Lynch v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 07 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 0782-21-2 |
| Parties | ERIC DOMINIQUE TAYLOR LYNCH v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG Gordon F Willis, Judge
Tara-Beth Coleman (Strentz Greene & Coleman, PLC, on brief), for appellant.
Tanner M. Russo, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Russell, Ortiz and Raphael Argued at Richmond, Virginia
The trial court convicted appellant Eric Dominique Taylor Lynch of possessing a Schedule I or II controlled substance, driving with a suspended or revoked license, driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol (DWI), and drinking while driving. He challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his drug-possession and DWI convictions. Finding no error in either conviction, we affirm.
We recite the facts "in the 'light most favorable' to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court." Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va.App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we "discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom." Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24 (2018)).
On the night of September 2, 2020, Officer J. Gilworth was dispatched to the service road behind a Krispy Kreme store to check on a man asleep at the wheel of a car "in the middle of the roadway." When Gilworth arrived, he found Taylor Lynch alone in the car, sleeping in the driver's seat. Gilworth approached the driver's side of the car and noted the vehicle identification number. Startled, Taylor Lynch awoke, taking his foot off the brake pedal. Because the car was already in drive, the car lurched forward. At Gilworth's direction, Taylor Lynch shifted the car's transmission from "drive" to "park."
When asked why he was in the driver's seat, Taylor Lynch at first said that he "wasn't supposed to be behind the wheel" but later said he didn't know why. Taylor Lynch, who was illuminated by the headlights of a second officer's vehicle, appeared "nervous" and was "very fidgety, very antsy," with "very quick" eye movements and "very fast" speech. "Every part of his body was moving." Taylor Lynch said the headlights "bother[ed]" his eyes. In Gilworth's experience, light sensitivity and rapid-eye movement suggested being "under the influence of a narcotic or stimulant."
Exiting the vehicle at Gilworth's request, Taylor Lynch immediately bent over and began to "hop/wobble" to the curb "as if he couldn't walk." He said he had a "charley horse" in his leg from sleeping so long. When Gilworth asked who owned the car, Taylor Lynch hesitated at first but then answered that the car belonged to his friend "Jason." Upon further questioning, Taylor Lynch looked around "with fast motor movements" and reached for his pockets. Gilworth reminded him to keep his hands visible and asked for his name and date of birth. Taylor Lynch spoke so quickly Gilworth could not understand him. When pressed again, Taylor Lynch could not recall his birth year.
He tried to stand, denied he was moving, and ignored the officers' directives to stay seated. Concerned that he might flee, Gilworth handcuffed Taylor Lynch, securing his hands behind his back. Even so, Taylor Lynch reached toward his waistband. He claimed he had a knife, but Gilworth saw only a plastic baggie in Taylor Lynch's hand. When Gilworth tried to retrieve it, Taylor Lynch "immediately threw his weight backwards on top of his hands" and "flew backwards" as he "screamed at the top of his lungs" that his "leg was locking up." Taylor Lynch said he could not stand, prompting the officers to lift him into the back of a police car and call an ambulance. Searching him, Gilworth retrieved a plastic baggie from Taylor Lynch's waistband. Gilworth found no knife. Taylor Lynch was transported to the hospital.
When Officer Finbarr Murphy searched the vehicle, he found methamphetamine in plain view in an "open tray" console next to the driver's seat. Other objects were in the center console as well. But Murphy testified that the methamphetamine was lying there "plainly" in view and "unpackaged." An open container of black cherry malt liquor was also sitting in the center console.[1] Several empty, clear plastic baggies were strewn throughout the vehicle, including "within the center console area," and a digital scale was lodged between the driver's seat and the center console. When Murphy opened a trash bag on the passenger-side floorboard, he found a syringe filled with "a dark liquid substance," as well as "a spoon containing a white residue." He also found a box of clear plastic baggies and several phones.
When Murphy arrived at the hospital, Taylor Lynch was unconscious. A physician tried repeatedly to rouse him by rubbing his sternum, but Taylor Lynch kept falling back asleep.
When a nurse began to draw blood for medical treatment, however, Taylor Lynch awakened and refused testing and any medical attention. Murphy transported Taylor Lynch to the police department and obtained warrants for his arrest.
Testifying in his own defense, Taylor Lynch said that he borrowed the car from his friend, Jason Rice, [2] and that he had been driving for "a couple of hours" before the police approached him. Taylor Lynch said he was unaware of the drugs and drug paraphernalia in the car because it was dark when he borrowed it and the interior light did not function. He admitted that he was asleep when the police approached, but he denied being under the influence of any substance. Taylor Lynch admitted that he had a felony conviction.
The trial court convicted Taylor Lynch of possessing a Schedule I or II controlled substance, driving with a suspended license, driving under the influence, and consuming alcohol while driving. The court sentenced him to a total active sentence of one year and eight months' incarceration, two years' probation, fines totaling $350, and restitution of $250.
Taylor Lynch challenges only his conviction for driving under the influence (CR20001171-00) and his conviction for possessing a controlled substance (CR20001169-00).
"On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, 'the judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va.App. 59, 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). The Court "does not 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). Instead, we ask "whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676 (2010)). "If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, 'the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.'" Eberhardt v. Commonwealth, 74 Va.App. 23, 31 (2021) (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va.App. 149, 161 (2018)).
Code § 18.2-266(iv) prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle when he is under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs "to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle . . . safely." Taylor Lynch contends that the evidence failed to prove that he was driving while intoxicated. He argues that he was not under the influence of a powerful stimulant like methamphetamine because he was sleeping or unconscious in the vehicle and at the hospital. He stresses that no field sobriety tests were administered and that he underwent neither breath nor blood tests to determine whether he was under the influence. He concludes that the Commonwealth failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis that a medical condition caused his "odd behavior."
We disagree. Contrary to Taylor Lynch's suggestion, Code § 18.2-266 does not require "chemical testing" or "proof of a specific blood-alcohol level." Beckham v. Commonwealth, 67 Va.App. 654, 662 (2017). To be sure, clause (i) provides that the statute is violated if a person who drives or operates a vehicle has "a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams or more per 210 liters of breath." Code § 18.2-266(i). Similarly, clause (v) establishes a violation based on specific blood concentrations of cocaine, methamphetamine, phencyclidine, or 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine. But such "test results are not required to prove intoxication for prosecution under clauses (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Code § 18.2-266." Stevens v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.App. 234, 245 (2005) (en banc). Under clause (iv), for instance, the violation occurs if "such person is under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug or drugs to a degree which impairs his ability to drive or operate any motor vehicle, engine or train safely." Code § 18.2-266(iv). As to those clauses, the "result of a breath analysis is but auxiliary proof which may tend to corroborate evidence of the objective symptoms." Brooks v. City of Newport News, 224 Va. 311, 316 (1982).
Without such forensic testing, intoxication "is established when any person has consumed enough alcoholic beverages [or drugs] to 'so affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or...
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