Lytle Invextment Co. v. Gilman

• Decision Date: 15 December 1925
• Docket Number: 36987
• Citation: 206 N.W. 108,201 Iowa 603
• Parties: LYTLE INVESTMENT COMPANY, Appellee, v. STEWART GILMAN, Mayor, et al., Appellants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

206 N.W. 108

201 Iowa 603

LYTLE INVESTMENT COMPANY, Appellee, v. STEWART GILMAN, Mayor, et al., Appellants

No. 36987

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 15, 1925

REHEARING DENIED MARCH 12, 1926.

Appeal from Woodbury District Court.--ROBERT H. MUNGER, Judge.

APPEAL from a decree enjoining the defendants from acting or attempting to act under the provisions of a resolution of the city council of Sioux City and a contract based thereon with the defendant Automatic Signal Advertising Company, in so far as the provisions of said contract relate to the use of the advertising panels on traffic regulators installed by said company on certain streets of the defendant city. The opinion states the facts. Defendants appeal.

Reversed.

Paul M Hatfield and E. G. Smith, for appellants.

E. J Stason and S. G. Pickus, for appellee.

DE GRAFF, J. FAVILLE, C. J., and STEVENS and VERMILTON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

DE GRAFF, J.

The city council of the defendant-city of Sioux City, by virtue of statutory authority (Section 4992, Paragraph 1, Code of 1924), on July 19, 1924, adopted a resolution authorizing the mayor and the commissioner of public safety to enter into a contract of lease with the defendant Automatic Signal Advertising Company, to install automatic traffic regulators on certain street intersections; and pursuant to said resolution, a contract was executed between said city and the advertising company whereby the said company leased to the city thirteen electric traffic regulators, to be placed by lessor at its own expense, and to be maintained by it for a period of three years, without cost to the lessee. The provocation for this action is found in the stipulation of the contract, to wit:

"The lessee agrees, in consideration for the installation and maintenance of said traffic regulators, to allow the lessor the right to paint and maintain the four sides of advertising panels in combination with each of said traffic regulators, and the lessor agrees to provide the necessary electrical current."

The plaintiff alleges in its petition that, as a taxpayer and abutting property owner on one of the street intersections, it is entitled "to the unobstructed use of the said streets for the use of himself and his said tenants, and the placing of private advertising upon towers or obstructions in said streets and in front of the building of this plaintiff will cause this plaintiff to suffer damage, by reason of the fact that it will be unable to rent said rooms to tenants whose competitors might [profit], through the maintenance of their signs and advertising in the public street fronting and abutting upon the property of the plaintiff," and that such damage is special and distinct from the damage suffered by other citizens, by reason of the illegal and unlawful use of the public streets by the Automatic Signal Company for private gain. This is the gist of the action praying for an injunction.

Preliminary to the answer to the controlling proposition on this appeal, it may be said that the trial court on the fact issue ruled, and correctly so, that the traffic regulators, without relation or reference to the advertising matter, were proper and suitable mechanical devices for the regulation of traffic on the streets of the defendant-city. It is well established that a court will not interfere in the exercise of lawful municipal authority in the absence of a plea and showing of fraud. It is not for a court to weigh the needs of a city in the matter of municipal improvements. This is the province of the city council to determine. It is a matter left to the discretion of the municipal tribunal, and the exercise of that discretion in good faith is conclusive. 2 High on Injunctions (4th Ed.), Sections 1240, 1311; Clay v. Independent Sch. Dist., 187 Iowa 89, 174 N.W. 47; Swan v. City of Indianola, 142 Iowa 731, 121 N.W. 547; Brewster v. City of Davenport, 51 Iowa 427, 1 N.W. 737.

Furthermore it may be observed that the instant action was not instituted on behalf of the public or upon the relation of any public official to test the validity of the resolution or the contract based thereon. It follows, therefore, that the decisions on which appellee relies, are not of material helpfulness in the solution of the determinative question presented in the case at bar. See People ex rel. Healy v....