Lufkin v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of The Supreme Court of Tenn..

• Citation: 336 S.W.3d 223
• Decision Date: 02 February 2011
• Docket Number: No. M2010–00827–SC–R3–BP.,M2010–00827–SC–R3–BP.
• Parties: David A. LUFKIN, SR.v.BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT of Tennessee.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

336 S.W.3d 223

David A. LUFKIN, SR.

v.BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT of Tennessee.

No. M2010–00827–SC–R3–BP.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.

Feb. 2, 2011 Session.March 22, 2011.

Thomas F. Mabry, Seymour, Tennessee, for the appellant, David A. Lufkin, Sr.Sandy Garrett, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JJ., joined.SHARON G. LEE, J.

An attorney who was suspended from the practice of law for two years and assessed costs associated with the suspension proceedings appeals to this Court for relief from all or a portion of the assessed costs. While this appeal was pending, the attorney filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and his pre-bankruptcy debts were discharged by order entered by the Bankruptcy Court on December 10, 2010. We hold that the assessment of costs of the disciplinary proceeding was a debt that was discharged in the attorney's bankruptcy case and is, therefore, no longer due and owing. Accordingly, the attorney's appeal to this Court is moot.

On December 16, 1999, this Court granted attorney David A. Lufkin, Sr.'s application to be placed on disability inactive status pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 21.3.¹ In July of 2006, Mr. Lufkin was reinstated to active status. In September of 2006, the Board of Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) filed a petition to temporarily suspend Mr. Lufkin from the practice of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 4.3.² We granted this petition by order of October 17, 2006. In April of 2007, the Board filed an additional petition for discipline against Mr. Lufkin based on seven complaints. Following a hearing by the Board Hearing Panel (“the Panel”) in June of 2009, the Panel recommended that Mr. Lufkin be suspended for two years, retroactive to his suspension on October 17, 2006; that he attend a specified amount of additional continuing legal education within the next two years; and that his practice be subject to the supervision of a practice monitor for one year should his law license be reinstated. Thereafter, on August 18, 2009, this Court entered an Order of Enforcement accepting the Panel's recommendations and assessing Mr. Lufkin with costs of the suspension proceedings in the amount of $11,277.88, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 24.3.³

Mr. Lufkin subsequently filed a petition with the Board pursuant to section 24.3 ⁴ requesting that the $11,277.88 cost assessment “be waived entirely, or the payment of [the costs] be modified and that payment of such costs not be required prior to the Petitioner having his license returned to active status,” in part, on the ground of “extreme financial hardship.” By order of March 11, 2010, the Panel ruled that the cost assessment should be reduced by $2,554 because a portion of the assessment was unwarranted. The Panel ordered Mr. Lufkin to pay the $8,723.88 balance as a condition precedent to his reinstatement.

On April 12, 2010, Mr. Lufkin appealed to this Court pursuant to section 1.3 of Supreme Court Rule 9 and requested that this balance be further reduced or waived for financial hardship and other reasons. Thereafter, on September 1, 2010, Mr. Lufkin filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition under the federal Bankruptcy Code, codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). On December 10, 2010, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee entered an order granting Mr. Lufkin a discharge under section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.

“A discharge in bankruptcy is an involuntary release by operation of law of asserted and non-asserted claims by a creditor against a person” that has filed a bankruptcy petition. Parnham v. Parnham, No. M1998–00915–COA–R3–CV, 2001 WL 120734, at *2 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb. 14, 2001) (citing In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 476 (E.D.Mich.2000)); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 503 (Bankr.D.N.J.1997). A discharge operates to void a debtor's personal liability for any judgment obtained before the debtor filed his or her bankruptcy petition with respect to any debt discharged under section 727. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2006); Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Clay, 984 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted). Disciplinary proceeding costs assessed to an attorney pursuant to section 24.3 are included among those debts discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In re Love, 442 B.R. 868, 882–83 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.2011).

Without ruling or commenting on the merits of Mr. Lufkin's petition, we hold that Mr. Lufkin's appeal to this Court is moot and should be dismissed because the costs for which he seeks relief have been discharged in bankruptcy and are no longer owed. A case, such as the one before us, that does not involve presently existing rights, “live issues that are within a court's power to resolve, and parties who have a legally cognizable interest in the resolution of these issues,” is no longer justiciable. State ex rel. DeSelm v. Jordan, 296 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tenn.Ct.App.2009). A case may lose its justiciability and thereby become moot as the result of a court decision, acts of the parties, or some other event that occurs during the pendency of the case. Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Tenn.2009). If a case no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of judicial relief to the prevailing party it will be considered moot. Id. Mr. Lufkin's liability for the costs and expenses of his disciplinary proceedings was nullified by his discharge in bankruptcy, and he no longer requires relief in this Court from the assessment of those costs and expenses. Therefore, this appeal is...