Luckhart v. Luckhart

• Decision Date: 11 April 1903
• Citation: 94 N.W. 461,120 Iowa 248
• Parties: LYDIA A. LUCKHART AND GERTRUDE M. LUCKHART, Appellees, v. WILLIAM LUCKHART et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

94 N.W. 461

120 Iowa 248

LYDIA A. LUCKHART AND GERTRUDE M. LUCKHART, Appellees, v. WILLIAM LUCKHART et al., Appellants

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

April 11, 1903

Appeal from Grundy District Court.--HON. F. C. PLATT, Judge.

SUIT in equity for the partition of certain real estate. From a decree finding that one John Luckhart at the time of his death was the owner of a certain three hundred and twenty acres of land in Grundy county, Iowa which William Luckhart claimed to own, he (William Luckhart) appeals.

Reversed.

J. H Scales for appellant.

Courtright & Arbuckle and John S. Roberts for appellees.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

The suit is to partition three hundred and twenty acres of land and five town lots, but the only controversy is over two quarter sections which appellant, William Luckhart, claims to own in virtue of conveyances thereof from John Luckhart executed in August of the year 1877. John Luckhart, who at one time was the owner of this land, was the father of the defendants to this action, by his first marriage. His first wife died in the year 1876, and in June of the year 1879 he married the plaintiff Lydia Luckhart, by whom he had one child, Gertrude M., who with her mother, is also a plaintiff. The father, John Luckhart, died intestate January 19, 1899 and plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to a part of his estate, which included, among other things, the land in dispute. The record title to this land, as has been observed, is in defendant William Luckhart, under and by virtue of his deed executed in the year 1877. But plaintiffs claim that this deed was without consideration, was never delivered, was not intended to convey a beneficial interest, and that the grantee therein held the legal title in trust for John Luckhart. The deeds conveying the land to William contained covenants of general warranty, recited considerations, and, as they are of record, the presumption is that William is the owner of the land, and his claim thereto should be sustained, unless it be for some of the matter set forth by plaintiffs in their pleadings, and established by their proofs. These are (1) that the deeds were never delivered: (2) that out of the circumstances surrounding the transactions a resulting trust arose in favor of the grantor or his heirs, which should be established and enforced.

Counsel for appellees frankly say that they have never claimed, and do not now contend, that there was an express trust in the land. But if they had, such contention would be without merit, for the reason that such a trust cannot be established by parol testimony. If they have shown that there was in fact no delivery of the deeds, then plaintiffs would be entitled to share in the land; but such claim distinctly negatives the idea of a trust, for defendant could not well have held the legal title in trust unless he acquired it in some manner. The deeds, as will be noticed, were from father to son. They recited valuable considerations, and the evidence shows that they were filed for record by the grantor. Under such circumstances, a delivery will be presumed. Valter v. Blavka, 195 Ill. 610 (63 N.E. 499); Connard v. Colgan, 55 Iowa 538, 8 N.W. 351. Moreover, there is other direct testimony of an actual delivery to the grantee. Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient testimony to overcome this evidence, and we must find there was an actual delivery of the deeds. As they recited a consideration, and there is no proof of fraud or mistake, it is not permissible for plaintiffs to establish a trust by showing want of consideration therefor. This rule is settled by a long line of authorities. Acker v. Priest, 92 Iowa 610, 61 N.W. 235; Gregory v. Bowlsby, 115 Iowa 327, 88 N.W. 822, and cases cited.

Appellees rely, however, on evidence to the effect that it was not intended that the grantee should take a beneficial estate. There are some general statements in the opinions of this court to the effect that where a conveyance is made without consideration, and it appears from the circumstances that the grantee was not to take beneficially, a resulting trust arises. See Williams v. Williams, 108 Iowa 91, 78 N.W. 792; Dunn v. Zwilling Bros., 94 Iowa 233, 62 N.W. 746. And there may be cases where this should be the rule. But generally speaking, a trust cannot be established by showing, as against a deed reciting a consideration, the receipt of which is acknowledged by the grantees, that there was in fact no consideration paid. See cases heretofore cited, and particularly Acker v. Priest. As the deeds ran directly from John Luckhart to his son William Luckhart, there is no room for the doctrine of resulting trust, growing out of the fact that John furnished the consideration for the land. He was the owner thereof, and made a transfer directly to his son; and, even if there was no valuable consideration, the transfer would be good as a gift or advancement based on love and affection, and no trust would arise. Aker v. Priest, supra, and cases cited. Because of such rules and presumptions, it is difficult, in any case of this kind, to establish a resulting trust. There is neither claim nor showing of any fraud perpetrated by William, nor is there any evidence that the conveyance was made for the purpose of defrauding the second wife.

It goes without saying that a pure resulting trust may be established by parol, but a trust depending upon an agreement of the parties cannot be so established. What, then, are the exact facts on which appellees rely to establish a resulting trust. They are that William never paid any consideration for the land; that he never had possession of the land except as a tenant; that John, the grantor, managed the land for some time after the deeds were made, and until about the year 1886; certain declarations made by William regarding his possession of the property; that John Luckhart put improvements on the land, and rented part of it to a stranger or...