M.F. v. State

• Decision Date: 11 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 76371,76371
• Citation: 583 So.2d 1383
• Parties: M.F., a juvenile, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. 583 So.2d 1383, 16 Fla. L. Week. S483
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1383

583 So.2d 1383

M.F., a juvenile, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. 76371.

583 So.2d 1383, 16 Fla. L. Week. S483

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 11, 1991.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Louis Campbell, Asst. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.

BARKETT, Justice.

We have for review M.F. v. State, 563 So.2d 171 (Fla.3d DCA 1990), based on asserted express and direct conflict with D.C.W. v. State, 445 So.2d 333 (Fla.1984); S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018 (Fla.1977); J.H. v. State, 424 So.2d 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and T.R. v. State, 364 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). ¹ The issue presented is whether the state can amend a timely-filed petition for juvenile delinquency more than forty-five days after the juvenile is taken into custody by changing the allegation from sale of cannabis to sale of cocaine. We approve the decision below and hold that the amendment was proper under the circumstances of this case.

Police in Miami arrested petitioner, M.F., on May 31, 1989, when, according to the police report, an undercover officer allegedly purchased $10 worth of rock cocaine from the juvenile. The state filed a petition for delinquency on June 27 alleging that M.F. "did unlawfully and feloniously sell, purchase, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, purchase, manufacture, or deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: CANNABIS, ... in violation of [section] 893.13 [of the] Florida Statutes [1987]." The allegation would have been a third-degree felony if filed in adult criminal court. M.F. entered a plea of denial.

An adjudicatory hearing was set for August 8, sixty-nine days after police took M.F. into custody. At that time, the state orally moved to amend the petition to change the controlled substance specified in the petition from cannabis to cocaine, now alleging what would have been a second-degree felony if filed in adult criminal court. Over M.F.'s objection, the court allowed the amendment but granted M.F. a thirty-day continuance.

M.F. subsequently moved to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.110(e), alleging that the state failed to satisfy the forty-five-day filing period required by section 39.05(6) of the Florida Statutes (1987). M.F. argued that the state was actually filing a "new charge," whereas the state argued that it was merely correcting a technical error. The court denied M.F.'s motion to dismiss. M.F. then pled nolo contendere to the amended petition, reserving the right to appeal. The court adjudicated M.F. delinquent, and the district court affirmed.

It is undisputed that under the applicable law, juveniles have a substantive right to have a delinquency petition dismissed with prejudice if the petition is not timely filed. Sec. 39.05(6), Fla.Stat.; ² see S.R., 346 So.2d at 1018. The court has no discretion under such circumstances, for it must dismiss an untimely petition. S.R., 346 So.2d at 1018; see Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.110(e). ³ The state has forty-five days to file its petition, and the period begins to run at the moment the juvenile is taken into custody. Sec. 39.05(6), Fla.Stat.; D.C.W., 445 So.2d at 333. Once a proper petition for delinquency has been timely filed, the state may correct defects or variances by amending the petition prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.110(c); ⁴ see also Fla.R.Juv.P. 8.110(d). ⁵ However, the state may not amend a petition if doing so conflicts with the juvenile's substantive right to have an untimely petition dismissed with prejudice. S.R., 346 So.2d at 1018.

In this case, the state initially filed its petition twenty-seven days after M.F.'s arrest, which was well within the forty-five-day period allowed by section 39.05(6). However, M.F. argues that because the initial petition alleged a different violation than the one later alleged by amendment, the petition was inadequate to satisfy the notice requirement of due process, the statutory forty-five-day filing requirement, and rule 8.110. Therefore, M.F. argues, the court was obligated to dismiss the petition with prejudice. M.F. further argues that allowing the state to amend under these circumstances would defeat the substantive protections afforded juveniles by the statute and would run contrary to the legislature's intent in chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes (1987) to promote swift intervention, treatment, and rehabilitation in juvenile cases.

The state argues that the original petition met the requirements of law, thereby satisfying the forty-five-day statutory time period. The state asserts that the distinction between cannabis and cocaine was merely a technical defect, allowing the state to timely cure the defect by amendment pursuant to rule 8.110(c). The state urges that it would be appropriate to determine whether the original petition was so vague, indistinct, and indefinite that the juvenile was misled or prejudiced in presenting a defense. Applying those principles, the state contends that M.F. suffered no prejudice because the juvenile had actual notice of the police report that specified cocaine as the controlled substance, and because M.F. got a thirty-day continuance after the petition was amended.

We begin our analysis with the overarching principle that due process of law requires the state to allege every essential element when charging a violation of law either in adult criminal or juvenile proceedings, to provide the accused with notice of the allegations. Art. I, Sec. 9, Fla.Const.; see, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 575 So.2d 1262 (Fla.1991); accord In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-34, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445-47, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). The state's authority to provide notice of allegations by formally charging a crime is often limited by legislative policy decisions imposing statutes of limitations to restrict the period during which the state may take legal action against an individual for particular offenses. Accordingly, a charging document is subject to dismissal if it fails to properly allege every essential element of the offense or if it is not filed within the period of time allowed by law.

This Court has carved out an exception to the filing requirement where the state, because of a clerical-type error made in good faith, improperly alleges the elements of an offense in a timely-filed charging document. In such instances, we have held that the state may amend the charging document to correct the error after the applicable statutory period has elapsed, provided that the amendment was not intended to actually change the substantive charge and did not prejudice the rights of the accused to present a defense and get a fair trial. In Rubin v. State, 390 So.2d 322 (Fla.1980), the state timely filed an information that named the victim as "Riverside Memorial Chapel, Inc., a subsidiary of Service Corporation International," and refiled the information after the statute of limitations expired to read "Riverside Memorial Chapel, Alton Road, Inc., a subsidiary of Service Corporation International." Id. at 323 (emphasis in original). The Court held that the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the first information because the first information was timely filed; the second information corrected what was just a "slight inaccuracy" in the name of the corporate victim; the second information contained sufficient information to link it to the first; the second information was filed while the first information was pending; the crimes charged in the two informations were identical; and the refile notation on the second information was sufficient indication that the state was pursuing the same prosecution. Id. at 324; see also State v. Anderson, 537 So.2d 1373 (Fla.1989) (when procedural irregularities or technical defects are made in an information, and those problems have no bearing upon the substantial rights of the parties, courts should require a showing of prejudice before dismissing the charge).

In considering whether these same principles should apply in the area of juvenile justice, we must take note of the fact that the Florida legislature has imposed a firm layer of protection for juveniles by requiring courts to dismiss with prejudice delinquency petitions filed more than forty-five days after the juvenile has been taken into custody. Sec. 39.05(6), Fla.Stat. Previous decisions of this Court reaffirm the strength of the legislature's policy decision to require the state to promptly file delinquency petitions. For example, in S.R., the Court held that an initial delinquency petition filed after the statutory filing period has elapsed must be dismissed with prejudice, so the trial court has no discretion under such circumstances to consider whether the juvenile was prejudiced by the untimely filing. ⁶ S.R., 346 So.2d at 1018. In D.C.W., the state initially proceeded against the juvenile as an adult but later filed a petition for delinquency when the charges brought in circuit court were reduced. The Court held that when an information or indictment setting forth adult criminal charges is filed within forty-five days of the juvenile's arrest, the state may proceed with delinquency proceedings if for some reason the case is transferred back to the juvenile division. D.C.W., 445 So.2d at 333. However, neither S.R. nor D.C.W. addressed whether prejudice to the juvenile should be considered when the state fails to properly allege every essential element in a timely-filed initial petition and amends the petition after the filing period elapses. Thus, S.R. and D.C.W. do not conflict with M.F., nor do they control the result here.

Turning to relevant district court decisions for guidance, there appears to be some inconsistency or lack of clarity among those cases. We review them to resolve conflicts and harmonize the law, breaking them down for the purposes of...