should be considered in light of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for lawyers with comparable skills, experience, and reputation. See Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107). "[A]ttorneys' fee matrices [are] one type of evidence that 'provide[ ] a useful starting point' in calculating the prevailing market rate." Ventura v. L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 139 F. Supp. 3d 462, 463-64 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). For example, the D.C. Circuit has established that courts may look to the Laffey Matrix, a schedule of appropriate fees for an attorney conducting litigation in Washington, D.C., that is based on years of experience.Covington, 57 F.3d at 1105.1 Rather than merely declaring that the use of a particular matrix is appropriate in the instant case, a plaintiff should provide the court with evidence that the matrix enumerates the prevailing rate for attorneys in "this community for this type of litigation by attorneys with comparable experience." L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 139 F. Supp. 3d at 464.
To assess reasonableness, a court must also consider whether the number of hours billed for work by counsel are reasonable. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the hours billed and sought for reimbursement are reasonable. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Reyes v. Kimuell, 270 F. Supp. 3d 30, 36 (D.D.C 2017) (citing Herrera v. Mitch O'Hara LLC, 257 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2017)). The fee request "must be sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified." Herrera, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 47 (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
In determining whether billed hours are reasonable, courts should exclude hours that were not reasonably expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Productivity is the key factor that determines whether an attorney's time was reasonably expended. See Ventura v. Bebo Foods, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 8, 33-34 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892). To this end, acourt should exclude hours that are "duplicative, excessive, or otherwise unnecessary." Bebo Foods, 738 F. Supp. at 33-34 (citing Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892); see also Herrera, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 47; Serrano, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 198.
In addition, a court determining the reasonableness of hours billed may exclude time expended on motions that ultimately fail. See Bebo Foods, 738 F. Supp. at 33-34 (citing Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892). In Reyes, this Court found that "the hours billed by counsel were reasonable because counsel expended a reasonable amount of time on each task, were successful in all of their motions, and did not bill for duplicative work." 270 F. Supp. 3d at 38. But success is not the sole consideration. A party's fee award should not necessarily be reduced simply because that party was ultimately awarded less in damages than it initially requested, particularly where there is "no indication [plaintiff's] demands were unreasonable, frivolous, or otherwise entirely disconnected from reality." Radtke v. Caschetta, 822 F.3d 571, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
The lodestar calculation inherently encompasses most, if not all, of the factors constituting a reasonable attorney's fee. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 566 (1986). Therefore, there is a strong presumption that a fee yielded by the lodestar method is reasonable. See West v. Potter, 717 F.3d 1030, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Keepseagle v. Perdue, 334 F. Supp. 3d 58, 64 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 549 (2010)). The party requesting an adjustment to the lodestar amount bears the burden of justifying the proposed deviation. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 892.
In addition to a reasonable attorney's fee, a successful plaintiff is entitled to recuperate reasonable costs of the action under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216. Reasonable litigation coststhat are compensable under the FLSA include costs such as court filing fees, the cost of serving process of complaint, and the cost of postage. See Reyes, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 39; Serrano, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 198; Bebo Foods, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34.
Plaintiff proffers the USAO Laffey Matrix as evidence of attorneys' reasonable hourly rates for working on this case. Mot. for Atty's' Fees at 10. Plaintiff identifies several cases supporting his contention that this matrix is an appropriate guide for determining reasonable hourly rates here. Id. (citing Reyes, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 36; Al-Quraan v. 4115 8th St. NW, LLC, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2015); L.A. Howard Constr. Co., 139 F. Supp. at 464; Driscoll, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 120). Defendant provides no contrary evidence or argument. This Court finds that recent case law in this circuit supports the use of the USAO Laffey Matrix as a guide for calculating reasonable attorneys' fees awards in FLSA litigation in Washington, D.C.
At the time that they completed their work for this litigation, Plaintiff's attorneys Justin Zelikovitz and Jonathan P. Tucker had eight to ten years of experience each. See Mot. for Atty's' Fees, Ex. B at ¶¶ 3-4; see also Mot. for Atty's' Fees at 10. Under the USAO Laffey Matrix, the reasonable rate for each of their services was set at $417.00 per hour. See Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, USAO Attorney's Fees Matrix Laffey Matrix —2015-2019, U.S. Dep't of Justice (last visited Jun. 12, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/file/796471/download ("USAO Laffey Matrix 2015-2019"). Plaintiff's also employed a student associate, Tre Holloway; a paralegal, Nicolas Wulff Gonzalez; and an administrative assistant, Julie Gutierrez Gomez. See Mot. for Atty's' Fees at 10 (citingMot. for Atty's' Fees, Ex. B at ¶¶ 3-4). Using the USAO Laffey Matrix rate for paralegals and law clerks at the time that work for this litigation was completed, the reasonable fee for each of their services was set at $166.00 per hour. See USAO Laffey Matrix 2015-2019. Because Plaintiff correctly identified and applied the USAO Laffey Matrix in calculating the appropriate rates of counsel here, and Defendant has submitted no evidence or argument rebutting such rates, this Court accepts Plaintiff's proposed hourly rates as reasonable.
Plaintiff's counsel submitted detailed billing records. See generally Mot. for Atty's' Fees, Ex. A. The Court's examination of these records reveals no indication that counsel billed for duplicative work. Furthermore, counsel appears to have expended a reasonable amount of time on each task. A substantial number of the hours for which Plaintiff seeks reimbursement from Defendant were spent conducting discovery and responding to discovery motions filed by Defendant. See Mot. for Atty's' Fees, Ex. A at 1-2. More specifically, Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for 35.2 attorney hours and 16.2 staff hours spent conducting written discovery. Id.; Mot. for Atty's' Fees at 12. These hours are reasonable in light of the fact that Defendant submitted thirty-eight Requests for Production of Documents and twenty-nine Interrogatories. See Mot. for...
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