E.M. v. Gateway Region Young Men's Christian Ass'n
| Citation | 613 S.W.3d 388 |
| Decision Date | 21 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 108227,ED 108227 |
| Parties | E.M. BY AND THROUGH her mother and next friend, Melanee MCINNIS, Appellant, v. GATEWAY REGION YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, St. Louis Public Schools, Michael Holloman, and John Doe and/or Jane Doe, Defendants, and Tameka Wiggins, Respondent/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
Matthew J. Padberg, Theresa A. Appelbaum, Co-Counsel, Nicole Burlison Knepper, Co-Counsel, 1926 Chouteau Ave, St. Louis, MO. 63103, for appellant.
Brittany L. Newell, Joshua E. Douglass, Co-Counsel, 12444 Powerscourt Drive, Suite 400, St. Louis, MO. 63131, for respondent.
The plaintiff, E.M., by and through her mother and next friend, Melanee McInnis, appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis dismissing her petition for negligence against her teacher, the defendant Tameka Wiggins, for failure to state a claim. E.M.’s petition alleged that she disclosed to Wiggins that another teacher was pursuing a relationship with her, that Wiggins failed to report E.M.’s disclosure to State authorities or school authorities, and that E.M. was then sexually assaulted by the other teacher. Wiggins cross-appeals, claiming the trial court erred in declining to dismiss E.M.’s cause of action against her on the additional bases of sovereign immunity and official immunity.
We conclude that section 210.115 RSMo. (2016),1 which requires reporting of suspected child abuse to State authorities, creates only a duty to the general public under the public-duty doctrine. Likewise, we conclude that the St. Louis School District's Board of Education regulation P4843, which requires reporting of any complaint of an employee's sexual harassment of students to specified school and district authorities, creates only a duty to the general public under the public-duty doctrine. Neither section 210.115 nor School Board regulation P4843 creates a duty to any particular student through a special, direct, and distinctive interest of the student.
Because E.M. does not have a special, direct, and distinctive interest in the reporting requirements set forth in either section 210.115 or School Board regulation P4843, she cannot plead a negligence claim against her teacher, the defendant Wiggins. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed E.M.’s petition against Wiggins for failure to state a cause of action. Further, because Wiggins prevailed in obtaining dismissal of E.M.’s petition based on the public-duty doctrine, Wiggins is not aggrieved by the trial court's judgment, which rejected dismissal on the bases of sovereign immunity and official immunity. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In the fall of 2016, E.M. was a 15-year-old high-school student in the St. Louis Public School District ("the school district"). Defendant Michael Holloman was a physical education instructor employed by Gateway Region Young Men's Christian Association ("the YMCA") and hired by the school district to teach physical education. Holloman was E.M.’s physical education teacher. Defendant Tameka Wiggins was another of E.M.’s teachers at her high school. E.M. alleges, among other things, that Holloman pursued an inappropriate sexual relationship with her, engaged in inappropriate physical contact with her, and took video recordings of E.M. and other female students during exercise class. E.M. asserts that she disclosed to Wiggins that Holloman was trying to start a relationship with her, E.M. Despite E.M.’s disclosure, Wiggins did not report E.M.’s complaint about Holloman either to State authorities or school authorities. E.M. maintains that Holloman later sexually assaulted her.
E.M. filed negligence claims against the YMCA, the school district,2 Holloman, Wiggins, and an unnamed school district employee responsible for screening and hiring employees, as well as a claim for assault and battery against Holloman. E.M.’s first amended petition alleges that "YMCA and [the school district] and their employees had a duty to intervene in the contact between Defendant Holloman and E.M., and to protect E.M. from any inappropriate relationship, contact, touching or advances from Defendant Holloman." E.M.’s petition further states:
Wiggins filed a motion to dismiss based, in the alternative, on sovereign immunity, official immunity, and the public-duty doctrine. The trial court rejected Wiggins's motion on the bases of sovereign and official immunity. The court ruled that Wiggins is not entitled to sovereign immunity protection because E.M. sued Wiggins in her individual capacity. The trial court further ruled that Wiggins is not entitled to official immunity because her duty under St. Louis Board of Education regulation P4843 ("School Board regulation P4843") to report E.M.’s complaint of sexual harassment was mandated, involved no exercise of discretion, and thus was a ministerial duty.
The trial court, however, granted Wiggins's motion to dismiss based on the public-duty doctrine under section 210.115, the child-abuse reporting statute. The court ruled that the duty to report suspected child abuse under section 210.115 is owed to the general public, and so E.M.’s negligence claim against Wiggins is barred by the public-duty doctrine. The trial court did not address whether the reporting mandate under School Board regulation P4843 created a general duty to the public or a duty to E.M. in particular.
The trial court certified its judgment for immediate appeal under Rule 74.01(b), finding that Wiggins's dismissal from the suit disposed of a distinct judicial unit and there was no just reason for delay. E.M. appeals the dismissal of her claim against Wiggins, and Wiggins cross-appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity and official immunity.
E.M.’s claims against Wiggins stem from her alleged failure to report her knowledge of Holloman's sexual misconduct toward E.M. either to the State's child-abuse authorities or school authorities. E.M. claims the trial court erred in dismissing her cause of action against Wiggins under the public-duty doctrine because she, E.M., had a special, direct, and distinctive interest in the ministerial duty to report that Wiggins breached. Wiggins counters that neither section 210.115 nor School Board regulation P4843 entitle E.M. to pursue a private cause of action against her. Wiggins also cross-appeals, claiming the trial court erred in declining to dismiss E.M.’s negligence count against her based on sovereign immunity and official immunity.
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we have a duty to determine whether this Court has jurisdiction. Wilson v. City of St. Louis , No. SC 97544, 600 S.W.3d 763, 765-766 (Mo. banc Jan. 14, 2020). A judgment is appealable as a "final judgment" under section 512.020(5) if it resolves every claim, or at least the last unresolved claim, in a lawsuit. Id. at 767-68. Rule 74.01(b) provides an exception to the general rule that a final, appealable judgment leaves no unresolved claims in a lawsuit. Id. at 768-770. The trial court may certify for immediate appeal a judgment resolving one or more, but fewer than all, of the claims or parties when the court expressly finds no just reason for delaying the appeal until all claims are resolved. Id.
A "final judgment" for purposes of appeal under section 512.020(5) must satisfy the following criteria. Id. at 770-71. First, it must actually be a judgment, meaning that it must fully resolve at least one claim in a lawsuit, and must establish all the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to that claim. Id. Second, the judgment must be "final," either because it disposes of all claims—or the last claim—in a lawsuit, or because it has been certified for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 74.01(b). Id.
A judgment is eligible to be certified under Rule 74.01(b) only if it disposes of a "judicial unit" of claims, meaning it: (a) disposes of all claims by or against at least one party, or (b) it disposes of one or more claims that are sufficiently distinct from the claims that remain pending in the circuit court. Determining whether these criteria are met is a question of law and depends on "the content, substance, and effect of the order," not the circuit court's designation.
Id. (citing Gibson v. Brewer , 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997) ).
If, as a matter of law, a judgment is eligible for Rule 74.01(b) certification, the trial court may, but is not required to, certify the judgment for immediate appeal under Rule 74.01(b). Id . The 74.01(b) certification is a matter of discretion. Id. It is based on whether the trial court is persuaded and expressly finds no just reason for delaying appeal of this judgment until entry of a final judgment disposing of the last claim. Id.
A judgment could be eligible for certification under Rule 74.01(b) because it...
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