M.S. v. County of Orange
Decision Date | 07 July 2009 |
Docket Number | 2007-09165. |
Citation | 884 N.Y.S.2d 74,64 A.D.3d 560,2009 NY Slip Op 05761 |
Parties | M.S. et al., Respondents, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. |
Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, the cross claim asserted by the defendant County of Orange against the defendant A.H. is reinstated, and the matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for a new trial on the issue of liability, and thereafter a new trial on the issue of damages, if warranted, with costs to abide the event.
The infant plaintiff M.S. (hereinafter the infant plaintiff), by and through his father J.M. commenced this action alleging that, while placed in the foster home of the defendants Barbara H. and Ralph J.H. (hereinafter the foster parents), he was sexually abused on five occasions between March 14 2001, and June 7, 2001, by his roommate, the then-infant defendant A.H. The infant plaintiff was only six years old at the time of the subject incidents. J.M. asserted a derivative cause of action in his individual capacity as well. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendants County of Orange and the foster parents were liable under a theory of negligent supervision.
The County contends that the Supreme Court improperly denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged negligent supervision insofar as asserted against it. The County, however, failed to satisfy its burden of establishing its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by eliminating all issues of fact as to whether it had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the infant plaintiff's injuries (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994]; cf. Liang v Rosedale Group Home, 19 AD3d 654, 655 [2005]; Whitfield v Board of Educ. of City of Mount Vernon, 14 AD3d 552, 553 [2005]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged negligent supervision insofar as asserted against it.
Likewise, the County failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on an immunity defense relating to its supervision of the foster care placement (see Sean M. v City of New York, 20 AD3d 146, 160 [2005]; Merice v County of Westchester, 305 AD2d 383, 384 [2003]; Barnes v County of Nassau, 108 AD2d 50, 54 [1985]).
Nonetheless, at trial, the Supreme Court erred in allowing into evidence testimony given by the infant plaintiff with respect to the County at the hearing held pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, as well as the infant plaintiff's deposition testimony with respect to all of the defendants, in lieu of live testimony that would have been subject to cross-examination. Although CPLR 3117 (a) (3) permits a party to introduce his or her own deposition transcript into evidence at trial if the party is "unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment" (see generally Cutler v Konover, 81 AD2d 571, 572 [1981], affd 55 NY2d 891 [1982]; Wojtas v Fifth Ave. Coach Corp., 23 AD2d 685 [1965]), and General Municipal Law § 50-h (4) also permits the use, under similar circumstances, of transcripts of hearings held pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h, as against municipal defendants only (see Weinberg v City of New York, 3 AD3d 489, 490 [2004]; Claypool v...
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