E. M. Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees

• Citation: 17 A.2d 525,127 Conn. 415
• Parties: E. M. LOEW'S ENTERPRISES, Inc., v. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES et al.
• Decision Date: 10 January 1941
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

17 A.2d 525

127 Conn. 415

E. M. LOEW'S ENTERPRISES, Inc., v. INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

January 10, 1941

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; John H. King, Judge.

Action by E. M. Loew's Enterprises, Inc., against the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and others for an injunction against picketing and for damages brought to the Superior Court and tried to the court. From a judgment for the defendants, plaintiff appeals.

No error.

See also, 6 A.2d 321.

Joseph X. Friedman, of Hartford, for appellant.

Joseph P. Cooney, John P. Cotter, and John J. Scanlan, all of Hartford, for appellees.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS JJ.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

In the original complaint in this action begun in August, 1937, the plaintiff sought relief against the defendants on the ground that they were illegally picketing a moving picture theatre operated by it in Hartford. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the conduct of the defendants had caused serious loss and damage of an irreparable nature to the plaintiff and that it was without adequate remedy at law, and claimed an injunction, $5,000 damages, and such other legal or equitable relief as was proper. By an amendment to the complaint, filed December 21, 1937, further allegations were added to the effect that the picketing was in furtherance of a strike and that since the bringing of the action the strike had terminated. The case was tried and the trial court reached the conclusions that the right to maintain the picketing existed only as an incident to and during the continuance of a bona fide strike, that the strike had terminated, at the latest, about four months before the trial, that in the absence of evidence of actual damages the plaintiff was entitled only to nominal damages, but that it was entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from continuing the picketing. The case came to this court by appeal from the judgment entered in accordance with these conclusions. E. M. Loew's Enterprises, Inc. v. International Alliance of T. S. E., 125 Conn. 391, 6 A.2d 321, 122 A.L.R. 1287. We held that the controlling issue was that presented by the conclusion of the trial court that the strike had terminated, and as this was, on the facts then before the court, erroneous, we found error and ordered a new trial.

On April 16, 1940, after the remand of the case, the plaintiff filed an amendment to the complaint alleging that since the bringing of the action and prior to March 21, 1940, the strike had terminated. Thereafter the parties filed a stipulation that Chapter 309a of the 1939 Supplement to the General Statutes, §§ 1420e-1428e, an act passed in the legislative session of that year and entitled ‘ Injunctions in Labor Disputes,’ was an issue in the case, although not formally raised by the pleadings, and also, in effect, that the facts found upon the previous trial should be regarded as though found upon this trial. The trial court, after hearing the further evidence offered at the new trial, concluded that Chapter 309a prevented the issuance of any injunction to restrain the continuance of the picketing, and in effect that there had been no termination of the strike such as would make the picketing unlawful. Judgment was entered for the defendants. While at the trial the plaintiff made a number of other claims of law, upon this appeal it contends only that the trial court erred in these two conclusions.

As regards the application of Chapter 309a, which was enacted after this action was begun, the contention of the plaintiff is, not that its application in this case would impair vested rights, but that it affects substantive rights and therefore is not to be construed as applying to a pending action. It is an accepted rule in the construction of statutes that, at least in so far as they affect substantive rights, the legislature is presumed to have intended that they should not apply in pending actions, unless the contrary clearly appears. Town of Old Saybrook v. Public Utilities Commission, 100 Conn. 322, 325, 124 A. 33. On the other hand, as regards statutes which are general in their terms and affect matters of procedure, the presumption is that they are intended to apply in all actions, whether pending or not. Hine v. Belden, 27 Conn. 384, 391; O'Brien v. Flint, 74 Conn. 502, 509, 51 A. 547; Zalewski v. Waterbury Mfg. Co., 89 Conn. 46, 48, 92 A. 682. It may be questionable whether the latter presumption applies to all statutory changes which affect only remedies. The basis of the presumed intention that statutes affecting substantive rights shall not apply to pending actions is no doubt the injustice of changing the grounds upon which an action may be maintained after it has been brought. Lazarus v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 145 N.Y. 581, 585,40 N.E. 240. Where the nature of the relief sought is the principal object of the action and so is of its substance, the same considerations might apply as in the case of statutory changes involving substantive rights. ‘ The word ‘ remedy’ itself conceals at times an ambiguity, since changes of the form are often closely bound up with changes of the substance. * * * The problem does not permit us to ignore gradations of importance and other differences of degree. In the end, it is in considerations of good sense and justice that the solution must be found.' Cardozo, J., in Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 271, 130 N.E. 288, 290.

However that may be, injunctions fall within the field of equitable remedies and not equitable rights; they are necessarily prospective in their operation. An action for an injunction being equitable, whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to relief is determined, not by the situation existing when it is begun, but by that which is developed at the trial. Woodbridge v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 69 Conn. 304, 334, 37 A. 688; Mackey v. Dobrucki, 116 Conn. 666, 671, 166 A. 393. In an action seeking an injunction, we said: ‘ In equitable proceedings, any events occurring after their institution may be...