Lyons v. Norris, 1961601

• Decision Date: 30 November 2001
• Docket Number: 1961601
• Parties: G. Sage Lyons, Director of Finance, et al.(FN*) v. John Norris et al. John Norris et al. v. G. Sage Lyons et al. Robert Childree v. Michael Crespi Robert Childree v. Robert L. Turner G. Sage Lyons et al. v. Paul D. Brown 1961601, 1961602, 1961603, 1961604 and 1961642
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

G. Sage Lyons, Director of Finance, et al.^*

v.

John Norris et al.

John Norris et al.

v.

G. Sage Lyons et al.

Robert Childree

v.

Michael Crespi

Robert Childree

v.

Robert L. Turner

G. Sage Lyons et al.

v.

Paul D. Brown

1961601, 1961602, 1961603, 1961604 and 1961642

OCTOBER TERM, 2001-2002

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

11/30/2001

Appeals from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-96-311)

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-96-981)

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-96-1479)

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court (CV-96-2266)

MOORE, Chief Justice.

The finance director and the comptroller for the State of Alabama (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the state officials") denied reimbursement for the office overhead expenses of several attorneys who represented indigent criminal defendants. These attorneys filed a declaratory-judgment action in Montgomery Circuit Court against the state officials seeking a determination as to how the state officials were to comply with, and implement, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1307 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993). The attorneys also filed in the trial court a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to compel the state officials to retroactively reimburse the attorneys for overhead expenses they had "incurred" in representing indigent criminal defendants. One of the attorneys sued the comptroller in his individual capacity for negligence and wantonness, while another one of the attorneys sought certification of a putative class consisting of all attorneys appointed pursuant to § 15-12-21, Ala. Code 1975, to represent indigent criminal defendants.

The trial court consolidated these related cases and conducted a hearing on the issue of class certification. The parties submitted the case on stipulated facts and briefs. In its order dated May 5, 1997, the trial court issued a writ of mandamus, instructing the state officials to "approve all Attorney Fee Declarations that include Orders approving 'office overhead expenses' filed prior to or contemporaneously with the Attorney Fee Declaration." The trial court also denied class certification with respect to a class of "all attorneys licensed and practicing in the State of Alabama since September 3, 1993, who accepted the representation of indigent criminal defendants ... and who submitted fee and expense vouchers [containing] court approved sums for 'office overhead expenses' pursuant to ... May."

The state officials appealed from the trial court's judgment entered in favor of the attorneys. As to those appeals, we reverse and remand. The attorneys cross-appealed from the trial court's order denying class certification. As to the cross-appeal, we affirm.

I.

Because the facts are not in dispute, and because we are presented with pure questions of law, the trial court's judgment is accorded no presumption of correctness. This Court's review of the application of the law to the undisputed facts is de novo. See Ex parte Graham, 702 So. 2d 1215, 1221 (Ala. 1997); Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365, 1372 (Ala. 1994).

II.

In May, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals, with one judge dissenting, held that "office overhead expenses are by law encompassed in the term 'expenses reasonably incurred' as that term is used in § 15-12-21(d)[, Ala. Code 1975]," and that the appellant in that case, an attorney appointed to represent indigent criminal defendants, was "entitled to be compensated for his office overhead expenses reasonably incurred and reasonably calculated in representing" the defendant, who was indigent. 672 So. 2d at 1308. This Court granted certiorari review in that case but subsequently quashed the writs as improvidently granted. May v. State, 672 So.2d 1310 (Ala. 1995). Subsequently, in Ex parte Smith, 698 So.2d 219, 224 (Ala. 1997), this Court agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals that § 15-12-21, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes payment to a court-appointed attorney for overhead expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of an indigent defendant. However, as expressed in both § 15-12-21 and May, before counsel is entitled to be reimbursed for those expenses, the trial court must approve the expenses in advance.

At the time the attorneys commenced this action, § 15-12-21(d), Ala. Code 1975, provided as follows:

"(d) Counsel appointed in [indigent] cases ... shall be entitled to receive for their services a fee to be approved by the trial court. The amount of such fee shall be based on the number of hours spent by the attorney in working on such case and shall be computed at the rate of $40.00 per hour for time expended in court and $20.00 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court in the preparation of such case. The total fees to any one attorney in any one case, from the time of appointment through the trial of the case, including motions for new trial, shall not, however, exceed $1,000.00, except as follows: In cases where the original case involves a capital offense or a charge which carries a possible sentence of life without parole, the limits shall be $1,000.00 for out-of-court work, plus payment for all in-court work, said work to be billed at the aforementioned rates. Counsel shall also be entitled to be reimbursed for any expenses reasonably incurred in such defense to be approved in advance by the trial court. Retrials of a case shall be considered a new case.

(Emphasis added.) ¹

The current dispute turns upon the meaning attributed to the phrase "approved in advance by the trial court." The attorneys argue that this phrase allows the trial court to approve their expenses at any point before they submit their claims for payment. They contend that because the trial court ultimately approved their overhead expenses, the comptroller must reimburse them for these expenses. The state officials argue that the statute requires the trial court to enter an order approving the expenses before they incur those expenses, and that because the trial court failed to do so in these cases, the state officials properly denied the attorneys' claims.

When a court construes a statute, "[w]ords used in [the] statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says." IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992). Here, the plain language of § 15-12-21(d), Ala. Code 1975, requires a claim for "any expenses reasonably incurred," be "approved in advance by the trial court." The operative words of this statutory provision, for purposes of this issue, are "any expenses," "reasonably incurred," and "approved in advance." Thus, the trial court's advance approval necessarily relates to incurring expenses. In other words, the plain language of § 15-12-21(d) indicates that an order approving the expense must be entered before the expense is incurred. The language of § 15-12-21(d) cannot support a different result.

Even May, supra, recognized this result: "'Although § 15-12-21(d) authorizes payment of court-approved expenses, "[t]he trial judge must find some reasonable basis for the expenditure of state funds before he may authorize" payment under the statute, Wiggins v. State, 440 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983).'" May v. State, 672 So. 2d at 1308, quoting Whittle v. State, 518 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (original emphasis omitted; emphasis added). See Nicks v. State, 783 So. 2d 895, 921 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); Fisher v. State, 587 So. 2d 1027, 1031 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).

This interpretation is further supported by the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Ex parte Barksdale, 680 So. 2d 1029 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996). That case cited with approval an Alabama attorney general's opinion on this very subject: "'Office overhead expenses claimed pursuant to § 15-12-21(d),Code of Alabama 1975, must be approved by the trial court in advance of being incurred before such expenses may be reimbursed by the State Comptroller.'" 680 So. 2d at 1030, quoting Op. Atty. Gen., No. 96-191, p. 3 (April 19, 1996) (emphasis added). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded: "This opinion implies, as does the statute, that a fixed amount must be preapproved by the court before expenses may be reimbursed by the State Comptroller's office." 680 So. 2d at 1030 (emphasis added).

This interpretation is consonant with our Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 6.4(g), Ala.R.Crim.P., defines the term "compensation for services," for which a private attorney representing an indigent client is entitled to be reimbursed, to include "any reasonable expenses necessarily incurred by appointed counsel in defense of an indigent client, including fees and expenses of expert or professional persons, provided that the incurring of such expenses has been approved in advance by the judge presiding ...." (Emphasis added.) This result is further supported by our courts' historical application of § 15-12-21(d). See Ex parte State, 662 So. 2d 1189 (Ala. 1995); Nicks v. State, 783 So. 2d 895 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); McLeod v. State, 581 So. 2d 1144 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990); McGahee v. State, 554 So. 2d 454 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, 554 So. 2d 473 (Ala. 1989); Whittle v. State, 518 So.2d 793 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987); Tarver v. State, 500 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff'd, 500 So. 2d 1256 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987); Hold v. State, 485 So. 2d 801 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Jackson v. State, 516 So. 2d 726 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); McKinley v. State, 441 So. 2d 1040 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Dutton v. State, 434 So. 2d 853 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Wiggins v. State, 440 So. 2d 1164 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); Whisenhant v. State, 482 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Bailey v. State, 421 So. 2d 1364 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982).

The logic for having expenses approved in advance is obvious: The Alabama Legislature and this Court -- in ...