Lumpkin v. Mankin
| Decision Date | 10 September 1926 |
| Docket Number | 12064. |
| Citation | 134 S.E. 503,136 S.C. 506 |
| Parties | LUMPKIN v. MANKIN. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Richland County Court; M. S. Whaley, Judge.
Action by Madison Lumpkin against Louisa Mankin. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
De Pass & De Pass, of Columbia, for appellant.
Cooper & Winter, of Columbia, for respondent.
Action between the plaintiff, a colored man, who owned a mule, and the defendant, a colored woman, who owned a Ford automobile. The mule and the automobile mixed up in Arthur town, on the Bluff road, in Richland county. One of the important issues was which got hurt the worst, the Ford or the mule. Plaintiff, on account of the conduct of the automobile and driver, claimed $500, actual and punitive damages "either or both." The defendant denied plaintiff's claim, and demanded by counterclaim $500 damages, actual and punitive, on account of the conduct of the mule and the plaintiff.
The trial was before Judge Whaley, in the county court of Richland county, and resulted in a verdict in plaintiff's favor for $150 actual damages, and $100 punitive damages. The defendant was not satisfied with the result, and has asked this court to review the trial.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant asked for a nonsuit, for the reason "that no acts of negligence were alleged in the complaint or proven by the testimony." This motion was refused, and such refusal is made the basis of the first exception.
The allegations of the complaint as to negligence were in the most general terms. But, if the defendant wished the acts of negligence specified, she should have made a motion that the plaintiff be required to make his complaint more definite and certain. Sutton v. Railway, 82 S.C. 345, 64 S.E 401; Prescott v. Railway, 99 S.C. 422, 83 S.E. 781.
There was some evidence as to negligence on part of the defendant. Plaintiff testified that he was trying to get the mule out of the road; that he saw the car "about a half acre before it struck mule," and the defendant did not try to stop the car, and made no effort to slow up, until after she had struck the mule, although one traveling in the road could have seen the mule "about a mile up the road." He also swore that the defendant told him that "she was just learning to drive car." One of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the defendant and the mule could both see each other some time before the collision. Another witness of plaintiff testified that the road was much traveled, that the automobile was running between 15 and 20 miles an hour, and that the mule was coming across the road "in a kind of a mule gait." And there was testimony that the defendant was not driving on the right side of the highway, but was in the middle of the road.
Act No 721 of 1924, which regulates traffic upon highways of the state, contains a provision that no passenger vehicle shall exceed 35 miles per hour on rural roads, but it also has this provision:
"No person shall operate any vehicle on the public roads of this State at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper at the time and place, having regard to the traffic and use of the highway, and its condition, or so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person."
The trial judge was right in submitting to the jury the question if the defendant was operating her Ford at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable and proper at the time and place, and under the circumstances surrounding her. The motion for nonsuit was properly refused.
At the conclusion of all testimony, the defendant moved for a directed verdict in her favor as to punitive damages, which was granted by the court. After argument of counsel, the trial judge became reminded of the act of the General Assembly, referred to above, and he then submitted the issue of punitive damages, as well as the question of actual damages, to the jury, and made a clear charge as to the two classes of damages. The defendant has two exceptions pertaining to this action on...
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Harper v. Harper
... ... wilfulness, or wantonness, and, therefore, sufficient to ... carry that issue to the jury. Lumpkin v. Mankin, 136 ... S.C. 506, 134 S.E. 503; Ford Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., ... 169 S.C. 41, 168 S.E. 143; Ralls v. Saleeby, 178 ... S.C. 431, ... ...
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Broadway v. Jeffers
... ... paragraph therein, if it was conceived that the jury would be ... misled thereby. In the case of Lumpkin v. Mankin, ... 136 S.C. 506, 134 S.E. 503, 504, Mr. Justice (afterward Chief ... Justice) Blease, writing the opinion of the court, said: ... "In ... ...
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State v. Holmes
...trial judge, when he discovered that he had committed an error in his instructions, to make the necessary correction. See Lumpkin v. Mankin, 136 S.C. 506, 134 S.E. 503. It not to be overlooked, too, that the correction in the instructions was given at the request of the appellant's counsel.......