M., In re

• Citation: 89 Cal.Rptr. 718
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 18 September 1970
• Parties: In re Michael M., a minor. V. Mackie PEASE, Supervising Probation Officer, Contra Costa County, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael M., Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 27389.

Page 718

89 Cal.Rptr. 718

In re Michael M., a minor.

V. Mackie PEASE, Supervising Probation Officer, Contra Costa County, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michael M., Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 27389.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Sept. 18, 1970.

As Modified Sept. 30, 1970.

Edwin R. Baltimore, Walnut Creek, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., of California, Robert R. Granucci, Horace Wheatley, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

ELKINGTON, Associate Justice.

A petition filed with the Contra Costa County Juvenile Court under the provisions of article 7, sections 650-664, Welfare and Institutions Code, alleged that Michael M., a minor, aged 17, "did sell a restricted dangerous drug, to wit: a hallucinagen known as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) *** thereby violating section 11912 of the Health and Safety Code of California" and that he therefore came "within the provisions of section 602 of the Juvenile Court law [Welf. & Inst.Code]."

The juvenile court thereafter found the allegations of the petition to be true and committed Michael to the California Youth Authority. The proceedings on which the finding and commitment were based were the following: "THE COURT: The reason for this hearing this morning is that a petition was filed in the Juvenile Court, stating that Michael comes within Section 602 of the Juvenile Court Law, in that on or about May 7, 1969, he did sell a restricted dangerous drug, LSD, without a written prescription, thereby violating Section 11912 of the Health and Safety Code. Counsel, does your client admit or deny that? [ COUNSEL]: My client admits that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Michael, is that true? THE MINOR: Yes."; also Michael made certain admissions immediately thereafter in open court in the presence of, and without objection by, his attorney, as to the details of his offense.

On his appeal Michael contends that the foregoing proceedings were tantamount to a plea of guilty; that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights of confrontation and against self-incrimination; and that the rule of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, requiring a recorded showing of waiver of such rights on a plea of guilty to a criminal charge, is applicable to his case.

There can be little doubt that Michael's admissions to the court were, in their practical effect, equivalent to a plea of guilty to a charge of felonious possession of a restricted dangerous drug. As a result he could be, and was, committed to a state institution, the California Youth Authority, where he may be confined until age 21 (see Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1769), and, under some conditions, even longer (see Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1800).

It is now well established law that juvenile court proceedings, where a minor may be adjudged a delinquent and subjected to detention as here imposed, "'must measure up to the essentials of due process."' (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.) Among these "essential" constitutional rights are those of confrontation and against self-incrimination. (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 U.S. 1068, 1075, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 377-378; In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. pp. 42-57, 87 S.Ct. 1428.)

It is noted that California's Welfare and Institutions Code, section 702.5, enacted 1967, provides that in a hearing taken to determine whether a minor comes within the provisions of section 602 of that code, "the minor has a privilege against self-incrimination and has a right to confrontation by, and cross-examination of, witnesses."

Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U. S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, holds that before a plea of guilty may be accepted in a criminal case the defendant, among other things, must affirmatively waive: (1) his "privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth...