M.M., In Interest of
Citation | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 4,571 So.2d 112 |
Decision Date | 19 December 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 89-2429,89-2429 |
Parties | 16 Fla. L. Weekly 4 In the Interest of M.M., a Child. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, B. Sue Foreman and Jill Hanekamp, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Lynn G. Waxman, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant was charged with and convicted of attempted residential burglary. At the end of the state's case and again at the close of the evidence, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the motion. A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The standard for this court's review is whether there is substantial competent evidence to support the verdict. Williams v. State, 386 So.2d 538 (Fla.1980). A conviction for the crime of burglary requires proof of three essential elements: (1) knowing entry into a structure; (2) knowledge that such entry is without permission; and (3) criminal intent to commit an offense within such structure. § 810.02, Fla.Stat. (1989). Additionally, ownership of the building or structure is a material element of the crime and must be proven as alleged in order to support a conviction for burglary. Smith v. State, 96 Fla. 30, 117 So. 377 (1928); Sifford v. State, 202 So.2d 14 (Fla.1967); In the Interest of M.E., 370 So.2d 795 (Fla.1979); Kirkland v. State, 366 So.2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) ( ).
The two reasons for requiring proof of ownership or custody are first, to show that the building was not the property of the accused, and second, to identify the offense sufficiently to protect the accused from a second prosecution for the same offense. In the Interest of M.E., 370 at 796-797.
Ownership for the purposes of charging burglary is not the same as ownership in property law since burglary is a disturbance to habitable security and not to the fee. [Actual ownership is not required, rather] ownership means any possession which is rightful as against the burglar and is satisfied by proof of special or temporary ownership, possession, or control.
Thus, the state can meet its burden of proving ownership by simply establishing a possessory right of the alleged victim superior to that of the accused. O'Bryan v. State, 359 So.2d 545 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). Appellant argues that the state failed to prove the essential element of ownership in this case.
The state alleged that the owner of the townhouse was Chris Harris, but it did not call Harris as a witness or anyone else claiming rightful possession. The state presented only the testimony of codefendant Anthony Butts who stated that they did not know to whom the house belonged and that they did not have permission to enter.
That testimony, appellant argues, is insufficient to prove ownership...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Longstreth v. State
...the unlawful entry element of burglary and have reversed convictions based on lack of proof of that element. In Interest of M.M., 571 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla.App.1990) (reversing conviction of attempted residential burglary for failure to prove ownership); See also Jones v. State, 415 So.2d 852......
-
DSS v. State
...room was the property of the Dade County Parks and Recreation Department. 359 So.2d 583. As explained in In Interest of M.M., 571 So.2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990): A conviction for the crime of burglary requires proof of three essential elements: (1) knowing entry into a structure; (2) knowled......
-
DSS v. State
...or possessor of the property in order to prove a burglary. See L.D.S. v. State, 784 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); In the Interest of M.M., 571 So.2d 112 [(Fla. 4th DCA 1990)]. Moreover, in this case, we are not required to decide whether we agree with the analysis of the Third District in ......
-
V.G. v. State
...evidence to withstand the motion for judgment of dismissal as to the grand theft auto and burglary charges. See In re M.M., 571 So.2d 112, 113 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (rejecting argument that the appellant's lack of knowledge as to ownership of the burglarized property was sufficient to establi......