Lucia Mar Unified School Dist. v. Honig

• Decision Date: 14 March 1988
• Docket Number: No. S000064,S000064
• Citation: 750 P.2d 318,44 Cal.3d 830,244 Cal.Rptr. 677
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 750 P.2d 318, 45 Ed. Law Rep. 321 LUCIA MAR UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Bill HONIG, as Superintendent, etc. et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Page 677

244 Cal.Rptr. 677

44 Cal.3d 830, 750 P.2d 318, 45 Ed. Law Rep. 321

LUCIA MAR UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Bill HONIG, as Superintendent, etc. et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S000064.

Supreme Court of California.

March 14, 1988.

Rehearing Denied April 27, 1988.

Frank J. Fekete, Bakersfield, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Henry Ullerich, Office of the Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Joanne Lowe, State Dept. of Educ., Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

Section 59300 of the Education Code requires a school district to contribute part of the cost of educating pupils from the district at state schools for the severely handicapped. We must determine if that section imposes on a district a state-mandated "new program or higher level of service" for which the state must provide reimbursement under section 6 of article XIIIB of the California Constitution. ¹ The constitutional provision, adopted by initiative in 1979, declares, with exceptions not relevant here, that "[w]henever the Legislature ... mandates a new program or higher level of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of such program or increased level of service...."

The resolution of the question before us turns on whether the contributions made by a district pursuant to section 59300 are used to fund "a new program or higher level of service" and if so, whether the statute "mandates" that a district make the contribution set forth therein. We conclude that the contribution required by section 59300 is utilized to fund a "new program" as defined in the constitutional provision, but that it is not clear from the record whether districts are "mandated" to pay these costs. The matter will therefore be remanded to the Commission on State Mandates to make that determination.

The State Department of Education (department) operates schools for severely handicapped students, including schools for the deaf (§ 59000 et seq.), the blind (§ 59100 et seq.), and the neurologically handicapped (§ 59200 et seq.). Although prior to 1979, school districts were required by statute to contribute to the education of pupils from the districts at the state schools (former §§ 59021, 59121, 59221) these provisions were repealed in that year and on July 12, 1979, the state assumed the responsibility for full funding. (Stats. 1979, ch. 237, § 3, p. 493.) This responsibility existed when article XIIIB became effective on July 1, 1980 (art. XIIIB, § 10), and continued until section 59300 became effective on June 28, 1981. (Stats. 1981, ch. 102, § 17, p. 703.)

Section 59300 represents an attempt by the state to compel school districts to share in these costs. The section provides, "Notwithstanding any provision of this part to the contrary, the district of residence of the parent or guardian of any pupil attending a state-operated school pursuant to this part, excluding day pupils, shall pay the school of attendance for each pupil an amount equal to 10 percent of the excess annual cost of education of pupils attending a state-operated school pursuant to this part." ²

Starting in 1981, the department attempted to collect the contributions called for in the section by sending invoices to the school district superintendents. When the invoices were not paid, their amount was deducted from the appropriations made by the state to the districts for the support of the schools.

The Government Code sets forth a procedure to determine whether a statute imposes state-mandated costs on a school district or other local agency under article XIIIB. (Gov. Code, § 17500 et seq.). The district must file a test claim with the Commission on State Mandates (commission) which, after a hearing, decides whether the statute mandates a "new program or increased level of service." (Id., §§ 17521, 17551, 17556.) If a claim is found to be reimbursable, the commission must determine the amount to be reimbursed. (Id., § 17557.) The code specifies the procedure to be followed by a local agency to obtain reimbursement if the commission has determined that reimbursement is due. (Id., § 17558 et seq.) If the Legislature refuses to appropriate money to satisfy a mandate found to be reimbursable by the commission, a claimant may bring an action for declaratory relief to enjoin enforcement of the mandate. (Id., § 17612, subd. (b).) ³ In the event the commission finds against the local agency, it may bring a proceeding in administrative mandate under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure to challenge the commission's determination. (Gov. § 17559.) The procedure provided in the code is the exclusive means by which a local agency may claim reimbursement for mandated costs. (Id., § 17552.)

In 1984 plaintiff Lucia Mar Unified School District and other school districts (plaintiffs) filed a test claim before the commission, ⁴ asserting that section 59300 requires them to make payments for a "new program or increased level of service," and that they are entitled to reimbursement pursuant to section 6 of article XIIIB. The commission denied the claim, finding no reimbursable mandate because, although section 59300 increased plaintiffs' costs for educating students at state-operated schools, it did not impose on the districts a new program or higher level of service.

Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate, declaratory relief, and restitution against the commission, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction (superintendent), and the department. They sought a declaration that section 59300 violates section 6 of article XIIIB, and prayed for orders to compel the commission to reverse its determination, and the superintendent and the department to reimburse them for the amounts withheld under the authority of section 59300. The trial court affirmed the commission's decision. It, too, held that section 59300 does not mandate a new program or higher level of service, finding that the section only calls for an "adjustment of costs." ⁵

The court held, further, that it had no jurisdiction to issue orders to the superintendent to refund the sums withheld from plaintiffs because the commission's decisions may only be challenged by a proceeding in administrative mandate under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Gov. Code, §§ 17552, 17559.) Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, 198 Cal.App.3d 299, 233 Cal.Rptr. 531, reasoning that a shift in the funding of an existing program is not a new program or a higher level of service. It declined to rule whether restitution from the superintendent was an appropriate remedy.

The commission argues before this court, as it did below, that section 59300 does not mandate a new program or a higher level of service. The superintendent and the department express no opinion as to the merits of plaintiffs' assertions, but argue that if we should find a reimbursable mandate, plaintiffs' remedy is to seek an appropriation from the Legislature rather than reimbursement from the department.

We recognize that, as is made indisputably clear from the language of the constitutional provision, local entities are not entitled to reimbursement for all increased costs mandated by state law, but only those costs resulting from a new program or an increased level of service imposed upon them by the state. In keeping with this principle, we recently held in County of Los Angeles v. State of California (1987) 43 Cal.3d 46, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202, that legislation requiring local governments and other employers to increase certain workers' compensation benefits did not invoke the subvention requirement because the state mandate did not provide for a "program." We reasoned that the additional expense to the local agency mandated by the legislation arose as an incidental impact of a law which applied generally to all state residents and entities, and this type of expense was not what the voters had in mind when they adopted section 6 of article XIIIB. (See also City of Anaheim v. State of California (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1478, 1484, 235 Cal.Rptr. 101.)

We defined a "program" as used in article XIIIB as one that carries out the "governmental function of providing services to the public, or laws which, to implement a state policy, impose unique requirements on local governments and do not apply generally to all residents and entities in the state." ( County of Los Angeles, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 56, 233 Cal.Rptr. 38, 729 P.2d 202.) Unquestionably the contributions called for in section 59300 are used to fund a "program" within this definition, for the education of handicapped children is clearly a governmental function providing a service to the public, and the section imposes requirements on school districts not imposed on all the state's residents. Nor can there be any doubt that although the schools for the handicapped have been operated by the state for many years, the program was new insofar as plaintiffs are concerned, since at the time section 59300 became effective they were not required to contribute to the education of students from their districts at such schools.

The fact that the impact of the section is to require plaintiffs to contribute funds to operate the state schools for the handicapped rather than to themselves administer the program does not detract from our conclusion that it calls for the establishment of a new program within the meaning of the constitutional provision. To hold, under the circumstances of this case, that a shift in funding of an existing program from the state to a local entity is not a new program as to the local agency would, we think, violate the intent underlying section 6 of article XIIIB. That article imposed spending limits on state and local governments, and it followed by one year the adoption by initiative of article XIIIA, which...