Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp. of Cal.
| Citation | 244 P.2d 764,111 Cal.App.2d 431 |
| Parties | LUKE v. MERCANTILE ACCEPTANCE CORP. OF CALIFORNIA et al. Civ. 4363. |
| Decision Date | 28 May 1952 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
Ralph Robinson, Fresno, for appellants.
Louis W. Caporale, Jr., Fresno, for respondent.
A jury trial in this action for damages for conversion of an automobile resulted in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $580.82 compensatory damages, and $2,500 exemplary and punitive damages. Defendants appeal from the judgment entered against them for these amounts. They assert that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and judgment and that the court erred in the admission and exclusion of evidence and in its instructions to the jury.
On September 2, 1949, defendants, who were engaged in the business of selling used cars, sold a used 1949 Ford automobile to one Diego Martinez. Martinez traded in a 1941 car as down payment and a contract of conditional sale was executed by the Barnett Car Company and Martinez. The contract recited a balance due on the 1949 Ford of $1,570.56, payable in monthly installments of $65.44 for 24 months. Martinez owed a balance of $451.08 on the 1941 car which he traded in and stated that he expected to receive funds from the government with which he would pay this balance. He then executed and delivered a promissory note for $451.08, to A. J. Barnett, payable on March 2, 1950. The note bears the following notation:
'It is further agreed that this note is secured by 1941 Ford, Motor #98BA58426 subject to Mercantile Acceptance Co lien and that no assignment of interest or equity will be accepted unless this note is first paid in full.'
The note was not made a part of the conditional sales agreement and was not referred to therein. Barnett Car Company sold and assigned the contract of conditional sale to defendant Mercantile Acceptance Corporation on or about September 2, 1949, and retained the promissory note. The 1949 Ford was delivered to Martinez and the monthly payments on the contract were thereafter made by him until April 1950 and thereafter by Plaintiff Luke to Mercantile Acceptance Corporation to and including the payment on July 1, 1950.
On or about April 25, 1950, plaintiff Luke purchased the equity of Martinez in this car, giving him a check in the sum of $290 and $10 in cash. At the time of this transaction Martinez informed Luke that there was a balance of $1,047 owing on the car under a conditional sales contract held by Mercantile Acceptance Corporation, which contract called for monthly payments of $65.44. However, Martinez did not inform Luke of any claim of the Barnetts with reference to the automobile and Martinez did not mention the promissory note which he had given Barnett.
On April 29, 1950, Martinez and Luke went to the office of the defendant Mercantile Acceptance Corporation to formally transfer and assign the Martinez equity to Luke. Martinez and Luke talked to one Cliff, whom they presumed to be the manager in charge. Cliff informed them that he did not have time to prepare the equity assignment and asked them to return later. Luke then asked Cliff if he, Luke, should 'go ahead' and make the payments before the transfer was formally made and Cliff informed him that it was 'all right' to make the payments. No mention was made by anyone of any claim in favor of the Barnetts or as to the promissory note held by them. Luke then made three monthly payments to Mercantile Acceptance Corporation on the following dates: May 6th, June 3rd and July 1st, 1950.
At the time he made the May payment, Luke called Cliff's attention to the fact that the receipt was made out to Diego Martinez, whereupon Cliff said 'Go ahead and make the payments under that name' and stated that it would be 'all right' pending the formal transfer of the equity to Luke on their records. Luke then informed Cliff that he, Luke, was the new equitable owner of the car and no objection was then made to Luke as such owner or to his possession and use of the automobile.
On the morning of August 5, 1950, Luke went to the office of the acceptance corporation and tendered the August payment on the contract. The cashier refused to accept it and referred Luke to Mr. Basham the manager of the defendant acceptance corporation, who informed Luke that Martinez owed the Barnett brothers $428 and that Luke would have to 'straighten this out' with the Barnett company. Basham did not then claim that the August payment was 'late' or that there was any default under the terms of the sales contract and told Luke that he should see the Barnett company and make the 'necessary arrangements.'
Luke then talked to defendant Jess Barnett, who stated that he wanted his money and that he had men out to pick up the car. Luke asked for time to see Martinez about 'straightening out' the Barnett claim. Barnett said 'I can stop my men, but I can't stop Mercantile's men.' Luke then drove the car to a service station, and while it was being serviced, one Linn, who stated that he represented the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation, repossessed the automobile despite the strenuous objection of Luke.
On August 12th Luke and his attorney went to see Basham and were informed by him that he had picked the car up for Barnett and that he 'didn't pick it up for nonpayment.' Basham informed them that under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act they had no right to pick up the car because Martinez was 'in the service' and that if they would get Mrs. Martinez to sign for the car, he would return it to them; that he had already checked on Luke's credit and was ready and willing to finance the car with him. He also stated that Luke had better 'straighten out' the Barnett claim if he wanted the car; that he was interested in securing collection of the promissory note and that he was collecting the note for Barnett.
Basham testified that on August 5th he asked Luke if he had any of the necessary documents signed by Martinez and further told him that these documents were necessary for a transfer to Luke; that he supplied Luke with the necessary forms, including a power of attorney to sign Martinez' name to the legal owner's certificate; that he asked Luke and his attorney for some proof of their title and stated that they had no documents of any nature relative to the automobile and that he would have to have the white registration certificate out of the automobile. He further testified that they were looking for the automobile after they received notice that Martinez had gone into the Marine Corps; that Mrs. Martinez told them that Martinez had sold the car to someone and that she did not know his name or where he was located; that the reason his company repossessed the automobile was because they knew that the car was no longer in the possession of Martinez; that they did not know who had possession of it, and for that reason they had no insurance; that the car was repossessed because the August payment was late; that the Mercantile Acceptance Corporation had a very heavy investment in the automobile and that they were trying to protect their interest in the car.
Some time in August, after the repossession, Luke located Martinez, who was in the Marine Corps, and obtained his signature to a bill of sale and thereupon filed this action. On August 14, 1950, the Barnett Car Company filed a claim and delivery action against Martinez and Mercantile Acceptance Corporation and the automobile was returned to Barnett Car Company under a writ of possession issued in said action.
The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendants unlawfully converted the automobile involved. Plaintiff purchased the equity of Martinez in the car for a valuable consideration and possession was immediately transferred to the plaintiff. The fact that plaintiff was the equitable owner of the car, coupled with his actual and lawful possession thereof at the time it was forcibly taken from him, entitled him to bring an action in conversion, even though he had not then secured a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
...rectify the situation. 4 (Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., supra, 8 Cal.App.3d 339, 354, 87 Cal.Rptr. 226; Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp. (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 431, 244 P.2d 764.) "The object of exemplary damages is to make the example as well as the punishment fit the offense . . . ." (......
-
Maheu v. Hughes Tool Company
...802 (2d Dist.1950). Although punitive damages must bear a "reasonable relationship" to actual damages, Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp., 111 Cal.App.2d 431, 244 P.2d 764, 769 (1952); Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948), there is no fixed ratio by which to ......
-
Monge v. Superior Court
...in an appropriate cause of action. (See Billie v. Manning (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 142, 145, 210 P.2d 254; Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp. (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 431, 437-438, 244 P.2d 764; Browand v. Scott Lumber Co. (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 68, 73-74, 269 P.2d 891; Sullivan v. Matt (1955) 130......
-
Williams v. Bone
...& Thrift Co. of Modesto, 124 Cal.App. 131, 12 P.2d 50; Prentice v. Zumwalt, 124 Cal.App. 646, 13 P.2d 379; Luke v. Mercantile Acceptance Corp., 111 Cal.App.2d 431, 244 P.2d 764; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.2d 791, 197 P.2d 713; Wolfsen v. Hathaway, Cal., 187 P.2d ......