Luehrman v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby Cnty.

• Decision Date: 30 April 1879
• Citation: 70 Tenn. 425
• Parties: Henry Luehrman v. Taxing District of Shelby County and others.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

70 Tenn. 425

Henry Luehrman

v.Taxing District of Shelby County and others.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

April Term, 1879.

FROM SHELBY.

Appeal in error from the Circuit Court of Shelby County. J. O. PIERCE, J.

L. B. HORRIGAN, W. M. RANDOLPH, D. E. MYERS and O. YERGER for Luehrman et als.

C. W. HEISKELL, GANTT & PATTERSON, MCKISICK & TURLEY, and ESTES & ELLETT for Taxing District.

COOPER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The decision of this case turns upon the constitutionality of the act of the Legislature repealing the charter of the City of Memphis, (1879, ch. 10), the act to establish Taxing Districts, (1879, ch. 11), and the act amendatory thereof, (1879, ch. 84).

The first objection urged against them is, that they violate the following prohibition of the Constitution: “No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title.” The objection is, that each of the first two acts embraces more than one subject. The title of chapter 10 is: “An act to repeal the charter of certain municipal corporations, and to remand the territory and inhabitants thereof to the government of the State.” The objection seems to be that while the subject of the title and of the act is the repeal of certain municipal charters, the fourth section of the act provides that the public buildings, squares, etc., “and all other property, real and personal, hitherto used by such corporations for municipal purposes, are hereby transferred to the custody and control of the State, to remain public property as it has always been, for the uses to which said property has been hitherto applied.” The title of chapter 11 is: “A bill to establish Taxing Districts in this State, and to provide the means of local government for the same.” The objection is, that while the subject of the act is that of the title, it embraces many details, such as the conferring judicial powers on the executive officers of the corporation, and making certain official delinquencies felonies, which, while germane to the object of the act, are, it is said, independent subjects.

Under a similar provision in the Constitution of other States to the one quoted, it has been uniformly held, that only the general or ultimate object of the act need be stated in the title, and not the details by which that object is to be attained. Dillon's Mun. Cor., sec. 28, and cases cited. “There has been a general disposition,” says Mr. Cooley, citing a large number of cases, “to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.” Const. Lim., 146. And Nicholson, C. J., after stating and considering those purposes, announced, as the conclusion of this court, that “any provision of an act directly or indirectly relating to the subject expressed in the title, having a natural connection therewith, and not foreign thereto, should be held to be embraced in it. This court, thereupon, held that a provision for a tax on privileges was properly included in an act entitled “An act to fix the State tax on property.” Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heis., 504, 523. Upon like grounds a provision for the organization and sitting of courts in new counties, was held to be properly embraced in an act, entitled “An act to authorize the formation of new counties and to change county boundaries.” Brandon v. State, 16 Ind., 197. And an act entitled “An act for revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city of Dubuque, and to establish a city court therein,” was held to express only one object by its title, which was the revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city, the court adding that the city court, not being an unusual tribunal in such a municipality, might be provided by the act, whether mentioned in the title or not. Davis v. Woolreugh, 9 Iowa, 104. “We think it plain,” says Folger, J., “that an act creating a municipal corporation, and giving it the necessary legislative, taxing, judicial and police powers, embraces but one subject.” Harris v. People, 50 N. Y., 601. And see to the same effect, Village of Gloversville v. Howell, 70 N. Y., 290, which was a suit for the recovery of penalties under “An act to reorganize the village of Gloversville.” The rule of construction upon which these decisions are based, is so obviously the dictate of good sense, that it has been adopted with entire unanimity by courts and text-writers. And under the peculiar wording of our Constitution, which has been held to render the act void in toto where more than one subject is embraced in it, although only one is expressed in the title, a strict construction, as to the correctness of which I entertain grave doubts, it becomes very important to adhere to the suggestions of Judge Cooley, which are quoted with approbation by Chief Justice Nicholson, in 8 Heis., 519. “The generality of a title,” says that eminent judge and writer, “is no objection to it so long as it is not made a cover to legislation, incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection. The Legislature must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be the object of a statute, and how much particularity shall be employed in the title in defining it.”

Tested by these rules, it is clear that the provision touching the property of the corporation whose charter was repealed, in the first of the acts under consideration, was not an independent subject, and was properly embraced in the act. For, it was not so much the enactment of a positive provision, as the enunciation of a legal result of the repeal. Dill. Mun. Cor., sec. 30; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; and see what Cooley, J., says on this point in People v. Hurlburt, 24 Mich., 44. It related indirectly certainly, and perhaps we might say directly, to the subject of the act. And the same may be said, with even more certainty, of the details of the second act, all of which are, “directly or indirectly,” connected with the local government, the creation of which was the subject thereof. The Constitution, it may be added, provides that “the Legislature may also vest such jurisdiction in corporation courts as may be deemed necessary.” Art. 6, sec. 1. And judicial duties, it is well settled, may be added to those proper to the office of mayor, recorder, or other executive of a municipal corporation. Dill. Mun. Corp., sec. 147; Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Col., 382.

Another objection to these acts is, that they were special, relating exclusively to the corporation of Memphis, not general, and therefore violative of another provision of the Constitution. “No corporation shall be created, or its powers increased or diminished by special laws; but the General Assembly shall provide, by general laws, for the organization of all corporations hereafter created, which laws may, at any time, be altered or repealed; and no such alteration or repeal shall interfere with or divest rights which have become vested.” Const., art. 11, sec. 8. There can be no doubt that the repealing act was directed, and exclusively applied to the corporation of the city of Memphis, and just as little doubt that the main object of the other act was to furnish a new charter for the inhabitants of the territoral limits of that city.

If the question were a new one, I would be inclined to hold, that the section of the Constitution just cited was intended only as a restriction upon the legislative powers over private corporations. The weight of judicial authority has been, however, to treat words in a Constitution relating to corporations generally, such as “corporate powers,” “body politic or corporate,” and ““charters of incorporation,” as applying equally to public and private corporations. Purdy v. People, 4 Hill, 384, overruling 2 Hill, 31;Atkinson v. Railroad Company, 15 Ohio St., 21;State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St., 18;Archison v. Bartholew, 4 Kans., 124; Mayor of Morristown v. Shelton, 1 Head, 24. It seems, also, that the journals of the constitutional convention of 1870 contain evidence that a motion to limit the provisions of the section, above quoted, to private corporations, was voted down. Under these circumstances, although the history of the corresponding section in the previous Constitution of 1834, and the peculiar wording and context of the clause in question leave little doubt in my mind that only private corporations were intended. I will examine the objection made, upon the concession that public corporations are included.

The prohibition of the Constitution is against the creation or the increase or diminution of the powers of a corporation by special law, and the direction is to provide by general laws “for the organization of all corporations hereafter created.” The repeal of a general law, passed in accordance with this requirement, would, necessarily, affect all corporations organized under it. But the intention, so far as appears, was not to interfere with existing public corporations, however diverse might be the provisions of their respective charters. The powers of such corporations could not, it may be, be increased or diminished except by a general law, while there is nothing to prevent the repeal of an existing charter by special law, with a view to the reorganization of the corporate community under a general law. In no other way could the old charters be changed, except indeed by an indiscriminate repeal, a sweeping innovation certainly not expressed, and which the courts are not called upon to imply. The Legislature might have enacted, after the adoption of the new Constitution, a general law, as has been done in regard to private corporations, for the organization of public corporations, and either not interfere with pre-existing charters, or only repeal such of them as chose to organize under...