Maas v. Cornell University

• Decision Date: 07 January 1999
• Citation: 683 N.Y.S.2d 634,253 A.D.2d 1
• Parties: 132 Ed. Law Rep. 523, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 99 James MAAS, Appellant, v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 634

683 N.Y.S.2d 634

132 Ed. Law Rep. 523, 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 99

James MAAS, Appellant, v. CORNELL UNIVERSITY, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Jan. 7, 1999.

Michael E. Rosman, Center for Individual Rights, Washington D.C., David A. Stoll, New York City and Lo Pinto, Schlather, Solomon & Salk, Ithaca, for appellant.

Nelson E. Roth, Cornell University, Ithaca, for respondent.

Before: MERCURE, J.P., PETERS, SPAIN, CARPINELLO and GRAFFEO, JJ.

CARPINELLO, J.

Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Rumsey, J.), entered April 29, 1998 in Tompkins County, which, inter alia, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and (2) from the judgment entered thereon.

The relevant facts are fully set forth in our decision on a prior appeal in this matter (245 A.D.2d 728, 666 N.Y.S.2d 743). There, we affirmed the dismissal of six causes of action in a complaint filed by plaintiff, a tenured professor, against defendant, his employer. The current appeal stems from Supreme Court's order granting defendant summary judgment on the remaining two causes of action, each sounding in negligence, on the ground that they are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law.

The thrust of plaintiff's remaining claims is that defendant was negligent in failing to follow its own policies and procedures in resolving sexual harassment complaints against him as a result of which he suffered injuries including defense costs, loss of income, injury to reputation and mental stress. The Workers' Compensation Law, designed to provide a swift and sure source of benefits to injured employees in exchange for "the loss of the common-law tort claim in which greater benefits might be obtained" (O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 222, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 359 N.E.2d 1347), is the exclusive remedy for unintentional employment-related injuries (see, Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 29[6]; see also, Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.2d 412, 416, 482 N.Y.S.2d 720, 472 N.E.2d 682; Thompson v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., 86 A.D.2d 867, 868, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308).

"Consequently, when a defense based on the exclusivity of the statutory remedy is interposed, no suit against an employer may be maintained for an accidental injury that may be fairly described as 'arising out of and in the course of the employment' " (Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., supra, at 416, 482 N.Y.S.2d 720, 472 N.E.2d 682, quoting Workers' Compensation Law § 10; Fetterhoff v. Western Block Co., Div. of Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 49 A.D.2d 1001, 1002, 373 N.Y.S.2d 920). Thus, for example, an employee may not sue his or her employer for injuries caused by negligent supervision (see, Rosario v. Copacabana Night Club, 1998 WL 273110 [May 28, 1998, SDNY]; Ross v. Mitsui Fudosan, 2 F.Supp.2d 522, 532; Silberstein v. Advance Mag. Publs., 988 F.Supp. 391; Nagle v. Franzese, 1991 WL 4736 [Jan. 18, 1991, SDNY] ), negligent hiring (see, Rosario v. Copacabana Night Club, supra; Chrzanowski v. Lichtman, 884 F.Supp. 751; Nagle v. Franzese, supra) or negligence in failing to institute and follow policies to prevent discriminatory conduct (see, Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 657 F.Supp. 197, 205). So too, here, plaintiff cannot sue defendant for injuries caused by the latter's alleged negligence, i.e., unintentional conduct, in carrying out the disciplinary action against him in the course of his employment.

Plaintiff attempts to avoid the application of the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law on the ground that his injuries do not amount to a "disability" and, therefore, do not fall within the purview of the statute. We are unpersuaded. Regardless of the nature and extent of his injuries, plaintiff cannot avoid the plain fact that the same are alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence; accordingly, the exclusivity provisions apply (see, Workers' Compensation Law §§ 11, 29[6] ). Moreover, in reviewing plaintiff's complaint, bill of particulars and examination before trial testimony, it is clear that he is seeking recovery for mental/emotional injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment.

A mental injury can be an accidental injury compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law (see, e.g., Matter of Wood v. Laidlaw Transit, 77 N.Y.2d 79, 564 N.Y.S.2d 704, 565 N.E.2d 1255; Matter of Greene v. Freihofer Baking Co., 180 A.D.2d 980, 580 N.Y.S.2d 808; Matter of Rackley v. County of Rensselaer, 141 A.D.2d 232, 233, 535 N.Y.S.2d 137, lv. dismissed 74 N.Y.2d 791, 545 N.Y.S.2d 106, 543 N.E.2d 749). To this end, this court has held that "a mental injury need not be caused by a discrete, identifiable psychic trauma * * * in order to be compensable. There is no question that emotional stress extending over a period of months, in the absence of a 'specific precipitant', will support a finding of accidental physical injury" (Matter of Rackley v. County of Rensselaer, supra, at 233, 535 N.Y.S.2d 137 [citations omitted] ). Furthermore, in a legion of cases dating back to 1920, it has been firmly established that the workers' compensation bar applies even if an employee suffers losses which are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law (see, Farnum v. Garner Print Works & Bleachery, 229 N.Y. 554, 129 N.E. 912; Thompson v. Maimonides Med. Ctr., supra, at 868, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308; Fetterhoff v. Western Block Co., Div. of Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., supra, at 1002, 373 N.Y.S.2d 920; Repka v. Fedders Mfg. Co., 239 App.Div. 271, 267 N.Y.S. 709, affd. 264 N.Y. 538, 191 N.E. 553; see also, Nagle v. Franzese, supra).

Plaintiff further argues that his claims are exempt from workers' compensation coverage pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 2(7),...