Lyons v. Jackson
Decision Date | 08 August 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 00-2153.,00-2153. |
Citation | 299 F.3d 588 |
Parties | Dashawn LYONS, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andrew JACKSON, Warden, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
John R. Minock (argued and briefed), Cramer Minock, Ann Arbor, MI, for Petitioner-Appellee.
Thomas M. Chambers (argued and briefed), Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, County of Wayne, Detroit, MI, Brad H. Beaver, Office of the Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, for Respondent-Appellant.
Before: BOGGS, GILMAN, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges.**
BRIGHT, J., delivered the opinion of the court. GILMAN, J. (pp. 601-603), delivered a separate concurring opinion. BOGGS, J. (pp. 603-605), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
Andrew Jackson, the warden of a Michigan state correctional institution, appeals a federal district court's conditional grant of habeas corpus to prisoner Dashawn Lyons1 on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Lyons is currently serving a life sentence without parole after pleading guilty to first degree murder.
In 1990, Lyons was sixteen years old and had received an education to the seventh grade. On advice of counsel, who believed it likely the trial court would impose a juvenile sentence, Lyons pled guilty in Michigan state court to first degree murder. The trial court did sentence Lyons as a juvenile. The prosecution appealed, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, and Lyons received the only available adult sentence under Michigan law: life in prison without possibility of parole. Lyons' trial counsel did not consider or advise Lyons that the prosecutor could appeal the imposition of a juvenile sentence.
Lyons petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and the federal district court2 concluded that the failure of Lyons' counsel to inform him of the prosecutor's right to appeal, particularly in light of Lyons' youth at the time of the plea, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court further concluded that a contrary determination on the facts and the law by the Michigan Court of Appeals constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Accordingly, the court granted Lyons' petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.3 The warden appeals. After a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the district court.
On November 27, 1989, Lyons shot and killed Douglas Thomas. The state of Michigan charged Lyons with first degree murder and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony.
Lyons' trial in the Recorder's Court for the city of Detroit was scheduled to begin on March 5, 1990. The assigned judge had another jury trial that day, so Lyons' trial was postponed to the next day and transferred to the docket of Judge Roberson, Chief Judge of the Recorder's Court. The next day, March 6, Lyons pled guilty to first degree murder before Chief Judge Roberson on the advice of his defense counsel, Laurence Burgess.
At the plea hearing that day, Burgess informed the court that he recognized it was unusual to offer a plea to first degree murder, but he had discussed the matter with Lyons and Lyons' father who was present in the courtroom. Burgess stated his conviction that he would be able to convince the court to sentence Lyons as a juvenile and explained that "on the basis of that" Lyons wanted to offer a guilty plea.
The court questioned Lyons as to whether he understood the two greatly disparate sentencing possibilities available to the court in his case. Lyons affirmed his understanding that if the court decided to treat him as an adult, the court had no option but to sentence him to life in prison without parole; but if the court treated him as a juvenile, he would be committed to the state juvenile authority for a period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday.4 Lyons also stated that he was not being coerced into his plea, had not been promised anything in return for his plea, and was aware of the various trial rights he was foregoing by pleading guilty.
The court then questioned Lyons briefly as to the factual basis of the crime. Lyons stated that he knew the victim and went to the victim's house. Lyons was carrying a revolver at the time. Lyons stated: The court specifically asked Lyons if he had tried to rob the victim and Lyons admitted he had.
On November 30, 1990, after a sentencing hearing conducted over a number of months, Chief Judge Roberson concluded that it was appropriate to sentence Lyons as a juvenile. The court ordered that Lyons be confined to a maximum security state juvenile facility until age twenty-one.
The prosecutor appealed the juvenile sentence disposition.5 The state court of appeals reversed and remanded for sentencing as an adult, i.e., mandatory life imprisonment without parole on the first degree murder charge. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court ordered a stay of further trial court proceedings, then vacated the court of appeals opinion on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and remanded to the court of appeals for rebriefing. The court of appeals again reversed and remanded for imposition of the adult sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
At his resentencing before Chief Judge Roberson on January 30, 1995, Lyons orally moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Pursuant to recent Michigan Supreme Court orders in similar cases, Chief Judge Roberson immediately imposed the adult sentence of life without parole and deferred consideration of the motion until an evidentiary hearing could be scheduled.6 Lyons later filed a written motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
On April 13, 1995, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Lyons' motion to withdraw his plea. Lyons' trial counsel, Burgess, testified. Burgess stated that he did almost entirely trial work and handled very few appellate cases. Burgess explained that he had prepared for the March 5, 1990, trial before the originally assigned judge. But upon learning that his client's case had been transferred to Chief Judge Roberson, Burgess changed tack and recommended to Lyons that he plead guilty. Although Burgess believed that he could argue an imperfect self-defense claim on Lyons' behalf at trial, which might result in Lyons being convicted of a lesser offense, Burgess's knowledge of Chief Judge Roberson's sentencing policies and general philosophy for handling juveniles convinced him that he "could get a fair hearing from Judge Roberson and ... persuade him to sentence [Lyons] as a juvenile." Accordingly, Burgess took the "unusual" step of advising Lyons to plead guilty to first degree murder.
Burgess acknowledged that prior to March 5, he and Lyons had "discuss[ed] the trial more than anything else" and their main discussion regarding Lyons' guilty plea took place only in the few hours after the case had been reassigned to Chief Judge Roberson. Burgess realized that the sixteen-year-old Lyons was relying heavily on his advice, nonetheless he strongly recommended the plea. Burgess also discussed the situation with Lyons' father and advised him that it was in Lyons' best interest to plead guilty.7
Burgess testified that, in formulating his advice to Lyons, he did not consider the prosecutor's right to appeal a trial court's sentencing decision.
Q In formulating your advice to Mr. Lyons did you take into account the fact that the Prosecution had a right to appeal Judge Roberson's decision?
[Burgess] No, didn't consider that at all and I certainly didn't discuss it with him. But it really didn't enter my mind.
. . . .
Q You didn't take that into consideration in formulating your own opinion as to the best choice for him?
[Burgess] No. It's not something that I would even think about. My reasoning was that Judge Roberson would be fair. I thought I could convince him that this young man should be sentenced as a juvenile. I never in my wildest dreams thought the Court of Appeals or a Supreme Court would reverse a judge on a discretion such as this....
Q If you had taken that into consideration, are you able to say whether it would have made a difference in your advice?
[Burgess] ... I can't really tell you whether or not I would have gone ahead and still advised him of this but at least he should have been aware of it and in that case I was remiss, I guess. But it's not something I even thought about. I can tell you.
Lyons testified at the evidentiary hearing as well. He stated that when Burgess advised him to plead guilty, he initially "wanted to fight" the charges and go to trial. However, he eventually acceded to the plea, relying on the advice and information Burgess provided to him. Lyons then testified about Burgess's failure to inform him of the prosecutor's right to appeal and the impact such information would have had on his decision to plead guilty.
Q Did you and Mr. Burgess discuss the fact that the Prosecutor had a right to appeal the case and if Judge Roberson sentenced you as a juvenile another court could decide to reverse that and say, no, you have to be sentenced as an adult?
[Lyons] No, we did not.
Q If [Burgess] advised you there was a second hurdle to get past, a second risk regarding a juvenile versus the adult sentence, would you have plead guilty to first degree murder?
. . . .
[Lyons] Likely I would have chosen to go to trial.
Lyons testified that he...
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