Lutzken v. City of Rochester

• Decision Date: 08 April 1959
• Citation: 7 A.D.2d 498,184 N.Y.S.2d 483
• Parties: William F. LUTZKEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 483

184 N.Y.S.2d 483

7 A.D.2d 498

William F. LUTZKEN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

April 8, 1959.

Honora A. Miller, Corp. Counsel, Rochester (Charles A. Cavallaro, Rochester, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

MacFarlane, Harris, Martin, Kendall & Dutcher, Rochester (James W. Richards, Rochester, of counse), for plaintiff-respondent.

Before McCURN, P. J., and WILLIAMS, BASTOW, GOLDMAN and HALPERN, JJ.

GOLDMAN, Justice.

Plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant City of Rochester on a quantum meruit basis for services rendered in the removal of four tree stumps. This claim was set forth in the second cause of action of plaintiff's complaint, the first cause of action alleging an express contract having been properly dismissed by reason of a complete failure of proof. Although the record is not clear or conclusive as to any promise made by the City to pay plaintiff for removing the stumps (the City contending that it was a pure demonstration in the hope of securing future business), the Trial Judge may have been justified in concluding that plaintiff was entitled to believe that if he did the work satisfactorily, and this is not denied, he would be paid the reasonable value of his services. A municipality, like an individual, if it accepts the benefits of one's services should be required to pay for them, if the authority to make the contract existed. Fair dealing should require a governmental body, on the theory of implied or quasi contract, to pay the reasonable value of property received or services rendered if it legally can be held responsible therefor. The obligation to do justice should fall equally on all persons whether natural or artificial in character.

Public policy, however, dictates that in the interest of protecting all of the taxpayers it is imperative that certain formalities be established in the form of ordinances and statutes to prevent careless and loose dealing by persons charged with the responsibility of purchasing services or commodities for a municipal entity. No municipality should have the power or right to waive or disregard requirements which have been properly determined to be in the interest of the whole, as opposed to the equitable considerations which one might be inclined to extend to one who has, even though in good faith, failed to follow the prescribed rules. The doctrine of implied contract cannot be invoked to do rought justice and fasten liability where the legal requirements specifically prohibit.

The theory upon which the City Court granted the plaintiff judgment is set forth in paragraph Seventh of the second cause of action, which reads as follows:

'Seventh: That the said work, labor and services were so performed by the plaintiff, without any express contract or previous request from the said defendant, but at all times when the said work, labor and services were being performed, the defendant knew that plaintiff was performing the same and expected to be paid therefor, and acquiesced in the work being done, and thereafter accepted the same and received the benefits of the work so done by plaintiff.'

This allegation attempts to spell out an implied contract to compensate plaintiff for the benefits which the City received, but, as set forth in the answer of the City, plaintiff had the further burden of proving that the municipal employees with whom he dealt had authority under the charter, ordinances and statutes to create the liability for which the City would be required to respond in payment. To determine this question, we must turn to the City Charter which regulates purchasing. Section 124 provides that the purchasing agent cannot issue a contract without certification by the budget director that the contract is authorized and that sufficient funds are available. § 125; Local Laws, 1925, No. 4 of the City of Rochester, as amended by Local Laws, 1954, No. 4. Section 132 prescribes that claims against the city cannot be paid unless evidenced by a claim voucher approved by the budget director or department head for which the obligation was incurred. § 210; Local Laws, 1925, No. 4 of City of Rochester as amended by Local Laws, 1948, No. 2. Section 133 requires that contracts shall not be entered into or any expenditure of money made unless the budget director makes the certification required by section 124. § 212; Local Law No. 4 of 1925 as amended by Local Law No. 2 of 1948. All contracts and obligations entered into contrary to the provisions of the preceding sections are declared void by section 135. § 214; Local Law No. 4 of 1925, as amended by L.1943, ch. 710, § 837. Furthermore, section 152, dealing with purchasing procedure, provides that all purchases of materials, supplies and work shall be made by the purchasing agent supervised by the comptroller in accordance with the ordinances of the Council. § 197; Local Law No. 4 of 1925, as amended by Local Law No. 3 of 1941.

Plaintiff submits that notwithstanding the charter requirements, and particularly section 152 (cited in briefs as § 283), the funds with which to compensate him were available under charter section 163 (cited in respondent's brief as § 220). This section deals solely with 'emergency funds' and provides in part that 'The council may create in any department * * * an emergency fund not exceeding the sum of one thousand dollars which sum may be expended in such manner as the council may prescribe. Reimbursement claim vouchers must be presented to the comptroller for all moneys expended from such funds'. (§ 219; Local Law No. 4 of 1925.) The plaintiff contends that under this section the park department had funds available with which to pay him for the services he rendered. Nowhere in the charter or ordinances do we find a definition of 'emer...