Monge v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 09 January 1986
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 525, 40 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,238 Martha MONGE, and Allison Patton, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent, CROWN GIBRALTER GRAPHIC CENTER, INC., Richard Crockett, Frank Matranga, and Armando Vasquez, Real Parties in Interest. B015480.

Page 64

222 Cal.Rptr. 64

176 Cal.App.3d 503, 54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 525,

40 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,238

Martha MONGE, and Allison Patton, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent, CROWN GIBRALTER GRAPHIC CENTER, INC., Richard Crockett, Frank Matranga, and Armando Vasquez, Real Parties in Interest.

B015480.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Jan. 9, 1986.

Richard B. Hauser, Chatsworth, and Patrick H. Aspell, Pasadena, for petitioners

No appearance for respondent.

John Nouskajian, Jr., Patricia M. Coleman, and Terrence L. Cranert, South Pasadena, for real parties in interest.

WOODS, Presiding Justice.

By petition for mandate, plaintiffs seek review of an order striking from their complaint all allegations concerning punitive damages. Leave to amend was not granted.

The questions presented are (1) whether punitive damages may be recovered in a civil action for conduct constituting employment discrimination in the form of sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and constructive termination of employment, and (2) whether this complaint states sufficient facts for punitive damage liability.

The first amended complaint alleges that while plaintiff Allison Patton (Patton) was operating a computer terminal in the course of her employment with defendant Crown Gibralter Graphic Center, Inc. (Crown) the message "How about a little head?" was displayed on the screen. Patton believed that the president, vice president and another corporate officer of defendant corporation had conspired to create the message, and that it was directed to her as a sexual proposition. Patton promptly complained to her immediate supervisor, plaintiff Martha Monge. Monge transmitted the complaint of sexual harassment to defendant officers who were her supervisors. Defendant officers allegedly ratified the act by refusing to investigate or correct it. They also engaged upon a systematic course of retaliation by "creat[ing] an intimidating, hostile and offensive working environment for each of the Plaintiffs" that "changed Plaintiffs' working environment, hours, lunch and other privileges, and demoted the Plaintiffs to lesser positions, all in retaliation against the Plaintiffs for their complaints regarding sexual harassment."

As a result of defendants' conduct, Monge, who was pregnant, was hospitalized for tension and emotional distress. Patton also suffered emotional distress and, eventually, both Monge and Patton were "forced to resign" because of the retaliatory actions by defendants.

Paragraphs 13, 18 and 24 of the complaint characterize defendant's sexual harassment and retaliatory conduct as "malicious and oppressive" and as "done with the intent to harm the Plaintiffs, and with wilful or reckless disregard for the consequences to the Plaintiffs." In the second cause of action, plaintiffs allege that defendants' described actions "had as their sole purpose the intentional infliction of emotional distress...."

On these alleged facts, plaintiffs seek to recover compensatory, general and punitive damages under their three respective causes for (1) sexual discrimination and harassment under section 12940 of the Government Code (Fair Employment and Housing Act); (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) wrongful termination of employment and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between employer and employee.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing is alleged. The Department issued "right to sue" letters prerequisite to a civil action. (Gov.Code, § 12965.)

Defendants demurred to the entire complaint and moved to strike all punitive damage The trial court overruled the demurrer but granted the motion to strike without a statement of grounds. Because no leave to amend was granted, we assume that respondent ruled either that, as a matter of law, punitive damages may not be recovered on any such causes, or that the particular allegations in the complaint were deficient and could not be cured by amendment.

allegations and the related prayer for punitives from the complaint.

DISCUSSION

We conclude that respondent clearly abused its discretion and that sufficient facts are pleaded to allow recovery of punitive damages as to each cause of action.

I

Section 3294 of the Civil Code allows for recovery of punitive damages in all civil actions "not arising from contract." ¹ There can be no dispute that all three of plaintiffs' causes are in tort and are not based upon contract within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. (Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 215, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912 [racial discrimination and harassment in employment conditions is noncontractual action allowing punitive damage award]; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 177-178, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330; Hentzel v. Singer Co. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 290, 304, 188 Cal.Rptr. 159 [wrongful discharge from employment and breach of implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing]; Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 497, fn. 1, 86 Cal.Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216 [intentional infliction of emotional distress upon employee by racial epithets uttered by superiors on the job].)

II

Since respondent overruled the demurrer as to all three causes of action, the punitive damage allegations are not precluded by absence of a foundational cause of action.

Plaintiffs first cause of action is for sexual job discrimination and harassment under section 12940 of the Government Code. ² There is no dispute that the first cause of action sufficiently alleges the defendant corporation's violation of subdivisions (a), (f), (i) and (j) and the corporate officers' individual violations of subdivisions (g) and (i) of Government Code section 12940. (See also DFEH v. Fresno Hilton Hotel (1984) No. 84-03, FEHC Precedential Decisions CEB 2 (Cal. CEB 1984-1985) [sexual harassment by superior ratified by employer's failure to correct]; DFEH v. Bee Hive Answering Service (1984) FEHC Dec. No. 84-16 [1984-85 CEB 8] [sexual harassment at job known to employer is discriminatory practice under FE & H Act]; DFEH v. Hart and Starkey, Inc. (1984) FEHC Dec. No. 84-23 [1984-85 CEB 9] [intolerable harassment that employer reasonably should anticipate would cause employee's resignation].)

The next question is whether a cause of action for sexual employment discrimination may, under law, sustain recovery of punitive damages. The clear answer is that it may.

In Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pages 220-221, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912, the Supreme Court held that civil actions based upon racial employment discrimination violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov.Code, §§ 12900, et seq.) may include recovery of punitive damages under the general provisions of section 3294 of the Civil Code. This is so because section 3294 applies generally to all noncontractual causes of action and the Act does not suggest any legislative intent to preclude such damages to civil litigants.

It follows that where an action is pleaded under the Fair Employment and Housing Act for sexual employment discrimination, the same opportunity to plead and recover punitive damages exists.

Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals held in Mitchell v. Keith (9th Cir.1985) 752 F.2d 385, that a corporate employee, harassed and terminated due to racial discrimination by a managerial employee, may recover punitive damages against the corporate employer under the bases provided in section 3294, subdivision (b), of the California Civil Code. That federal action was brought under 42 United States Code section 1981 which provides for punitive damages for racial employment discrimination. However, the court looked to applicable state law to determine an employer's liability for punitive damages under the doctrine of respondeat superior because the provisions of the federal statute were deficient in this regard.

III

The sole remaining possible justification for striking the punitive damages allegations is the insufficiency of the charging allegations to plead facts that could establish the element of "oppression" or "malice." As will be demonstrated, the allegations are more than sufficient in this regard.

In determining whether a complaint states facts sufficient to sustain punitive damages, the challenged allegations must be read in context with the other facts alleged in the complaint. Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants' conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7, 172 Cal.Rptr. 427.)

Perkins provides the highly pertinent example of this standard in the context of a motion to strike punitive damage allegations. There the complaint alleged that defendants "wrongfully and intentionally" invaded plaintiff's privacy and terminated his telephone service "in retaliation" for prior complaints lodged by plaintiff. The complaint also generally alleged that defendants were guilty of "oppression, fraud and malice." Perkins read the complaint as a whole and held that the alleged conclusions of fact or law considered in the context of alleged wrongful conduct "in retaliation" pleaded an evil injurious motive sufficient to establish malice and sustain a plea for punitive damages.

In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 27-32, 122 Cal.Rptr. 218, it was pointed out that there exists an uncertainty in the case law as to just what terms adequately describe the necessary elements of "oppression, fraud or malice" under Civil Code section 3294. Searle suggests that different types of injurious conduct...