Lyles v. State

• Decision Date: 06 March 1908
• Citation: 60 S.E. 578,130 Ga. 294
• Parties: LYLES v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

60 S.E. 578

130 Ga. 294

LYLES v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

March 6, 1908

Syllabus by the Court.

Motions for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and the ruling of the judge below upon the question will not be disturbed, unless it appears that the refusal to grant the continuance was an abuse of his discretion.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Criminal Law, §§ 3045-3049.]

A similar rule applies when applications are made for a postponement of the hearings of motions for new trials.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 15, Criminal Law, §§ 3067-3071.]

The court below did not err in excluding from evidence certain declarations of the accused offered as a part of the res gestae; it not appearing that they accompanied the act or were so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from the suspicion of device or afterthought.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 805-818.]

It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit the Solicitor General to propound leading questions to a witness introduced by the state.

[Ed Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 50, Witnesses, §§ 795, 837-850.]

It is not error for the judge in his charge to the jury to give cautionary instructions tending to impress upon them the gravity of the issues involved, where nothing is said in such instructions tending to prejudice the rights of the defendant, or in any way to impress the jury with the idea that it is more important to vindicate the law by the conviction of the accused, if guilty, than it is to acquit him, if innocent.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1798-1802.]

The plain meaning of the defendant's statement being that he accidentally fired the shot that killed his wife, the judge did not err in stating to the jury in his charge that there was "no denial that the homicide was committed, and that the defendant, Lyles, took the life of the deceased."

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1754-1764.]

No material error was committed by the court in charging the jury as follows: "The defendant in this case, while he admits the killing, says it was the result of an unavoidable accident, and says, therefore, he should not be convicted." While the expression "unavoidable accident" was not used by the defendant in his statement, the entire theory of the defense as shown by the statement was that the homicide was the result of an accidental discharge of the gun without fault, evil design, or intention upon the part of the accused; and that theory of the defense appears to have been fully submitted to the jury, when the preceding extract from the charge is read in connection with what follows.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1990-1995.]

Where there is some evidence to show the existence of a certain state of facts, it is not error for the court to charge in reference thereto simply because the great preponderance of evidence tends to show that the supposed state of facts did not in truth exist.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1980-1985.]

Neither the evidence in the case nor the statement of the accused would have authorized the jury to convict the defendant of the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of a lawful act without due caution and circumspection; and therefore the court properly refused to charge the jury in reference to that subject.

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 14, Criminal Law, §§ 1980-1985.]

The evidence authorized the verdict; and no errors of law having been made to appear in any of the court's ruling in the trial of the case, nor in any of those portions of the court's charge upon which error was assigned, the judgment refusing a new trial will not be disturbed.

Error from Superior Court, Ware County; T. A. Parker, Judge.

H. E. Lyles was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.

J. L. Sweat and Jno. T. Myers, for plaintiff in error.

John W. Bennett, Sol. Gen., W. W. Osborne, W. W. Lambdin, and Jno. C. Hart, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BECK J.

1. On April 23, 1907, the defendant, Lyles, was put upon trial in the superior court of Ware county under an indictment charging him with the offense of having murdered his wife. The jury trying the case, after remaining out for some time, reported to the court their inability to agree upon a verdict, and an order was granted declaring a mistrial. On May 1st, during the same term of the court as that at which the mistrial had been declared, the case against Lyles was again called for trial, when the defendant's counsel submitted a motion for a continuance, based largely upon prevailing conditions, and insisting that the case go over until such future time as that a fair and impartial trial of the defendant could be had. Instead of granting the continuance until the next term of the court, the presiding judge adjourned the court until May 13, 1907, and on May 14th the trial of the case was again entered upon. As a part of the motion for continuance made on May 1st, in order to show the existence of conditions unfavorable to the defendant and prejudicial to his case, there is a narrative of what is alleged to have been a sensational scene in the courthouse at the time the mistrial was declared, and, further, there is set out at length certain sensational articles appearing in the newspapers, as well as interviews and statements made by the Solicitor General of the circuit relative to the case and trial, all of which, counsel for movant insisted, rendered it "highly improbable for the defendant at this time to have what the law guarantees to him, a fair and impartial trial." Another ground of the motion for continuance was that the "defendant's leading and chief counsel, who had the preparation of the case and its management and direction in hand since the appointment and employment of counsel, Judge Myers only being associated with him during the immediate trial of the case, is now physically unable to proceed with another trial of the case at this term of court." Upon hearing the motion the same was refused, and the presiding judge adjourned said court until May 13th, and on May 14th proceeded with the trial, as above stated. It does not appear that when the court convened on May 13th, nor on May 14th, when the case was called for trial, any further motion for continuance was made or insisted upon; but, on the other hand, it does appear that the defendant's counsel announced ready. Motions to continue cases are addressed to the sound discretion of the court; and, when a motion of this character is made and is overruled by the trial court, this court will not interfere with the decision of the judge below, unless a flagrant abuse of his discretion is made to appear. Oglesby v. State, 121 Ga. 602, 49 S.E. 706; Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 52 S.E. 1. No abuse of discretion on the part of the judge who heard and passed upon the motion for continuance is made to appear in this case. Excitement in the public mind and prejudice against the prisoner at the time of making the motion was not shown, but we are left to infer it from the nature of the articles and interviews published, and the description of the scene in the courthouse, without any other evidence whatever. And, even if there was such excitement and prejudice against the prisoner and his cause in the minds of the public at the time the motion was made as would have required a continuance of the case, there is nothing in the record to show that it had not subsided when the case was ordered to trial on the 14th of May. And even if the showing as to the physical condition of the leading counsel for the defendant, at the time the motion for continuance was made, was such as to render it the duty of the court then to continue the case, it is not suggested in this motion for a new trial that the counsel had not recovered his health and strength, or that he was any longer unable to proceed with the trial. Had it appeared on the 14th of May that the leading counsel for the prisoner was sick and physically unable to manage the case of his client, we have no doubt that further time for the recovery of his health and strength would have been allowed. This ground of the motion is completely disposed of by the rulings in the cases cited above.

2. After the rendition of the verdict finding the defendant guilty, the motion for a new trial was made, and was set for hearing on the 15th of June. When the motion for a new trial was taken up for hearing, counsel for the movant asked for a continuance of the hearing, on the following grounds "(1) Because of the absence of defendant's counsel, the brief of evidence in said case *** and the charge of the court *** were not obtained by said counsel until the 7th or 8th of June, 1907, and the regular term of the city court of Waycross, presided over by Judge J. T. Myers, and in which court J. L. Sweat was of counsel in several cases, having convened on June 10, 1907, and having continued in session until the afternoon of June 13th, said counsel have not had sufficient opportunity and time within which to carefully read and consider the brief of evidence and charge of the court by this date, with a view of ascertaining whether or not the same is correct." (2) Because the brief of evidence, although approved by the court, has not been read either by the court, counsel for the state, or counsel for the defendant, so as to ascertain whether or not the same is correct. (3) Because defendant's counsel have received information that certain of the jurors who...