Luedke v. Luedke
Decision Date | 26 December 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 1285S530,1285S530 |
Citation | 487 N.E.2d 133 |
Parties | Shari Lou LUEDKE, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Robert Emil LUEDKE, Appellee (Defendant below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John C. Vandivier, Jr., Raber & Vandivier, Danville, for appellant.
F. Robert Lively, Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellee Robert Emil Luedke brings this Petition for transfer. Appellant Shari Lou Luedke filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on January 6, 1982, and Appellee filed a counter-petition twelve days later. On November 9, 1982, the trial court entered its judgment and Decree of Dissolution, granting Wife's petition. The decree awarded her custody of the children; ordered Husband to pay $85.00 per week per child for support, in addition to all reasonable medical expenses of the children; determined the distribution of the marital property; and ordered Husband to pay a portion of Wife's attorney's fees. Wife appealed, claiming the trial court had abused its discretion in dividing the marital property and in deciding the amount of her attorney's fees to be paid by Husband. The Court of Appeals, 476 N.E.2d 853, (Miller, P.J., with Conover, J., and Young, J., concurring) reversed the trial court judgment and held the trial court had abused its discretion in the division of property and order for payment of attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on those issues.
We find the Court of Appeals erred on these issues. Accordingly, we vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
Other issues were raised by Wife concerning the conduct of the trial judge and admission of certain items of evidence. These issues were disposed of by the Court of Appeals' finding Wife showed no prejudice, and concluding there was no reversible error. Furthermore, no question was raised on appeal concerning the grant of the dissolution, award of child custody, or order for child support. Therefore, we adopt the findings of the Court of Appeals on these issues and consider only the alleged abuse of discretion by the trial judge in dividing the marital property and awarding attorney's fees.
The most significant holding of the Court of Appeals which is presented in this case is that where one spouse is the primary wage earner whose income finances the acquisition of marital assets, and the other spouse is the primary homemaker who earns no income, Ind.Code Sec. 31-1-11.5-11(b)(1) requires a "fifty-fifty" division of the marital property, adjusted by the facts relating to subsections (2)-(5). This "fifty-fifty" starting point will be abandoned only where the trial court determines one spouse has "seriously neglected" his or her role. Luedke v. Luedke (1985), Ind.App., 476 N.E.2d 853, 859-860, reh. denied (1985), 479 N.E.2d 619. The Court of Appeals further held the rebuttable presumption places the burden on each party to prove an equal division of the marital property in a particular case is not just and reasonable. Id., at 865. We do not so interpret Ind.Code Sec. 31-1-11.5-11(b)(1).
The interpretation of subsections (1) through (5) of Ind.Code Sec. 31-1-11.5-11(b) has been that the trial judge uses these factors in making a division of property and in weighing the evidence of contributions by the parties in the various manners described therein. This sensitive and difficult task of the trial judge to weigh these factors and make a division has been left to his discretion. Perhaps it could be said that in beginning to divide property pursuant to a dissolution of marriage, one's mind ought to lean toward an equal division until facts are brought forward to indicate otherwise; but to require as a matter of law that the trial judge work from the standpoint of a rebuttable presumption of a "fifty-fifty" split and require any variance to be supported by particular findings of fact, is to put an artificial structure on the fact-finding process which may very well impinge the trial judge's ability to openly weigh all the facts and circumstances, giving equal regard to all of them. An examination of all similar cases would undoubtedly show an equal number of times where trial judges have divided assets evenly or have found the evidence to weigh in favor of the homemaker, awarding her more than fifty per cent (50%). Of course, the converse is also true. The reasons for this, even as the Court of Appeals pointed out, is that a complete and thorough examination needs to be made of the quantity and quality of the contribution of both the wage earner and homemaker in order to come to a final determination. The actions of people in the course of daily life are not easily susceptible to mathematical calculation. For this reason, statutory and case law have been interpreted to provide that the Legislature has set guidelines to be used by the trial judge in weighing evidence and dividing property, and case law has been that the trial judge's decision will be found wanting on appeal only if it can be shown that he abused his discretion in applying these guidelines. This was expressed clearly in a similar situation by the Court of Appeals in Temple v. Temple (1982), Ind.App., 435 N.E.2d 259, 262:
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