M.W. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.
| Decision Date | 09 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 90570–3,90570–3 |
| Citation | 374 P.3d 1123,185 Wash.2d 633 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Detention of M.W. and W.D., Respondents, v. Department of Social and Health Services, State of Washington, and Western State Hospital, Petitioners. |
Amber L. Leaders, Attorney General of Washington, 7141 Cleanwater Dr. SW, Olympia, WA, 98504–0124, Rebecca R. Glasgow, Attorney General's Office, Solicitor General Division Attorney General, Attorney at Law, 1125 Washington Street, P.O. Box 40100, Olympia, WA, 98504–0100, Counsel for Petitioners.
Kathleen A. Shea, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Avenue, Suite 701, Seattle, WA, 98101–3647, Counsel for Respondents.
Nancy Lynn Talner, Attorney at Law, Mark Muzzey Cooke, ACLU of Washington, 901 5th Avenue Suite 630, Seattle, WA, 98164–2008, David B. Zuckerman, Attorney at Law, 705 2nd Ave. Ste. 1300, Seattle, WA, 98104–1797, Amicus Curiae on behalf of ACLU.
Emily Rebecca Cooper, Disability Rights Washington, 315 5th Ave. S Ste. 850, Seattle, WA, 98104–2691, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Disability Rights Washington.
Ann E. Benson, Cindy Arends Elsberry, Washington Defender Association, 110 Prefontaine Pl, S Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98104–2626, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington Defender Association.
FAIRHURST
, J.
We accepted discretionary review of this case after the superior court commissioner declared a 2013 amendment to the involuntary treatment act (ITA) unconstitutional. The statutory provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
(2013),1 modifies the procedure for recommitting a narrow subset of mentally ill individuals—those found incompetent to stand trial for violent felony charges—to additional 180-day periods of involuntary treatment.
¶ 2 The trial court commissioner held that former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
is unconstitutional on multiple grounds, including substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. We reverse the trial court and uphold the constitutionality of former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii).
¶ 3 Chapter 71.05 RCW governs the involuntary treatment and civil commitment of mentally ill individuals.
When a court declares that an individual is incompetent to stand trial for felony charges, the charges against that person are dismissed without prejudice and the person must undergo a mental health evaluation for civil commitment and treatment. Former RCW 10.77.086(4)
(2013). The civil commitment scheme for these individuals generally involves short-term periods of confinement, with the option for the State to petition for additional terms by the expiration of each period of confinement.
¶ 4 In 2013, H.B. 1114 amended portions of the ITA that govern this process, including adding former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
, which alters the recommitment process for that subset of individuals who are incompetent to stand trial for violent felony charges. Engrossed Second Substitute H.B. 1114, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003).
¶ 5 The State may initially petition for up to 180 days of treatment for individuals found incompetent to stand trial for felony charges. RCW 71.05.280(3)
, .290(3). The State must prove that “as a result of a mental disorder, [the person] presents a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts.” RCW 71.05.280(3). If the person is charged with a felony classified as violent, the 2013 amendments require the court to “determine whether the acts the person committed constitute a violent offense under RCW 9.94A.030.” RCW 71.05.280(3)(b).
¶ 6 After this initial 180-day commitment term, the State may file a new petition for an additional 90 or 180 days of involuntary treatment based on the grounds set forth in RCW 71.05.280
. Prior to 2013, this provision set forth four grounds for recommitment.2
All involved a full evidentiary hearing to determine if recommitment is warranted. See RCW 71.05.310
. The 2013 amendment at issue in this case alters that procedure for a small group of individuals.
¶ 7 Former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)3
provides a special procedure for petitioning for the continued commitment of individuals incompetent to stand trial when the court has determined they committed an act constituting a violent felony. Unlike other proceedings under the ITA that proceed directly to a full evidentiary hearing upon the State's petition for recommitment, the new process begins with a preliminary hearing before a full evidentiary hearing is warranted.
¶ 8 In the new preliminary hearing, a superior court commissioner determines if the State's petition meets its initial burden. The State has the burden of presenting prima facie evidence that “the person continues to suffer from a mental disorder or developmental disability that results in a substantial likelihood of committing acts similar to the charged criminal behavior.” Former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
. The State must show this evidence through two affidavits as required by former RCW 71.05.290(2)(e) (2009), which lists the health care providers qualified to support the additional confinement and states that they must “describe in detail” the facts justifying recommitment and analyze less restrictive alternatives.
¶ 9 If the State fails to meet this burden, then the petition will be dismissed and the person is released unless the State can proceed on alternative grounds for recommitment. If the State satisfies its burden, then the individual may rebut the State's showing by presenting “proof through an admissible expert opinion that the person's condition has so changed such that the mental disorder or developmental disability no longer presents a substantial likelihood of the person committing acts similar to the charged criminal behavior.” Former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
. If the individual fails to rebut the State's evidence, then the court will order an additional period of 180 days of commitment. If the individual does present such evidence, then they proceed to a full evidentiary hearing with the same procedural mechanisms and safeguards as other evidentiary hearings under the ITA. It remains the State's burden to prove recommitment for an additional 180-day period is warranted through clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; otherwise, the person is released. See RCW 71.05.310
(); former RCW 71.05.320(3) ().
¶ 10 The respondents' cases are unrelated, but they were consolidated because they both challenged the constitutionality of recommitment under former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
.4 M.W. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he attacked another patient at Navos psychiatric hospital, stomping on his head three times. W.D. was charged with felony assault in the second degree when he punched a stranger in the face with no warning or provocation.
¶ 11 Both men's charges were dismissed without prejudice after a judge determined that they were incompetent to stand trial and their competency could not be restored. In each case, the court ordered mental health evaluations under former RCW 10.77.086(4)
to determine if they should be involuntarily committed. The State petitioned for civil commitment on three statutory grounds: RCW 71.05.280(2) (), (3) (judge found them incompetent to stand trial for violent felony charges and that as a result of a mental disorder, they continued to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts), and (4) (gravely disabled).
¶ 12 M.W. and W.D. each stipulated to commitment for a 180-day period and waived their right to a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court committed M.W. and W.D. to Western State Hospital for 180 days of involuntary treatment on multiple grounds, including RCW 71.05.280(3)
. The court also made a special finding in each case pursuant to RCW 71.05.280(3) that the person had committed acts constituting assault in the second degree, which is a violent felony under RCW 9.94A.030.
¶ 13 Leading up to the expiration of the initial period of involuntary commitment, the State petitioned for an additional 180-day period of involuntary treatment, implicating the new procedure at issue in this case. The State alleged two grounds for recommitment: RCW 71.05.280(4)
(gravely disabled) and (3) (incompetent person charged with a violent felony who continues to present a substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts). The latter ground triggers the provision at issue, former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii), which provides a special procedure for recommitting individuals subject to a judge's special finding under RCW 71.05.280(3)(b) that they committed a violent felony.
¶ 14 M.W. and W.D. each filed a motion in response to the State's petition for continued confinement that challenged the constitutionality of former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
. The trial court then consolidated their cases.
¶ 15 The superior court commissioner declared former RCW 71.05.320(3)(c)(ii)
unconstitutional on multiple grounds: substantive and procedural due process, vagueness, equal protection, and the right to a jury trial. The court ordered the recommitment process to proceed without the unconstitutional provision. M.W. and W.D. then received full evidentiary hearings assessing their eligibility for further involuntary treatment and were each recommitted to an additional 180-day period on other grounds.
The parties agreed and the trial court stipulated to discretionary review in the Court of Appeals, which then transferred the case to us. Commissioner Pierce accepted review....
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