Lundstrom v. State, 898-84

• Decision Date: 23 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 898-84,898-84
• Parties: Loyal E. LUNDSTROM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 279

742 S.W.2d 279

Loyal E. LUNDSTROM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 898-84.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas,

En Banc.

April 23, 1986.

On Rehearing April 8, 1987.

Bill B. Hart, Eastland, for appellant.

Emory C. Walton, Dist. Atty., Robert Huttash, State's Atty., and Alfred Walker, First Asst., State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the Court en banc.

OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

CLINTON, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of the murder of his wife by a jury that assessed his punishment at life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed by the Eleventh Court of Appeals. Lundstrom v. State, 678 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.--Eastland 1984). We granted appellant's petition to review the court of appeals' holding that appellant's motion for change of venue was properly overruled by the trial court.

At the time of the killing appellant and the deceased had been married for ten years and had five children. They operated a motel and a cemetery monument business together and were both prominent in local affairs. Appellant was the mayor pro tem of Cisco, a town of 4,200. His wife was president of the P.T.A. Both were active in their church.

The murder, appellant's flight from the State, his voluntary return, and preparations for his trial were covered extensively by the press that served Eastland County. Also uncovered and widely disseminated was the news that appellant had been convicted of manslaughter in the death of his first wife, in Minnesota. That conviction had been reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court and appellant had not been retried.

Appellant's counsel filed a pretrial motion for change of venue alleging appellant could not receive a fair trial in Eastland County due to pervasive prejudice against him. The motion was supported by the affidavits of five residents of Eastland County in conformity with Article 31.03 V.A.C.C.P. ¹ The State filed a motion alleging appellant could receive a fair trial in the county, supported by the affidavits of five residents.

When the motion for change of venue came for a hearing appellant contended that the State's affidavits did not properly controvert appellant's in accordance with 31.04, V.A.C.C.P., and appellant was therefore entitled to change of venue as a matter of law. The trial court decided "to treat your motion as a motion for summary ruling on the change of venue," denied the motion, and invited appellant to put on his evidence. Appellant's counsel, citing caselaw to the court holding that putting on evidence would waive his objection to the form of the State's controverting affidavits, declined to do so. No evidence was heard, and appellant's motion was denied.

A defendant seeking a change of venue must file a written motion supported by affidavits of at least two credible residents of the county (known as compurgators), asserting that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial in that county due to either prejudice or a combination of influential persons against him. Article 31.03, supra. If the defendant's motion is not in the proper form, it is not error for the trial court to overrule it without a hearing. Ward v. State, 505 S.W.2d 832 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (not supported by affidavits of at least two credible persons); Donald v. State, 453 S.W.2d 825 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) (motion not sworn); Mankin v. State, 451 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) (motion supported only by the affidavit of defendant's attorney). If the motion is proper on its face, however, the defendant is entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law, unless the State properly challenges the defendant's motion. Revia v. State, 649 S.W.2d 625 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). As explained in McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505, 516 (Tex.Cr.App.1980):

"... if no controverting affidavit is filed by the State, the defendant is entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law. [citations omitted] The reason that the defendant is entitled to this change as a matter of law is because in the absence of controverting evidence, there is no issue of fact to be resolved. When there is no issue of fact to be determined by the trial court, and no place for its exercise of discretion, it must grant the defendant's motion. This is the reason it is stated that in this situation, a defendant is entitled to such a change as a matter of law." [emphasis in original.]

The defendant waives this right if he participates in a hearing on the motion when the State has filed no controverting affidavits or an improper controverting motion. "Where the defendant ... allows the trial court to hear the merits of the issue and to thus exercise its discretion in determining the issue of fact, he cannot thereafter argue that no issue of fact was raised and that he was entitled to the change as a matter of law." Id. See also Fields v. State, 627 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Therefore if the defendant, though entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law, nevertheless puts on evidence concerning the reasons for the change of venue, and allows the State to do so, the issue then becomes one of fact for the trial court to determine.

In the instant case appellant's motion was proper as to form and supported by affidavits of five residents of the county, who asserted that appellant could not receive a fair trial therein due to prejudice against him. The State contends, inter alia, that these affidavits were insufficient because they stated it was the "opinion" of the affiants that defendant could not receive a fair trial in Eastland County. The court of appeals held these affidavits defective: "The affidavits do not swear to the 'fact' that: 'There exists in the county where the prosecution is commenced so great a prejudice against him that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.' See TEX. CODE CRIM.PRO.ANN. art. 31.03." Lundstrom, supra, at 133.

The sentence quoted in the opinion is from 31.03, but from what source the word "fact" is quoted is unclear. It appears nowhere in 31.03, which states a change of venue may be granted "for either of the following causes ..." (Emphasis added.) Of course whether great enough prejudice exists to deny appellant a fair trial was a question of the compurgators' opinions. In Burleson v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 576, 100 S.W.2d 1019, 1021 (1937) (On State's motion for rehearing), affidavits saying "... we do not believe that a fair and impartial trial in this county can be had ..." were held sufficient. In Runnels v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 545, 213 S.W.2d 545 (1948), the defendant was held entitled to a change of venue as a factual matter after thirteen witnesses testified it was their "opinion" he could not receive a fair trial. Those opinions must be based on facts, but sworn opinions alone are enough to raise the issue. Id., at 546. Though it would perhaps have been preferable for appellant's compurgators simply to have sworn that appellant could not receive a fair trial, the affidavits need not follow the exact wording of the statute. Hussey v. State, 590 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) ("... in our opinions, there does in fact exist ... a dangerous combination against the defendant ... by reason of which the defendant cannot expect a fair trial ..." was sufficient to comply with Article 31.03).

Appellant's motion for change of venue was properly made and properly supported. That placed the burden on the State, if it wished to challenge the motion, to controvert appellant's affidavits in the manner prescribed by Article 31.04, V.A.C.C.P.:

"The credibility of the persons making affidavit for change of venue, or their means of knowledge, may be attacked by the affidavit of a credible person. The issue thus formed shall be tried by the judge, and the motion granted or refused, as the law and facts shall warrant."

The State in this case also filed affidavits from five persons, but these attacked neither the credibility nor the means of knowledge of appellant's compurgators. Instead the State's affiants swore that appellant could receive a fair trial in the county.

The original of Article 31.04, stated in virtually identical language, was art. 583, passed in 1879. From the beginning it was held that this article supplied the only means by which the State could challenge a defendant's motion for change of venue. In Davis v. The State, 19 Tex.App. 201 (Ct.App.1885) the court of appeals interpreted the relatively new article:

"The State has the right to controvert the application; but in what manner? How must this be done? The manner is plainly pointed out in this article. This must be done by the affidavit of some credible person that the general reputation of the supporting affiants is bad ...; or by the affidavit of some credible person that their means of knowledge are not sufficient to support and justify the statements contained in their said affidavits ... The credibility or means of knowledge of the persons making the affidavit being thus attacked, an issue is formed between the defendant and the State ...

... Now, if there be no affidavit of a credible person made controverting the affidavit [sic: credibility?] of the defendant's supporting affidavits, the change must be granted, because there is no issue between the parties. But where the affidavit of some credible person is made controverting the credibility or the means of knowledge of the compurgators, an issue is formed; and, until this be done, there being no issue between the parties, there is nothing 'to be tried and determined' by the judge."

Id., at 221-222. In Davis the district attorney's affidavits only asserted that the defendant could receive a fair trial, and so did not properly controvert the defendant's affidavits. (The defendant, however, waived his right to a change of venue by putting on evidence at a hearing.) Id., at 222-223.

Carr v. The State, 19 Tex.App. 635 (Ct.App.1885), from that same year, reversed and remanded a...