Lunsford v. City of Bryan

Decision Date09 January 1957
Docket NumberNo. A-6007,A-6007
Citation156 Tex. 520,297 S.W.2d 115
PartiesDon LUNSFORD, Petitioner, v. CITY OF BRYAN et al., Respondents.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Mullinax & Wells, Charles J. Morris, Dallas, for petitioner.

Baker, Botts, Andrews & Shepherd, Hugh Patterson & Everett A. Lowe, Jr., Houston, John M. Lawrence, III, W. S. Barron Bryan, for respondents.

HICKMAN, Chief Justice.

The petitioner, Don Lunsford, brought this suit against the City of Bryan, its City Manager, and its Fire Chief for a writ of mandamus compelling his reinstatement as a member of the fire department of the City, and for damages sustained by him on account of his alleged unlawful discharge therefrom. Relief was denied him by the trial court, and the case was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 292 S.W.2d 852.

The case calls for a construction of Article 5154c, Sec. 4, and Article 5207a, Sec. 2, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, which read as follows:

Article 5154c, Sec. 4. 'It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that no person shall be denied public employment by reason of membership or nonmembership in a labor organization.'

Article 5207a, Sec. 2. 'No person shall be denied employment on account of membership or nonmembership in a labor union.'

Petitioner alleged that his discharge was in violation of those statutes.

The public policy of this State was reaffirmed by an Act of the 54th Legislature, 1955, Chapter 387, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, Article 5154g, in this language:

Article 5154g, Section 1. 'It is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization and that in the exercise of such rights all persons shall be free from threats, force, intimidation or coercion.'

That Act became effective after this suit arose and will, therefore, be given no further notice.

The case was submitted on special issues. In answer to Special Issue No. 1 the jury found that petitioner was not a member of International Association of Fire fighters on the day of his discharge. In accordance with the court's instructions it returned no answer to the special issue inquiring whether petitioner's discharge was because of membership in that Association. It was the view of the courts below that the statutes above quoted have application only when the person who is denied employment or further employment is an actual member of the union on the day of the denial, and that there was evidence supporting the finding that petitioner was not a member on that day.

In making a statement of the case we shall endeavor to omit all references to facts bearing upon the reasons for the discharge; that is a disputed issue which has not been decided by the jury, and which will be decided upon a remand of the case. The sole question before us at this time is whether the jury should have been permitted to answer the issue submitting the question of whether petitioner was discharged by reason of or on account of membership in the union above named. Petitioner was discharged about 7:00 o'clock on the morning of July 13, 1955. The City Manager testified that he believed that petitioner was a member of the union when he discharged him. For several days prior thereto there had been much activity among members of the fire department. They were considering the advisability of applying for membership in the above-named union. On July 8, Jack Bostick, Vice President of the Union, arrived in Bryan to confer with members of the fire department, and requested permission of the Fire Chief to hold a meeting with the members at the fire station. The request was denied, but on the following morning he met with a group of the firemen at the local carpenters' hall, at which time an application for a charter from the union was signed by some of the firemen, petitioner's name appearing first on the list. At a later meeting petitioner was elected temporary secretary-treasurer of the group. Other names were added to the application, and on July 10 the application, together with petitioner's personal check payable to the union for charter fees and dues,...

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30 cases
  • Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • November 8, 1974
    ...use. The working man, unionist and nonunionist, must be protected. The right to work is the right to live.' See Lunsford v. City of Bryan, 1957, 156 Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115; Texas Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc., 246 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Civ.App.-- 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sheet Meta......
  • St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • October 30, 1997
    ...to give the statute the meaning which was intended by the lawmakers." Bridgestone, 878 S.W.2d at 134 (quoting Lunsford v. City of Bryan, 156 Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (1957)). Applying these principles, I conclude that the Legislature did not intend to apply the heightened immunity prov......
  • City of Round Rock v. Rodriguez
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • June 13, 2013
    ...unions, section 101.052 of the Labor Code protects the “right to work.” SeeTex. Lab.Code § 101.052; see also Lunsford v. City of Bryan, 156 Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (1957) (describing a former codification of section 101.052 as our “right-to-work” statute). This Court has recognized th......
  • Karl Rove & Co. v. Thornburgh
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • November 30, 1994
    ...v. City of Bryan, 292 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tex.Civ.App.1956) ("Membership is a question of fact."), rev'd on other grounds, 156 Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115 (1957).68 See Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527, 531 (Me.1973) (stating that "proof of participation in its organization, meetings, and activities,......
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6 books & journal articles
  • Discrimination based on national origin, religion, and other grounds
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas Employment Law. Volume 1 Part V. Discrimination in employment
    • May 5, 2018
    ...based on membership or non-membership in a labor organization. Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §101.052 (West 2015); Lunsford v. City of Bryan , 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1957). But an employee’s cause of action for wrongful discharge arising from union organizing activity will generally be preempted b......
  • Discrimination Based on National Origin, Religion, and Other Grounds
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2016 Part V. Discrimination In Employment
    • July 27, 2016
    ...based on membership or non-membership in a labor organization. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §101.052 (West 2015); Lunsford v. City of Bryan , 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1957). But an employ-ee’s cause of action for wrongful discharge arising from union organizing activity will generally be preempted ......
  • Discrimination Based on National Origin, Religion, and Other Grounds
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2017 Part V. Discrimination in employment
    • August 19, 2017
    ...based on membership or non-membership in a labor organization. Tൾඑ. Lൺൻ. Cඈൽൾ Aඇඇ. §101.052 (West 2015); Lunsford v. City of Bryan , 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1957). But an employee’s cause of action for wrongful discharge arising from union organizing activity will generally be preempted b......
  • Discrimination Based on National Origin, Religion, and Other Grounds
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Employment Law. Volume 2 - 2014 Part V. Discrimination in employment
    • August 16, 2014
    ...based on membership or non-membership in a labor organization. Tex. lab. CoDe ann. §101.052 (West 2006); Lunsford v. City of Bryan , 297 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1957). But an employee’s cause of action for wrongful discharge arising from union organizing activity may be preempted by the Natio......
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