Lynch v. New Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 8 Dist. in Williams Cnty.

• Decision Date: 03 May 2012
• Docket Number: No. 20110109.,20110109.
• Parties: Danni Jane LYNCH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The NEW PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 8 A Rural School District in Williams County, North Dakota, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

816 N.W.2d 53

281 Ed. Law Rep. 1214

33 IER Cases 1320

2012 ND 88

Danni Jane LYNCH, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.The NEW PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 8 A Rural School District in Williams County, North Dakota, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 20110109.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

May 3, 2012.

Irvin B. Nodland, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.

Tiffany Lynn Johnson, Bismarck, N.D., for defendant and appellee.

VANDE WALLE, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1] Danni Lynch appealed from a district court summary judgment dismissing her action against The New Public School District No. 8 (“the District”) for breach of contract, damage to professional reputation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and negligent infliction of emotional harm. We affirm, concluding that: (1) Lynch was not entitled to a notice of nonrenewal; (2) the District did not violate its grievance procedures; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lynch's motion to compel discovery.

I

[¶ 2] Prior to 2008 the District's three elementary schools, Garden Valley, Round Prairie, and Stony Creek, each included students through the eighth grade. In 2008, the District lost its accreditation. To regain accreditation the District needed to offer more electives for students in grades 7 and 8, and to do so it decided to reconfigure its elementary schools. Garden Valley became an upper elementary school for grades 7 and 8, and Round Prairie and Stony Creek became K–6 elementary schools. As a result of the reconfiguration plan, several teachers were transferred to different schools within the district.

[¶ 3] Lynch had taught the fifth grade class at Stony Creek for eighteen years. In June 2008, Lynch was informed she was being transferred to Round Prairie to teach second grade. On July 9, 2008, she sent a letter to Gregory McNary, the District's superintendent, requesting a written explanation of the reasons for the decision to transfer her to Round Prairie and asking for reconsideration of the decision. The District responded by letter indicating that the decisions on teacher transfers were made to promote the best interests of the students and that those decisions would not be changed.

[¶ 4] On August 11, 2008, Lynch was notified that the position at Round Prairie had been updated to a combination second and third grade position and that she had until August 14, 2008, to return a signed contract. On August 14, 2008, Lynch returned her signed contract to the District with a cover letter indicating she was “signing this contract under duress” and “asking you to begin the grievance process at this time.”

[¶ 5] Lynch's first day of work under the contract was August 19, 2008. Lynch did not appear for work that day, but instead sent a letter to the District stating, in part: “With much regret and sadness I am writing this letter to inform you that I cannot in good faith accept a demotion and the loss of the 5th grade teaching position that I have faithfully held for the past 18 years that the school district has now arbitrarily given to another 5th grade school teacher whose school was closed.” The District construed Lynch's letter as a resignation and held a public hearing at which it accepted her resignation.

[¶ 6] Lynch brought this action against the District, alleging breach of contract, damage to professional reputation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and negligent infliction of emotional harm. The district court granted the District's motion for summary judgment dismissing Lynch's claims. Lynch filed motions for reconsideration of the court's order granting summary judgment and to compel discovery. The district court denied the motions, and judgment was entered dismissing Lynch's claims.

II

[¶ 7] We have outlined the standards governing summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56:

Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt resolution of a controversy on the merits without a trial if there are no genuine issues of material fact or inferences that can reasonably be drawn from undisputed facts, or if the only issues to be resolved are questions of law. A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was appropriately granted, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and that party will be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which can reasonably be drawn from the record. On appeal, this Court decides whether the information available to the district court precluded the existence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitled the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment is a question of law which we review de novo on the entire record.

Richard v. Washburn Pub. Sch., 2011 ND 240, ¶ 9, 809 N.W.2d 288 (quoting Loper v. Adams, 2011 ND 68, ¶ 19, 795 N.W.2d 899). The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment must demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact:

If the moving party meets its initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present competent admissible evidence to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Mere speculation is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment, and when no pertinent evidence on an essential element is presented to the district court in resistance to the motion for summary judgment, it is presumed no such evidence exists.

Rickert v. Dakota Sanitation Plus, Inc., 2012 ND 37, ¶ 8, 812 N.W.2d 413 (quoting Beaudoin v. JB Mineral Servs., LLC, 2011 ND 229, ¶ 7, 808 N.W.2d 671).

III

[¶ 8] Lynch contends that she was entitled to notice of nonrenewal of her contract when the District decided to transfer her to a different school and that, when the District failed to give notice of nonrenewal, it was required to offer her a contract under the same terms and conditions as her existing contract.

[¶ 9] A school district which is contemplating not renewing the contract of a currently employed teacher must give notice of the contemplated nonrenewal by April 15 of the current school year and hold a hearing by April 21. N.D.C.C. § 15.1–15–05(1). If the school district decides not to renew the contract of the teacher it must give notice of nonrenewal by May 1. N.D.C.C. § 15.1–15–04(1). A failure to provide written notice of nonrenewal by May 1 “constitutes an offer to renew the individual's contract for the ensuing school year, under the same terms and conditions as the individual's current contract.” N.D.C.C. § 15.1–15–04(1)(c).

[¶ 10] This Court delineated the scope of a teacher's continuing employment rights, interpreting the nearly identical predecessor statute to N.D.C.C. § 15.1–15–04(1)(c), in Enstad v. North Cent. of Barnes Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 65, 268 N.W.2d 126 (N.D.1978). The Court outlined a school district's authority when it makes an offer of reemployment to a teacher, concluding that the teacher does not have a right to an identical contract with identical duties and assignments as the precedingyear. Id. at 134. In reaching that conclusion the Court expressly relied upon, and quoted with approval from, two decisions of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, Collins v. Wakonda Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W.2d 646 (S.D.1977), and Goodwin v. Bennett Cnty. High Sch. Indep. Sch. Dist., 88 S.D. 639, 226 N.W.2d 166 (1975). Enstad, at 132–34. The Court's decision in Enstad indicated that the teacher's statutory right to an offer of reemployment is the right to continued employment in the district in a position for which the teacher is qualified, not the right to a specific school or grade level:

The purposes of the Continuing Contract Law are to provide teachers security in employment and to prevent dismissal of a teacher without cause. The employment protected is the right to continued employment within the school district in a teaching position for which the teacher is qualified. Moreover, the position offered in the new contract must not be a demotion, as compared to the teaching position held under the existing contract. [Citations omitted.]

By the Continuing Contract Law the legislature did not, however, intend to grant the teacher a vested right to a specific school or to a specific class level of students within any school, in the district. The school board must be able to adapt to changes in enrollment, curriculum, available money, and other circumstances in determining the re-employment contract which is to be offered.

Id. at 133 (quoting Collins, at 647–48). The Court further noted:

A teacher, in acquiring a permanent status, does not thereby acquire a vested right to teach any certain class or in any certain school. The tenure laws do not interfere with the general power and right of school authorities to assign teachers to particular classes and to particular schools in accordance with their judgment and desire reasonably exercised. Such laws do not take from school authorities their incidental powers, originally to assign and subsequently to transfer a teacher to such classroom, such building, and such division as it may determine to be for the best interest of the school as long as the teacher is not thereby demoted in violation of the laws. [Citations omitted.] The power to transfer or reassign must be exercised in good faith and for the best interest of the school district, and must not be on an arbitrary and capricious basis or for the purpose of compelling a teacher's resignation.

Enstad, at 133 (quoting Goodwin, at 168–69) (emphasis omitted).

[¶ 11] The Court in Enstad ultimately concluded:

We construe Section 15–47–27, N.D.C.C. [the predecessor to N.D.C.C. § 15.1–15–04(1) ], to require that the school board's offer...