Lynch v. Uhlenhopp

Decision Date18 September 1956
Docket NumberNo. 48862,48862
Citation78 N.W.2d 491,248 Iowa 68
PartiesGladys M. LYNCH, Petitioner, v. Honorable Harvey UHLENHOPP, Judge of the Eleventh District of Iowa, Respondent.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Robert B. Kay and Marvin G. Kjellberg, Clarion, for petitioner.

Kelleher & Kelleher, Fort Dodge, for respondent.

Leo Pfeffer, Will Maslow and Shad Polier, New York City, for American Jewish Congress, as amicus curiae, filed brief for petitioner.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

The petitioner, Gladys M. Lynch, was married to Francis L. Lynch on November 27, 1939. Two sons, Jerry F. Lynch, the elder, and Richard R. Lynch, were the only issue of this marriage. A divorce was granted to the petitioner, as plaintiff in the action, on April 9, 1953, in the District Court of Wright County. On April 8, 1953, the parties entered into a stipulation, the material part of which provided: 'Item I. That the care, custody and control of Richard R. Lynch shall be awarded to the Plaintiff (Gladys M. Lynch) and it is provided that the said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion and that the Defendant (Francis L. Lynch) shall have the right of visitation at all reasonable hours and that the Defendant shall pay monthly support money of $40.00 per month commencing with the date of decree.' Other provisions of the stipulation concerned the custody of Jerry F. Lynch and a property settlement between the parties, none of which are material here. All of the provisions of the stipulation were incorporated in the decree. Richard was about five years old at this time, and was in his seventh year when the contempt proceedings were instituted.

The record shows that the petitioner was at the time of the divorce, and apparently still is, a Protestant, while Francis L. Lynch has at all material times been a Roman Catholic. On June 17, 1955, Francis L. Lynch filed his 'Information for Contempt' setting out Item I of the stipulation, as made a part of the decree, and alleging that prior to the divorce Richard had been baptized in the Roman Catholic Church and reared as a member of that church. Violation of the decree by the petitioner in that she 'has not reared and is not rearing said minor child in the Roman Catholic religion or in accordance with the teachings and practice of said religion, and she has announced her purpose and determination not to observe, perform or comply with said provisions of said decree; and has announced her purpose and intention not to observe and recognize as binding on her, said provision,' was pleaded. Upon hearing, the respondent found the petitioner guilty of contempt because of failure to obey the quoted portion of the decree; but it was provided that the hearing be continued for two weeks from the date of entry of the judgment of contempt for the purpose of passing sentence; and that 'if plaintiff files her affidavit in this cause by that date that she is rearing the child in the Catholic faith, then she shall stand purged of contempt to this time; otherwise appropriate punishment to be inflicted.'

It appears without contradiction that the petitioner, since the divorce, has not taken Richard to a Roman Catholic church, but that he has been attending a Congregational church Sunday School, and has attended a Bible school summer camp, apparently conducted by the same church, for about two weeks in the summers of 1953 and 1955. Mrs. Lynch did not take him to Sunday school, but sent him with 'her former sister-in-law'; she 'saw that he got there.' The father's right of visitation was not denied him, and twice he took the boy to the Roman Catholic church. The father says, and the mother denies, that she stated she would not raise the boy in the Roman Catholic faith. The petitioner, as a witness, said that she refused to sign the first stipulation presented to her because it obligated her to raise Richard as a Roman Catholic, 'because it would be too inconvenient to do so * * *.' She testified it was her understanding 'when he got old enough to make a choice that I wouldn't interfere in any way. That is the way it was stated to me before the divorce. That is the way it was stated to me by Mr. Henneberry (the husband's attorney in the divorce action) and Mr. Kay (her own attorney.)'

Although constitutional questions are present, another defect in the proceedings is deemed by a majority of this court to be so clearly apparent as to require that the writ of certiorari be sustained, before the issue of constitutionality is reached. We shall discuss this matter first.

I. Contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal. While the object to be attained is often civil obedience, the punishment frequently resembles that inflicted for violation of the criminal laws. The rule is thus stated in 12 Am.Jur., Contempt, section 67, page 434:

'While contempts are not to be regarded in any sense as a substitute for the ordinary criminal laws of the country, they are, in their essential characteristics, to be deemed primarily criminal and punitory. * * * Proceedings for contempt are therefore commonly treated as criminal in their nature even when they arise in civil actions.'

It is well settled that a judgment may be so indefinite and uncertain as to be wholly void. 30 Am.Jur., Judgments, section 20, page 828. In 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 72, pp. 191, 192, it is said:

'A judgment must be definite and certain in itself, or capable of being made so by proper construction. It must fix clearly the rights and liabilities of the respective parties to the cause, and be such as defendant may readily understand and be capable of performing * * *. Where the record entry is wholly uncertain * * * the judgment is at least erroneous, and it may be void.' (Italics added.)

This is particularly true in contempt proceedings, where the alleged contemnor is in danger of drastic punishment if the judgment does not clearly inform him what is required. The contempt proceeding is so near in its nature to criminal prosecutions that the well-known rule which commands that one cannot be convicted of a crime unless the statute is clear and definite so that he may know what he can and what he cannot do, is at least analogous. The Supreme Court of California has said:

'The rights of the parties under a mandatory judgment whereby they may be subjected to punishment as contemnors for a violation of its provisions, should not rest upon implication or conjecture, but the language declaring such rights or imposing burdens should be clear, specific and unequivocal so that the parties may not be misled thereby.' Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 124 P.2d 5, 8. This language was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592, 28 A.L.R.2d 672, 677.

To the same effect is the holding of the Nevada Supreme Court in State ex rel. Smith v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 63 Nev. 249, 167 P.2d 648, 651. The court there said:

'A judgment or decree may be so uncertain and indefinite as to be impossible of administration, unenforceable and void. And a judgment may be partly valid and partly void. [Citing authorities.]

'It is well settled that indefiniteness and uncertainty in a judgment or decree may constitute a good defense in contempt proceedings [with further citations].'

In State v. Oppal, Ohio App., 77 N.E.2d 270, 271, the defendant had been cited for contempt for failure to execute a quitclaim deed as ordered by the court in a divorce action. The property was encumbered by a mortgage upon which the defendant was personally liable. The decree did not disclose whether she was to be held harmless from this liability upon executing the deed. The Ohio appellate court held the decree was so uncertain that its provisions could not be enforced by contempt, and reversed the judgment of guilty against the defendant. It cited 23 Ohio Jurisprudence, section 153, page 621:

"Inasmuch as the judgment and its enforcement are the end and aim of the whole litigation, to satisfy this purpose the judgment must so dispose of the matters at issue between the parties that they and such other persons as may be affected, will be able to determine with reasonable certainty the extent to which their rights and obligations have been determined."

In Howard S. Tierney, Inc. v. James, 269 App.Div. 348, 56 N.Y.S.2d 8, 13, 14, the defendant had been enjoined from soliciting, accepting or receiving insurance business from customers of the plaintiffs who had not been specifically allotted to him by arbitrators. The trial court found him in contempt for violation of this order. The New York Supreme Court reversed, saying: 'The better way would have been to list in the interlocutory judgment the names of all customers, dealing with whom was enjoined, thus eliminating all doubt.' The court held the injunction void for indefiniteness, quoting: "Unless a contempt proceeding is based upon an order which is clear and precise, no finding of contempt may be made." Mitchell v. Sperling, 229 App.Div. 204, 241 N.Y.S. 543, 545. The point is well stated in Ketchum v. Edwards, 153 N.Y. 534, 47 N.E. 918, 920: 'But as punishment for contempt involves, or may involve, not only loss of property, but liberty, it is a reasonable requirement that the mandate alleged to be violated should be clearly expressed * * *.'

A sound expression of the rule is found in Seastrunk Rendering Co. v. Hollingsworth, Tex.Civ.App., 177 S.W.2d 1014, 1016, 1017:

'To warrant a decree of injunction, enforceable through contempt proceedings, the acts commanded or restrained must be described in the decree with sufficient definiteness for the defendant to know in advance what he must or must not do in order to abide by the decree and escape the penalties attaching to its infringement. The vice in the decree lies in the fact that it enjoins, not specific acts or omissions, but results, evidence of the existence vel non of...

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34 cases
  • Zummo v. Zummo
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • May 17, 1990
    ...cases); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn.Supp. 278, 132 A.2d 420, 421-22 (1957) (collecting authorities); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491, 499-50 (1957) (collecting cases); see generally Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 22 ALR4th 971, 1......
  • Arnold v. Arnold
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • March 8, 1966
    ...cannot be so extended as to embrace awards made by implication, or which are uncertain, indefinite and conjectural. Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 92, 78 N.W.2d 491; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 76, page 198; and 30A Am.Jur., Rev.Ed., Judgments, section 61, page 207. See also Anno. 55 A.L.R.2d B......
  • State v. Johnson, 56930
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • October 16, 1974
    ...authority. City of Clinton v. Owners of Property, etc., 191 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Iowa 1971), and citations; Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa, 68, 80, 78 N.W.2d 491, 498--499 (1956).' Moreover, this court further stated in Wiese, supra, at 737: '(A) trial court does not exhaust its jurisdiction unti......
  • Spiker v. Spiker
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 20, 2006
    ...on, an agreement of the parties."). We also observe that this approach is consistent with our general approach in Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 83, 78 N.W.2d 491, 500 (1956), where we refused to permit contempt powers of courts to be used to enforce a stipulated provision of a dissolutio......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Margaret F. Brinig, Children's Beliefs and Family Law
    • United States
    • Emory University School of Law Emory Law Journal No. 58-1, 2008
    • Invalid date
    ...to Jewish faith). For a case refusing to enforce the parents' agreement to raise the child as a Catholic, see Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1956). 29 514 A.2d 81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986). 30 Id. at 84; see also Grayman v. Hession, 446 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)......

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