Luther v. Vanyur

• Decision Date: 03 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 5:97-HC-259-BR2.,5:97-HC-259-BR2.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: William F. LUTHER, Petitioner, v. John VANYUR, Respondent.

14 F.Supp.2d 773

William F. LUTHER, Petitioner, v. John VANYUR, Respondent.

No. 5:97-HC-259-BR2.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

December 3, 1997.

William F. Luther, Butner, NC, pro se.

R.A. Renfer, Jr., Asst. U.S. Attorney, Raleigh, NC, for Respondent.

ORDER

BRITT, District Judge.

On 8 October 1997, Magistrate Judge Alexander B. Denson filed his Memorandum and Recommendation (M & R) in the above-captioned case in which he recommended that respondent's motion for summary judgment be denied, that petitioner's motion for summary judgment be allowed and that the writ of habeas corpus issue. Respondent filed objections to the M & R on 24 November 1997.

The court has conducted the required de novo review of the M & R, paying specific attention to the portions of the M & R to which respondent objected. Respondent's objections are without merit, and the same are hereby, OVERRULED. The court ADOPTS the well-reasoned M & R of Magistrate Judge Denson as its own and incorporates the M & R by reference as if fully set forth herein.

For the reasons stated in the M & R, respondent's motion for summary judgment is DENIED, petitioner's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall ISSUE. It is hereby ORDERED: (1) that petitioner's federal sentence commenced on 22 May 1991 and has run uninterrupted since that date; and, (2) that respondent credit petitioner's federal sentence accordingly.

MEMORANDUM and RECOMMENDATION

DENSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner, an inmate at FCI Butner, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner contends that he has not received proper credit on his present sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Respondent concedes that Petitioner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies. On June 30, 1997 Respondent filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment. Petitioner filed a response seeking summary judgment in his favor. This matter is therefore ripe for determination on the cross motions for summary judgment.

Background

The parties are in substantial agreement regarding all material facts. On March 6, 1990, Petitioner was arrested by the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. He was released on bond and thereafter convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina¹ of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 121 months to be followed by a five year period of unsupervised release. At the sentencing, Petitioner was ordered to surrender to the United States Marshal on March 5, 1991 for service of the federal sentence. (Resp't Mem. Supp. Summ. J., Ex. 1 at 3-6.²) Petitioner did not surrender. On April 22, 1991, he was arrested by North Carolina authorities and charged with possession of stolen property. On May 13, 1991, the state court convicted Petitioner of the charges and sentenced him to eight years imprisonment, the sentence to "run concurrent with any sentence now serving." (Resp't. Mem., Ex. 1 at 7.)

Subsequently, on May 22, 1991, Petitioner was transferred from state custody by the United States Marshal to a Bureau of Prisons facility. (Resp't Mem., Ex. 1 at 8.) Respondent contends that this transfer was made in error and that Petitioner should have remained in state custody until the state sentence was completed. Nonetheless, Petitioner remained in Bureau of Prisons institutions until discovery of the error. On September 27, 1994, Petitioner was returned to the North Carolina authorities to complete his state sentence. (Resp't Mem., Ex. 1 at 9.) On January 6, 1995, Petitioner was paroled from his state sentence and returned to federal custody, where he remains. (Resp't Mem., Ex. 1 at 2, 9.) The period of state parole terminated on April 21, 1995. Records from the North Carolina Department of Correction reflect that Petitioner's state sentence ran from May 13, 1991, until his parole on January 6, 1995, and that Petitioner received credit on his state sentence for the time he spent in federal custody. (Resp't Mem., Ex. 1 at 2, 9.) The Bureau of Prisons, however, calculates Petitioner's federal sentence as commencing on January 6, 1995, allowing no credit for either the prior state or federal period of incarceration. (Resp't Mem., Ex. 1 at 2.)

The undersigned now turns to an analysis of the motions for summary judgment. For ease of reference during the analysis, the relevant dates are recapitulated in the following table:

Dec. 14, 1990 — sentenced in federal court

Mar. 5, 1991 — report date for service of federal sentence; failed to report

Apr. 22, 1991 — arrested on state charges

May 13, 1991 — convicted by state, sentenced to 8 years "concurrent with any sentence sentence now serving"; began serving state sentence

May 22, 1991 — accepted into federal custody from state custody; Pet. contends federal sentence begins running this date

Sep. 27, 1994 — Bureau of Prisons returns him to state custody

Jan. 6, 1995 — paroled from state and returned to federal custody; Resp. contends federal sentence begins running this date

Analysis

Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment must come forward and demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact that requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). When making the summary judgment determination, the facts and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Petitioner seeks credit on his federal sentence for his time of incarceration beginning May 22, 1991, and running through January 6, 1995. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to this credit on a theory that his federal sentence commenced on May 22, 1991, the date on which he was accepted into federal custody to serve his federal sentence. Furthermore, Petitioner argues that the running of his federal sentence continued and was not tolled for the period September 27, 1994 to January 6, 1995 when the Bureau of Prisons returned him to state custody.

Respondent argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3584 mandates that the federal and state sentences be served consecutively. Allowing the federal sentence to commence on May 22, 1991, Respondent argues, would create concurrent sentences in violation of § 3584. Respondent further argues that a low-level administrative error — accepting custody of Petitioner from the state — should not circumvent the mandate of § 3584. Therefore, Respondent argues, Petitioner's sentence did not commence on May 22, 1991, and the petition is properly analyzed under § 3585(b), credit for prior custody. Because Petitioner has already received credit for the period May 22, 1991 to January 6, 1995 on his state sentence, Respondent argues, he cannot be given credit for that period on his federal sentence pursuant to § 3585(b).

The issues for this habeas review thus become: 1) when did Petitioner's federal sentence commence; and 2) if the sentence commenced on May 22, 1991, whether the sentence was interrupted or tolled on September 27, 1994 when he was returned to state custody. Because there are no genuine issues of material fact, an evidentiary hearing is not required and the analysis proceeds to the questions of law.

I. Commencement of Petitioner's Sentence

The date on which a federal sentence commences is governed by statute. Specifically, the provision states:

(a) Commencement of sentence. — A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.

18 U.S.C. § 3585(a).

Thus, when Petitioner was received in custody by the U.S. Marshal on May 22, 1991 "awaiting transportation to ... the official detention facility at which the sentence [was] to be served," his federal sentence commenced.³ Respondent concedes that this conclusion is suggested by the plain language of the statute. (Resp't Mem. at 7-8.) However, Respondent argues that a "blind application" of the plain language of § 3585(a) would be in conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3584 in this particular situation. (Resp't Mem. at 8.) Respondent makes the bold assertion that § 3584 "clearly requires a federal sentence and a subsequently imposed state sentence to be served consecutively." (Resp't Mem. at 6.) However, Respondent fails to cite any case law or legislative history to support this interpretation of the statute. In fact, § 3584 states that

if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively. ... Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.

18 U.S.C. § 3584(a).

According to the plain language of the statute, terms of imprisonment imposed at different times are presumed to run consecutively if the federal trial judge is silent at sentencing regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences. Here, the federal trial judge was silent at sentencing regarding concurrent or consecutive terms because at that time there was no state sentence to which the federal sentence could have run...