State v. Rodriguez

• Decision Date: 03 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 75302,75302
• Citation: 575 So.2d 1262
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Narcisco RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1262

575 So.2d 1262

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Narcisco RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.

No. 75302.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 3, 1991.

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1991.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Angelica D. Zayas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for petitioner.

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, and L. Michael Roffino, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Coral Gables, for respondent.

BARKETT, Judge.

We accepted jurisdiction to resolve an express and direct conflict between Rodriguez v. State, 553 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), and Pritchard v. State, 528 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). ¹ The issue is whether a charging document must specifically allege three or more prior convictions for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) when charging a defendant with felony DUI to confer jurisdiction on the circuit court and to comply with due process of law.

The state filed an information in the circuit court charging Narcisco Rodriguez with three traffic-related offenses on October 11, 1988. One of the charges was for DUI in violation of section 316.193(1), (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). ² Section 316.193(2)(b) provides that "[a]ny person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent [DUI violation] is guilty of a felony of the third degree." The information here made no mention of any specific prior DUI convictions, nor did the state before trial provide Rodriguez any details of the alleged prior convictions.

At arraignment, Rodriguez moved to dismiss or to transfer the matter to the county court, asserting that because the information did not inform him of what specific prior offenses he allegedly committed, the information did not adequately charge the felony, and therefore the circuit court had no jurisdiction. The circuit court denied the motion. Subsequently, a jury found Rodriguez guilty of DUI. After denying Rodriguez's renewed motion to dismiss, the court immediately adjudicated Rodriguez guilty of third-degree felony DUI and sentenced him to four and one-half years' imprisonment. ³

The district court reversed on the ground that the felony prosecution in circuit court was improper because the information merely charged Rodriguez, "in effect, with three misdemeanors." Rodriguez, 553 So.2d at 1331. The district court expressed conflict with Pritchard, which held that the state need not allege the prior DUI convictions in the charging document "because of possible prejudice to the accused in the event the prior convictions were brought to the jury's attention." Pritchard, 528 So.2d at 1273.

The arguments presented by the parties require us to make two related inquiries concerning the sufficiency of the information. First, we must determine whether the information unambiguously alleged the commission of a felony, thereby properly invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. If the circuit court had jurisdiction, we must then determine whether the information satisfied Rodriguez's right to the protection of due process of law.

On the question of jurisdiction, the closely analogous case of State v. Phillips, 463 So.2d 1136 (Fla.1985), controls. In Phillips, we said an information charging a felony and misdemeanors arising out of the same circumstances is within the exclusive subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. Id. at 1137; State v. Vazquez, 450 So.2d 203 (Fla.1984); § 26.012(2)(d), Fla.Stat. (1987); see art. V, § 5, Fla. Const. However, the information must unambiguously charge a felony to invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction.

The narrow issue in Phillips was whether the information "sufficiently alleged commission of a felony and thus properly invoked the jurisdiction of the circuit court." Phillips, 463 So.2d at 1137. In that case, an information charged Phillips with the theft of less than one hundred dollars, citing section 812.014(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes (1981). The heading of the information read "FELONY PETIT THEFT." Phillips, 463 So.2d at 1137. Section 812.014(2)(c) did not exclusively define felony petit theft. To the contrary, that section defined three substantive criminal offenses: second-degree misdemeanor petit theft, first-degree misdemeanor petit theft, and third-degree felony petit theft. Had the information merely cited to section 812.014(2)(c), without any additional clarification, the defendant would not have known which crime he was accused of committing. However, because the information also included the heading of "FELONY PETIT THEFT," the heading cured the problem since the heading and citation combined to unambiguously state that Phillips was charged with felony petit theft in violation of section 812.014(2)(c). Thus, the Court concluded that the circuit court had jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional issue in this case is even more clear than in Phillips. The information charged Rodriguez with DUI in violation of section 316.193(1), (2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). Those provisions read as follows:

316.193 Driving under the influence; penalties.--

(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if such person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that his normal faculties are impaired; or

(b) The person has a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent or higher.

(2)....

....

(b) Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of subsection (1) is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

By referring specifically to subsection (2)(b), the state made clear that it was charging Rodriguez with the third-degree felony as specifically set forth in that subsection. Thus, the information properly invoked the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

However, this does not end our inquiry. Rodriguez argues that even if the circuit court had jurisdiction, the information failed to meet the standards required by due process of law. His due process argument really involves two distinct aspects of the due process guarantee: the notice requirement and the entitlement to a presumption of innocence.

A charging document must provide adequate notice of the alleged essential facts the defendant must defend against. Art. I, §§ 9, 16, Fla. Const. In recognition of this concern, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(b) provides that an "indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." (Emphasis supplied); see also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.140(d)(1) ("Each count of an indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall allege the essential facts constituting the offense charged.") (emphasis supplied).

As the state conceded at oral argument, the combined existence of three or more prior DUI convictions is an element of the substantive offense of felony DUI as defined by section 316.193(1), (2)(b). This conclusion necessarily follows the reasoning in State v. Harris, 356 So.2d 315 (Fla.1978), where the Court construed the felony petit larceny statute, section 812.021(3) of the Florida Statutes (1975). Section 812.021(3) elevated the second-degree misdemeanor of petit larceny to the status of a third-degree felony upon the third or subsequent conviction of petit larceny. Like the felony DUI statute in this case, and virtually all other substantive criminal statutes, the felony petit larceny statute authorized punishment as provided in sections 775.082 (penalties), 775.083 (fines), or 775.084 (habitual offender penalties) of the Florida Statutes (1975). Justice Hatchett concluded for the Court that the felony petit larceny statute "creates a substantive offense and is thus distinguishable from [s]ection 775.084, the habitual criminal offender statute." Harris, 356 So.2d at 316. The felony DUI statute is indistinguishable in this regard. Section 316.193(2)(b) of the Florida Statutes (Supp.1988) requires that "[a]ny person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent [DUI violation] is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." As in Harris, we conclude that the existence of three or more prior DUI convictions is an essential fact constituting the substantive offense of felony DUI. ⁴

Moreover, the logic supporting our jurisdictional holding above also supports the conclusion that three prior DUI convictions combine as an essential element of felony DUI. The circuit court has jurisdiction only because the offense is a felony. It is a felony only by virtue of the fact that the defendant has been convicted of three or more prior DUI violations. It follows that because this fact is essential to the definition of the crime of felony DUI, it is an essential element that must be noticed and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Art. I, §§ 9, 16, Fla. Const.

Having established that the existence of prior DUI convictions is an essential element of felony DUI, it necessarily follows that the requisite notice of prior DUI convictions must be given in the charging document. However, due process also requires that a defendant's presumption of innocence be preserved. To address the overlap of these two due process concerns, we must look at both the charging document itself and the manner in which the allegations are conveyed to the jury.

In Harris, the Court observed that the presumption of innocence may be compromised if jurors deliberating on a single petit larceny charge were to become aware of allegations or proof of prior similar convictions. Accord Shargaa v. State, 102 So.2d 809 (Fla.) (the presumption of innocence is destroyed when jurors learn of...