Lynch v. Bogenrief

• Decision Date: 21 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 2--57291,2--57291
• Citation: 237 N.W.2d 793
• Parties: Marcene F. LYNCH, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of James Joseph Lynch, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harvey BOGENRIEF, as Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the City of Des Moines, Iowa, Defendant, and Pauline V. Lynch, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 793

237 N.W.2d 793

Marcene F. LYNCH, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of James Joseph Lynch, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Harvey BOGENRIEF, as Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the City of Des Moines, Iowa, Defendant and Pauline V. Lynch, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2--57291.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 21, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1976.

Walter W. Selvy and David L. Phipps, of Whitfield, Musgrave, Selvy, Kelly & Eddy, Des Moines, for defendant-appellant.

Lee Gaudineer, Jr., of Austin, McDonald, Myers, Peterson & Gaudineer, Des Moines, for plaintiff-appellee.

Heard by MOORE, C.J., and RAWLINGS, REES, UHLENHOPP and REYNOLDSON, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

This controversy concerns the retirement system death benefits of a deceased Des Moines fireman, claimed by an ex-wife whom he named beneficiary during their marriage, and by his widow as the administrator of his estate, and (alternatively on an assignment theory) in her own right. Trial court ruled the benefits should go to the estate. Mindful of the ancient admonition that hard facts may make bad law, we are compelled to reverse.

Decedent James Lynch was appointed fireman for the City of Des Moines March 1, 1950. He then nominated Pauline V. Lynch to receive his benefits under the retirement system. See chapter 411, The Code. On the designation form Lynch wrote in this claimant's name, and wrote the word 'wife' in that portion of the form which stated, 'Said nominated beneficiary has an insurable interest in my life by reason of being my (wife).' This beneficiary designation was never changed and remained on file in the office of the board of fire trustees at the date of Lynch's death on November 29, 1972. At that time his accumulated contributions totaled $9,504.37.

Decedent and Pauline had three children, born in 1942, 1948 and 1950. In 1955 decedent and Pauline were divorced. He paid child support during the children's minority and paid $50 per month alimony until his death. Following a subsequent marriage and divorce, in 1960 Lynch married Marcene, now his widow and administrator of his estate. Their children were born in 1963 and 1967. Marcene and the children were completely dependent on decedent for support. Pauline had been employed until at least the year prior to trial, but testified she was afflicted with emphysema and unable to work.

In an Ex parte proceeding the board of fire trustees adpted a resolution providing the accumulated contributions should be paid to the estate of James Lynch 'unless the prior designation of beneficiary by James Joseph Lynch, as a matter of law requires that the aforementioned accumulated contributions be paid to Pauline Lynch.'

When payment was not made, plaintiff administrator brought action in district court for writs of certiorari and mandamus to require defendant secretary of the board of fire trustees to make payment. Defendant Pauline V. Lynch was joined as an indispensable party. The board paid the funds into court. The controversy has proceeded between the two claimants.

At trial, evidence was produced to show the firemen's beneficiary designations were never called up for review by the firemen until after this litigation developed. Other evidence was introduced, over objections never ruled on, that Lynch had not seen his ex-wife Pauline for more than eleven years, he did not like her, and he was going to quit paying alimony as soon as he retired. Other testimony related to statements made by Lynch after he became terminally ill indicating he thought these benefits would go to his then wife and minor children.

Trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law determining 1) § 411.6(9) grants discretionary power to the board of trustees to pay either the estate or the nominated beneficiary, and 2) when Pauline V. Lynch was divorced from Lynch she ceased to be his dependent, had no insurable interest in his life, and decedent's designation of beneficiary became null and void.

Issues the parties raise here relate to statutory construction, the effect of the language contained in the beneficiary designation, and the effect of the divorce and the words employed in the divorce decree.

I. Statutory construction.

Chapter 411, The Code, is entitled 'RETIREMENT SYSTEMS FOR POLICEMEN AND FIREMEN.' Section 411.6, 'Benefits', comprises 14 subdivisions and extends over three and one half pages of the Code.

Section 411.6(8) deals with 'Ordinary death benefit.'

'Upon the receipt of proper proofs of the death of a member in service, there shall be paid to such person having an insurable interest in his life as he shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the respective board of trustees:

a. His accumulated contributions * * *

b. * * *

If there be no such nomination of beneficiary, the benefits * * * shall be paid to his estate * * *.'

Section 411.6(9) provides an 'Accidental death benefit':

'If * * * the death * * * was the natural and proximate result of an injury or disease incurred in or aggravated by the actual performance of duty * * * there shall be paid, in lieu of the ordinary death benefit provided in subsection 8 * * * to his estate or to such person having an insurable interest in his life as he shall have nominated by written designation duly executed and filed with the respective board of trustees the benefits set forth in paragraphs 'a', 'b', and 'c' of this subsection:

a. His accumulated contributions; and in addition thereto--

b. A pension equal to one-half of the average final compensation of such member shall be paid to his spouse, children or dependent parents * * *.

c. * * *.'

Appellant Pauline V. Lynch, the nominated beneficiary, asserts trial court erred in concluding the § 411.6(9) language, '* * * to his estate or to such person * * * as he shall have nominated by written designation * * *', vested the board of trustees with a discretionary power to select either the fireman's estate or his designated beneficiary as recipients of the statutory benefits. Each party relies on those various rules of statutory construction which support her statutory interpretation. Both however, agree the interpretive polestar is legislative intent. Rule 344(f)(13), Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 411.6(8) plainly provides in case of an ordinary (nonemployment-related) death, accumulated contributions are to be paid to the designated beneficiary, or if there is none, to the estate. The succeeding subsection states in case of employment-related ('accidental') death, certain benefits shall be paid 'in lieu of' those specified in preceding subsection 8. We are convinced the language of § 411.6(9) 'to his estate or to such person * * * as he shall have nominated * * *' is simply a shorthand, albeit inexact, effort to indicate a legislative intent that such benefits pass to the estate where no beneficiary is designated, as more fully expressed in § 411.6(8).

If the statute were given any other interpretation, a designated beneficiary of a fireman who died from a non-duty-related cause would be assured of receiving the accumulated contributions, while the designated beneficiary of a fireman who died from a work-related cause would face the uncertainty of an administrative decision. Of course the individual fireman would never be secure in the knowledge the persons he wished to provide for would receive his accumulated contributions. This interpretation of the statute, which would create an absurd result and long-range unfairness, should be avoided. Iowa Nat. Indus. Loan Co. v. Iowa State Dept. of Revenue, 224 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1974); Northern Natural Gas Company v. Forst, 205 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Iowa 1973). Ordinarily, the usual meaning is to be given the statutory language used, but the manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words employed. Id.

We note when the legislature vested discretion in the board of trustees as to certain beneficiaries (see § 411.6(8)(d) and (e)), it did so in very specific language; we conclude it did not intend discretion to be exercised by the board where it was not specifically granted. See In re Estate of Wilson, 202 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1972).

In seeking legislative intent to support trial court's statutory interpretation, plaintiff administrator strongly relies on the following portion of § 411.2:

'In any city in which the firemen or policemen are or shall be appointed under the civil service law of this state, there are hereby created and established two separate retirement or pension systems for the purpose of providing retirement allowances only for firemen or policemen of said cities who shall be so appointed after the date this chapter takes effect, or benefits to their dependents. * * *'

The administrator argues this language discloses a legislative intent to make benefits available 'only' to firemen or their dependents, not to provide a windfall for firemen's divorced spouses. We believe the legislative intent in this section was to restrict allowances to 'only' firemen and policemen (and their dependents) 'who shall be appointed after the date this chapter takes effect.'

The intent to benefit only dependents, contended for by the administrator, is belied by subsequent sections which permit accumulated contributions to pass to decedent's estate. Of course in such event ultimate disposition could be governed by a will. Creditors and non-dependents might potentially share. There is no reason to suppose the legislature was not fully aware of these alternatives when it statutorily directed accumulated contributions should go to the decedent's estate in absence of written designation left by the fireman who dies from either a duty-related or a nonduty-related cause.

Nor are we persuaded by the administrator's argument the retirement program is supported by tax revenues, is a special statutory creation, and therefore the fireman should not necessarily have an...