Lyles v. State
| Decision Date | 06 March 1908 |
| Parties | LYLES. v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
LYLES.
v.
STATE.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
March 6, 1908.
1. Criminal Law—Time or Trial and Continuance—Discretion of Court.
Motions for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and the ruling of the judge below upon the question will not be disturbed, unless it appears that the refusal to grant the continuance was an abuse of his discretion.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Criminal Law, §§ 3045-3049.]
2. Same—Motions for New Trial—Hearing —Postponement.
A similar rule applies when applications are made for a postponement of the hearings of motions for new trials.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Criminal Law, §§ 3067-3071.]
3. Same — Evidence—Res GestÆ—Declarations.
The court below did not err in excluding from evidence certain declarations of the ac cused offered as a part of the res gestæ; it not appearing that they accompanied the act or were so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from the suspicion of device or afterthought.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 805-818.]
4. Witnesses—Leading Questions, —Discretion of Trial Court.
It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit the Solicitor General to propouud leading questions to a witness introduced by the state.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 50, Witnesses, §§ 795, 837-850.]
5. Criminal Law — Trial — Instructions — Cautionary.
It is not error for the judge in his charge to the jury to give cautionary instructions tending to impress upon them the gravity of the issues involved, where nothing is said in such instructions tending to prejudice the rights of the defendant, or in any way to impress the jury with the idea that it is more important to vindicate the law by the conviction of the accused, if guilty, than it is to acquit him, if innocent.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1798-1802.]
6. Same—Assuming Fact Admitted.
The plain meaning of the defendant's statement being that he accidentally fired the shot that killed his wife, the judge did not err in stating to the jury in his charge that there was "no denial that the homicide was committed, and that the defendant, Lyles, took the life of the deceased."
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1754-1764.]
7. Same—Construction as a Whole.
No material error was committed by the court in charging the jury as follows: "The defendant in this case, while he admits the killing, says it was the result of an unavoidable accident, and says, therefore, he should not be convicted." While the expression "unavoidable accident" was not used by the defendant in his statement, the entire theory of the defense as shown by the statement was that the homicide was the result of an accidental discharge of the gun without fault, evil design, or intention upon the part of the accused; and that theory of the defense appears to have been fully submitted to the jury, when the preceding extract from the charge is read in connection with what follows.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1990-1995.]
8. Same—Evidence to Support.
Where there is some evidence to show the existence of a certain state of facts, it is not error for the court to charge in reference thereto simply because the great preponderance of evidence tends to show that the supposed state of facts did not in truth exist.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1980-1985.]
9. Same—Matter Not Presented by Evidence.
Neither the evidence in the case nor the statement of the accused would have authorized the jury to convict the defendant of the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection: and therefore the court properly refused to charge the jury in reference to that subject.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1980-1985.]
10. Same—Writ of Error—Review.
The evidence authorized the verdict; and no errors of law having been made to appear in any of the court's ruling in the trial of the case, nor in any of those portions of the court's
[60 S.E. 579]charge upon which error was assigned, the judgment refusing a new trial will not be disturbed.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from Superior Court, Ware County; T. A. Parker, Judge.
H. E. Lyles was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.
Lyles was indicted, tried, and convicted for the murder of his wife, Eula Lyles. The evidence discloses that on the evening of January 30, 1907, the wife and infant child of Lyles were shot by the defendant on the front porch of the house where they lived in the city of Waycross, Ga., the wife dying immediately, and the child within a few hours. The defendant, together with his wife and baby, had just returned to their home, bringing with them a double-barrel hammerless shotgun, which defendant had previously loaned to a friend, and which had been returned to him. There were no eyewitnesses to the tragedy. It was claimed by the defendant that the shooting was accidental, and that it occurred in the manner set forth in the sixth and ninth divisions of the opinion. It was contended upon the part of the state that Lyles had been drinking, and had made certain threats against his wife, who desired to leave Waycross and return to the home of her mother in Colquitt county, and that the defendant intentionally shot and killed his wife. After the jury had returned a verdict of guilty, the defendant moved for a new trial, and excepts to the judgment overruling his motion.
J. L Sweat and Jno. T. Myers, for plaintiff In error.
John W. Bennett, Sol. Gen., W. W. Osborne, W. W. Lambdin, and Jno. C. Hart, Atty. Gen., for the State.
BECK, J. (after stating the facts as above). 1. On April 23, 1907, the defendant, Lyles, was put upon trial in the superior court of Ware county under an indictment charging him with the offense of having murdered his wife. The jury trying the case, after remaining out for some time, reported to the court their inability to agree upon a verdict, and an order was granted declaring a mistrial. On May 1st, during the same term of the court as that at which the mistrial had been declared, the case against Lyles was again called for trial, when the defendant's counsel submitted a motion for a continuance, based largely upon prevailing conditions, and insisting that the case go over until such future time as that a fair and impartial trial of the defendant could be had. Instead of granting the continuance until the next term of the court, the presiding judge adjourned the court until May 13, 1907, and on May 14th the trial of the case was again entered upon. As a part of the motion for continuance made on May 1st, in order to show the existence of conditions unfavorable to the defendant and prejudicial to his case, there is a narrative of what is alleged to have been a sensational scene in the courthouse at the time the mistrial was declared, and, further, there is set out at length certain sensational articles appearing in the newspapers, as well as interviews and statements made by the Solicitor General of the circuit relative to the case and trial, all of which, counsel for movant insisted, rendered it "highly improbable for the defendant at this time, to have what the law guarantees to him, a fair and impartial trial." Another ground of the motion for continuance was that the "defendant's leading and chief counsel, who had the preparation of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial